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ABSTRACT 
This dissertation consists of three essays on sustainable operations management. 
The unifying theme in this work is the focus on sustainability-related risks originating 
from an organization’s internal operations or its supply chain, operational-level initiatives 
for managing such risks, and the determinants and subsequent outcomes of those 
initiatives.  
The first essay focuses on safety and environmental risks and looks into the role 
of a safety-oriented culture in effectively managing them. Building on the safety culture 
literature and organizational support theory, a conceptual model is developed suggesting 
that a safety-oriented culture enhances an organization’s financial performance and sets 
the stage for successful implementation of environmental and safety practices, which in 
turn, result in improved environmental and safety performance. The hypothesized 
relationships are empirically examined and validated using the data collected through a 
survey of 251 Canadian plants.  
The second essay is a conceptual paper focusing on supplier sustainability risks 
which materialize when buying organizations face their stakeholders’ negative reactions 
to their suppliers’ misconducts related to natural environment or society. The purpose of 
this paper is to explain the underlying factors of buying organizations’ operational-level 
responses to such risks. Drawing on agency/management control and resource 
dependence theories, a contingent conceptual framework is developed that explains how 
three major factors ─ i.e., supply managers’ perceived risk, dependence structure of 
buyer-supplier relationship, and the slack resources available to supply managers ─ 
interact to affect supply managers’ choice among four risk management strategies: 
monitoring-based or collaboration-based sustainable supplier development (risk 
mitigation), supplier phase-out (risk avoidance), and taking no actions (risk acceptance). 
This framework also suggests that these contingent risk management strategies improve 
buying organizations’ financial performance directly or indirectly through enhancing 
their organizational reputation. 
Finally, the third essay presents a vignette-based experiment conducted with a 
ii 
sample of 200 U.S.-based supply managers to empirically test and validate a set of 
propositions put forth in the second essay. Specifically, this study investigates and 
confirms the effect of three factors, i.e., supply manager’s perceived risk, supplier 
dependence on the buying organization, and slack resources available to supply 
managers, and their interactions on supply managers’ choice among the four risk 
management strategies.  
Keywords: Sustainable operations management; Sustainability-related risks; 
Safety management; Environmental management; Safety culture; Organizational support 
theory; Buyer dependence; Supplier dependence; Agency theory; Management control 
theory; Resource dependence theory; Perceived risk; Slack resources; Financial 
performance; Environmental performance; Safety performance; Survey; Vignette-based 
experiment. 
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Chapter I .   Introduction 
During the past three decades, sustainable development ─ “a development that 
meets the needs of the present without compromising the ability of future generations to 
meet their own needs” (Brundtland, 1987) ─ has become an important strategic objective 
for organizations and a prominent topic in the management literature. Based on this 
concept, companies should operate in a way that secures their long-term economic 
performance by avoiding short-term behaviors which are socially detrimental or 
environmentally wasteful (Porter and Kramer, 2006). The organizations caught up in 
social or environmental scandals increasingly face stakeholders’ adverse reactions and 
reputational damage followed by substantial market share/revenue losses and 
recalls/litigation costs (Fombrun et al., 2000). Hence, their growing interest in 
sustainability can be attributed to the increasing internal and external pressures to 
conform to stakeholders’ expectations to avoid the risk of losing sales or damaging their 
reputation and jeopardizing their survival (Sarkis et al., 2010, Ehrenfeld, 2005, Seuring 
and Müller, 2008). In addition, organizations have realized that they can enjoy cost 
savings and gain long-term competitive advantage by being concerned about the future of 
people and planet and through the creation of unique sustainability-oriented processes 
(Hart, 1995).  
Among organizations’ business processes, operations process is usually the area 
which employs the most personnel and has the highest footprint and impact on the 
natural environment. Therefore, proper management of social and environmental aspects 
of organizations’ operations can be a critical success factor in their journey toward 
sustainable development (Kleindorfer et al., 2005). Sustainable operations management 
(OM) extends the efficiency-oriented boundaries of traditional OM to broader 
considerations of sustainable development. It is defined as the set of capabilities that 
allows an organization to design and manage its operational processes and products to 
perform well on all three dimensions of sustainable development, i.e., economic, 
environmental, and social performance (Gimenez et al., 2012). It encompasses the 
management of human resources and workplace health and safety as well as the 
management of organizations' impacts on local communities and natural environment 
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(Kleindorfer et al., 2005).  
With the growing number of organizations taking the outsourcing and 
globalization path, one of the challenging aspects of sustainable operations is that the 
boundary of organizations’ responsibilities often extends beyond their direct control and 
includes their extended supply chain, i.e., the focal buying organizations and their 
upstream and downstream suppliers (Corbett and Kleindorfer, 2001, Linton et al., 2007). 
In other words, organizations are “no more sustainable than [their] supply chain[s]” 
(Krause et al., 2009) and should not only address sustainability within their internal 
operations but also diffuse it across their supply chains.  
Figure ‎I-1. Dissertation conceptual framework 
 
Risk Source 
Management Initiatives 
and Strategies 
Management of 
Sustainability-Related Risks 
Predictors/Enablers 
Outcomes 
Organization’s Internal Operations 
(Environmental and Safety Risk) 
Environmental practices 
Safety practices 
Safety culture 
Environmental performance 
Safety performance 
Financial performance 
 
Organization’s Supply Base 
(Supplier Sustainability Risk) 
Sustainable supplier development 
Supplier phase-out 
No action 
Buyer-supplier dependence 
Perceived risk 
Slack resources 
 
Organization’s reputation 
Financial performance 
1
st
 Essay 2
nd
 & 3
rd
 Essays 
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This dissertation consists of three essays on sustainable operations management. 
The unifying theme in this work is the focus on the sustainability-related risks (whether 
they originate from organizations’ internal operations or their suppliers’ activities), the 
initiatives which organizations undertake at the operational level to deal with such risks, 
and the enablers/predictors and subsequent outcomes of such initiatives. Sustainability-
related risks are defined as the conditions or potentially-occurring events with negative 
social or environmental impacts that may provoke harmful stakeholder reactions 
(Hofmann et al., 2014).  
This chapter proceeds with an outline of each essay and is closed by a discussion 
of their overarching contributions to the OM literature. Figure I-1 illustrates the 
conceptual structure of the dissertation and how the essays fit together. 
1. First Essay- “Safety Culture: A Catalyst for Sustainable Development” 
The first essay, presented in Chapter II, is an empirical paper focusing on 
environmental and safety risks originating from organizations’ internal operations and 
the “enabler” role of a positive safety culture in managing such risks and improving the 
organizations’ performance. The purpose of this paper is to address two major research 
questions: “Are the organizations promoting occupational safety for their employees 
more likely to join the green movement?” and, “Does an organization’s safety culture 
have a spillover effect on its environmental endeavors and financial performance?”. 
In doing so, this paper draws on the safety culture literature and organizational 
support theory (Eisenberger et al., 1997) to develop a conceptual model which suggests 
that a positive safety culture, encompassing two critical components of management 
commitment and employees’ participation/empowerment, enhances organizations’ 
financial performance and sets the stage for successful implementation of environmental 
practices, which in turn, result in improved environmental performance. It is also 
hypothesized that safety culture is positively associated with the safety performance both 
directly and indirectly through implementation of safety practices.  
This conceptual model is tested by the empirical primary data collected through a 
mail survey of 1,001 Canadian manufacturing plants. The plant is selected as the level of 
analysis because it is generally where many safety and environmental issues are 
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evaluated and operational decisions are implemented. The data extracted from 251 
complete responses is then analyzed using the Partial Least Squares (PLS) method 
(Ringle et al., 2005). The results reveal that a safety-oriented culture not only improves 
the safety performance through adoption of safety practices but also sets the stage for the 
organization to join the green movement and adopt green technologies and successfully 
implement green practices. It is also found to have a significant direct effect on the 
financial performance, providing empirical support for the concept of reciprocity norm 
and organizational support theory in the workplace safety context.  
2. Second Essay- “Managing Supplier Sustainability Risk: Strategies, Predictors, 
and Outcomes”  
The second essay, presented in Chapter III, is a conceptual paper which focuses 
on sustainability-related risks originating from buying organizations’ supply base, 
namely supplier sustainability risks. Such risks materialize through adverse stakeholder 
reactions (Hofmann et al., 2014) and occur when buyers are held responsible and 
accountable by customers, NGOs, or other salient stakeholders for their suppliers’ 
misconducts related to the natural environment or society (Foerstl et al., 2010). Based on 
anecdotal evidence, some buying organizations may try to mitigate these risks through 
sustainable supplier development (SSD) initiatives, such as monitoring their suppliers or 
collaborating with them, to improve their environmental or social performance. Some 
buying organizations, however, may take extreme measures and avoid the risks all 
together by phasing out the risky suppliers while others may decide to accept the risks by 
taking no actions and addressing them after their occurrence.  
Given this background, this paper aims to take one of the first steps toward 
building a theory of supplier sustainability risk management by addressing a broad 
research question: “Why and how and under what conditions buying organizations 
respond to supplier sustainability risks?”. More specifically, because of the crucial role 
of supply managers as the decision makers in the supply chain context (Ellis et al., 2010, 
Tazelaar and Snijders, 2013), this study focuses on the strategies they undertake at the 
operational level (Pagell and Gobeli, 2009). Since supplier sustainability risk is an inter-
organizational phenomenon, the exchange relationship between a buying organization 
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and a specific supplier is considered as the context and the buyer–supplier transaction as 
the unit of analysis. The focal decision is the supply managers’ decision to select among 
the four mentioned risk management strategies.  
To craft a theory of responses to this type of risk, the proposed conceptual 
framework draws on the resource dependence (Pfeffer and Salancik, 2003) and the 
agency/management control (Eisenhardt, 1989, Ouchi, 1979) theories and suggests that 
the supply managers’ choice among the four risk management strategies is contingent 
upon their perceived supplier sustainability risk and the buyer-supplier dependence 
structure. This framework also suggests that these risk management strategies improve 
buying organizations’ financial performance directly or indirectly through enhancing 
their organizational reputation. Finally, it is proposed that pursuing desirable strategies 
that fit the external environment contingencies (i.e., risk and dependence) to deliver 
positive performance and reputational outcomes significantly depends on the slack 
resources available to supplier managers to implement those strategies.  
3. Third Essay- “Managing Supplier Sustainability Risk: The Interacting Effect of 
Supplier Dependence, Perceived Risk, and Slack Resources”  
The third essay, presented in Chapter IV, focuses on a sub-model of the 
conceptual framework developed in the second essay to be empirically validated. 
Specifically, this study investigates the effect of three factors, i.e., supply manager’s 
perceived risk, supplier dependence on the buying organization, and slack resources 
available to supply managers, and how they interact to form supply managers’ choice 
among the four risk management strategies.  
A vignette-based experiment methodology is used to assess the effects of high 
and low levels of perceived supplier sustainability risk as well as high and low levels of 
supplier dependence within two organizational contexts where the amount of slack 
resources is either high or low. Drawing from real supplier sustainability risk events, two 
basic scenarios are developed about two fictitious mid-sized multinational companies 
with safety-related or environment-related risks within their supply base. Full-time 
supply managers currently working for US-based medium- or large-size organizations in 
manufacturing or retail trade sectors are targeted as our key respondents. The data 
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collected from 200 supply managers is further analyzed through two different set of data 
analyses: MANCOVA and logistic regression.  
The results reveal that SSD initiatives (collaboration-based and monitoring-
based) are more likely to be used by supply managers to mitigate the supplier 
sustainability risk in buyer dominant situations (i.e., high supplier dependence). 
However, supply managers are more likely to avoid the risk and phase out the supplier or 
accept the risk and take no actions if the supplier is not highly dependent on the buying 
organization. In addition, in high supplier dependence situations, the likelihood of using 
collaboration-based risk mitigation strategy (as opposed to the monitoring-based one) 
increases when supply managers perceive a high level of risk threatening their 
organization. The results also confirm that the level of slack resources moderates the 
defined predictor-outcome relationships in risk management decision making: as the 
amount of available slack resources decreases, the participants become more inclined to 
(1) choose monitoring-based rather than collaboration-based risk mitigation strategy to 
deal with high risk suppliers in buyer dominant situations, or (2) take no actions and 
accept the risk rather than avoid it by terminating the relationship even when they 
perceived a high level of risk in independent buyer-supplier relationships. 
4. Contributions 
In addition to the individual contributions of each essay which will be further 
discussed in Chapters II, III, and IV, the overarching contributions of this dissertation to 
the OM literature are four-fold. Firstly, the three essays collectively consider all three 
elements of sustainability, i.e., people, planet, and profit (Elkington, 1998) and 
individually examine at least two elements simultaneously to address a significant gap in 
the OM literature. While theoretical discussions of sustainability tend to cover all three 
elements, the majority of empirical studies have focused on environmental issues and 
overlooked the social component of sustainability (Kleindorfer et al., 2005, Linton et al., 
2007). In addition, only a few empirical studies have simultaneously looked at social, 
environmental, and economic aspects of sustainability (Thornton et al., 2013, Pagell and 
Gobeli, 2009, Pagell and Wu, 2009, Pagell et al., 2010, Pullman et al., 2009, Gimenez et 
al., 2012, De Brito et al., 2008), whereas almost all other studies investigate these aspects 
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in a standalone fashion (Seuring and Müller, 2008).  
Secondly, this dissertation takes a broad approach towards sustainable operations 
in line with Kleindorfer et al. (2005) who adapted the work by Hayes and Wheelwright 
(1984) on operations strategy to the context of sustainable operations and identified 
internal versus external strategies. Specifically, It takes the leap from investigating the 
intra-organizational sustainability-related initiatives in the first essay to the examination 
of the strategies aimed at managing sustainability issues within the supply chain in the 
second and third essays. Further, the three essays will collectively extend the current 
understanding of sustainable operations management by exploring it through two 
relatively new perspectives, i.e., “safety management” and “risk management”.  
Thirdly, this dissertation responds to the ever-growing need for drawing on 
established organizational theories to describe, explain, and predict operations and supply 
chain phenomena (Ketchen and Hult, 2007b, Sarkis et al., 2011) as it draws on three 
organizational theories (organizational support, agency/management control, and 
resource dependence theories) to better explain the underlying factors within the 
sustainable operations arena. 
Finally, top management intentions can be quite different from the decisions 
made at the operational level when it comes to being more sustainable (Wheeler et al., 
2002). Hence, this dissertation responds to Pagell and Gobeli’s (2009) call for more 
research on sustainability at the operational level. In doing so, the first essay examines 
individual plants and not companies as the unit of analysis to be closer to day-to-day 
decisions at the operational level. The second and third essays also target supply 
managers, and not top management, as the decision makers in the supply chain context 
and the operational-level strategies, and not corporate-level ones, for managing the 
supplier sustainability risks. 
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Chapter II .   Safety Culture: A Catalyst  for 
Sustainable Development
1
 
1. Introduction  
During the past three decades, sustainability has become an important strategic 
objective for businesses. Based on this concept, companies should operate in ways that 
secure their long-term economic performance by avoiding short-term behaviors which 
are socially detrimental or environmentally wasteful (Porter and Kramer, 2006). The 
organizations’ growing interest in sustainability can be attributed to the increasing 
internal and external pressures (Sarkis et al., 2010) and to the risk of losing sales and 
even jeopardizing their survival (Ehrenfeld, 2005). In addition, organizations have 
realized that they can enjoy cost savings and gain long-term competitive advantage by 
being concerned about the future of people and planet and through the creation of unique 
sustainability-oriented processes (Hart, 1995).  
This paper focuses on the internal dimension of “sustainable operations 
management” as defined by Kleindorfer and colleagues (2005), and how it affects the 
financial, environmental, and social performance of the organization. This dimension 
consists of (i) the management of human resources, health and safety at work, and 
adaptation to change, and (ii) the management of environmental impacts and natural 
resources. Specifically, the emphasis is on environmental management and workplace 
safety. Although both of them became important social responsibility issues during the 
1970s, the green movement seems to have gained much more scholarly attention and 
despite their similarities, to date, there has been a lack of research to establish a link 
between the two (Cantor, 2008). The number of occupational safety research publications 
in top operations management journals has also remained extremely low (Das et al., 
2008, De Koster et al., 2011). There are limited evidences in the operations management 
literature to show that managerial attention to employees’ safety actually leads to 
improved performance (Das et al., 2008), yet the need for improving workplace safety is 
pressing. Each year, millions of people suffer disabling injuries and thousands are killed 
                                                          
1
 A version of this chapter has already been published (HAJMOHAMMAD, S. & VACHON, S. 2014. 
Safety culture: A catalyst for sustainable development. Journal of Business Ethics, 123, 263-281.) 
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at workplaces throughout the world. In the United States, nearly 4,690 work-related 
fatalities and 3.1 million nonfatal occupational injuries and illnesses have been reported 
in 2010 (Bureau of Labor Statistics, 2010). The Occupational Safety and Health 
Administration (OSHA) estimates that organizations pay almost $1 billion per week to 
injured employees and their medical care providers (Cantor, 2008).  
In order to fill the gap in the current literature regarding the conjunction of 
occupational safety and ecological sustainability, this study attempts to address two 
major research questions: “Are the organizations promoting occupational safety for their 
employees more likely to join the green movement?” and, “Does an organization’s safety 
culture have a spillover effect on its environmental endeavors and financial 
performance?” In doing so, we draw on the safety culture literature and organizational 
support theory (Eisenberger et al., 1997) to explain how the employees motivated by 
organizations’ safety culture and their management commitment in improving workplace 
safety help the organization enhance its financial performance and effectively adopt 
environmental practices and improve its environmental performance. Similar to 
McFadden et al.’s (2009) proposed culture-initiative-outcome model for patient safety in 
the healthcare industry, we also suggest that a positive workplace safety culture 
encompassing two critical components, that is, management commitment and employees’ 
participation/empowerment, positively affects its safety performance both directly and 
indirectly through implementation of safety practices. We examine these issues by 
applying a survey methodology and collecting primary data from a sample of 251 
Canadian manufacturing plants.  
This paper contributes to the operations management literature in many ways. 
First, by linking workplace safety and financial performance, this study provides a 
foundation for future research on making a business case for safety management. Second, 
a theoretical model is developed linking safety culture to safety and environmental 
management practices and performance. More specifically, the model suggests that a 
positive safety culture can improve organizations’ safety and environmental performance 
both directly and indirectly through the adoption of related processes and practices. 
Third, it highlights the important role of individuals, both managers and employees, in 
achieving all three sustainability objectives, that is, improving social, environmental, and 
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financial performance. Finally, unlike other sustainable operations management studies 
which focus on the environmental sustainability as the entry point for operationalizing 
sustainability, this paper introduces the commitment to safety and establishing a positive 
safety culture as the starting point towards achieving sustainable development. 
In the next section, we integrate two streams of literature on environmental and 
safety management and define the six constructs of interest. We then propose nine 
hypotheses building on the organizational support theory, safety culture literature, and 
prior empirical studies in sustainability domain. After presenting the research 
methodology and data analysis results, we discuss our findings and their theoretical and 
managerial implications. 
2. Literature Review  
2.1. Safety culture  
The concept of safety culture (SC) was first coined in the International Nuclear 
Safety Advisory Group’s (INSAG) summary report on the Chernobyl accident, published 
by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in 1986. Although it has been 
widely used since then, there is no clear cut definition of the term safety culture and  
numerous definitions have been developed in the academic literature for it (Choudhry et 
al., 2007). It is used to describe an organizational culture in which safety is understood to 
be, and is accepted as, the top priority (Cooper, 2002). Cooper (2000) refers to it as the 
observable degree of effort by which all organizational members direct their attention 
and actions toward improving safety on a daily basis, while Richter & Koch (2004) 
describe it as the shared and learned meanings, experiences, and interpretations of work 
and safety which guide people’s actions towards risk, accidents, and prevention. In a 
nutshell, a strong safety culture is formed when the values espoused by management are 
consistent with the behavior of the employees (Vredenburgh, 2002) and when safety is 
regarded by everyone as being an issue that concerns everyone (Choudhry et al., 2007).  
Researchers have carried out empirical studies to determine the indicators which 
reflect safety culture (Mearns et al., 2003, Ostrom et al., 1993). Despite several 
inconsistencies in the idiosyncratic labeling of safety culture indicators, two factors — 
employees' participation and management commitment to safety — appear to be 
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replicated across several studies (Cox and Cheyne, 2000, Vecchio-Sadus and Griffiths, 
2004, Fernández-Muñiz et al., 2007, McFadden et al., 2009). Hence, in this study, a 
positive safety culture is defined as one in which managers are committed to and 
reinforce safety as an organizational priority and employees adhere to the safety rules and 
guidelines and participate in their establishment and improvement.  
2.2. Safety practices 
Safety practices (S PR) are the policies, procedures and activities implemented or 
followed by the management of an organization targeting safety of their employees 
(Kirwan, 1998). They are the essential elements permitting an effective management of 
safety in organizations and are designed to comply with the existing applicable 
legislations. Numerous studies have attempted to identify specific safety management 
practices that improve safety performance in terms of accident and incident rates 
(Shannon et al., 1997, DePasquale and Geller, 1999, McFadden et al., 2009). They have 
revealed that organizations with lower accident rates are characterized by a few of the 
following factors: management's active involvement in safety initiatives; frequent safety 
training for employees; hazard identification and assessment; horizontal and vertical 
communication about safety issues; frequent safety inspections; safety-oriented reward 
systems; thorough investigation and statistical analysis of accidents and incidents; and 
empowerment of the workforce.  
These practices can be categorized into two mutually exclusive groups of control 
and prevention. The former includes safety-related initiatives which are aimed at 
reducing the adverse impacts of accidents/incidents after their occurrence. Emergency 
response plans and actions are among these practices. The second group, however, 
includes the activities that are intended to prevent incidents/accidents occurrence, such as 
hazard identification and assessment, safety training, reporting incidents/accidents and 
statistical analysis of the collected data, and system redesign for improving the workplace 
safety. The latter type of practices is of interest in this study. Therefore, we define safety 
practices as the set of procedures/activities which aim at preventing incidents/accidents 
occurrence. 
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2.3. Environmental practices 
Upon the enactment of various environmental regulations in the 1970s, 
organizations have allocated significant capital and operating budgets to control the 
adverse environmental impact of their products and processes. Environmental practices 
(E PR) encompass the techniques to reduce, minimize, or eliminate the negative impacts 
of organizations’ operations, products or services on the natural environment 
(Shrivastava, 1995a, Rao and Holt, 2005). These practices are classified into three 
categories of pollution prevention, pollution control, and management systems (Klassen 
and Whybark, 1999a). While all three categories aim at improving environmental 
performance, practices which address pollution at the source are generally recognized to 
generate other benefits (Hart, 1995). This type of practice is of interest in this paper. 
Therefore, we define environmental practices as the techniques and procedures that lead 
to pollution reduction at the source (Thoumy and Vachon, 2012). They include efforts to 
analyze product life-cycle, prevent pollution, reduce wastes, or recycle materials. 
2.4. Organization’s performance 
In line with sustainable development perspective, we define the organizations’ 
performance along three dimensions: environmental performance (E PE), safety 
performance (S PE), and financial performance (F PE). The concept of safety 
performance refers to the extent to which organizations are able to prevent accidents and 
incidents or decrease their adverse impacts (De Koster et al., 2011). Environmental 
performance is defined as the extent to which an organization improves its performance 
in respect to its environmental responsibilities (Kleindorfer et al., 2005). Financial 
performance refers to the degree to which an organization achieves profit-oriented 
outcomes and reduces its overall costs. 
3. Conceptual Model and Hypotheses Development 
In this section, drawing from safety and sustainability literatures and 
organizational support theory, we present our hypotheses on the interrelationships 
between six constructs of interest.  
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3.1. Safety culture and financial performance 
Organizational support theory (Eisenberger et al., 1997), derived from social 
exchange theory (Blau, 1964), assumes that employees form general beliefs about how 
much their organization values their contributions and cares about their well-being. 
Central to this theory is the norm of reciprocity: when one person treats another well, the 
norm of reciprocity obliges the return of favorable treatment (Gouldner, 1960). Hence, 
the employees’ perceived organizational support increases their willingness to further 
contribute to the organization's success and helping the organization reach its objectives 
(Eisenberger et al., 2001). 
Figure ‎II-1. Conceptual model 
 
Applying this theory to the safety context, it can be posited that a positive safety 
culture stemming from management commitment has the potential to create a positive 
exchange relationship between the organization and its employees. When employees 
believe that top management cares about their personal safety and well-being, they will 
choose to reciprocate by developing affective commitment to the organization (Rhoades 
et al., 2001), putting forth discretionary effort on behalf of the firm (Piercy et al., 2006), 
and involving in more pro-social behaviors like aiding fellow employees, offering 
constructive suggestions, and gaining knowledge and skills that are beneficial to the 
organization (Meyer and Herscovitch, 2001). They will be more willing to pursue 
organizational goals and to remain with the organization (Meyer et al., 1990) which leads 
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to decreased absenteeism and turnover rates (Harrison et al., 2006) and increased 
productivity and customer satisfaction (Patterson et al., 2004, Mathieu et al., 2006). They 
will also feel more satisfied with their jobs (Rhoades and Eisenberger, 2002). All of these 
employees’ reactions to their perceived organizational support lead to improved job 
performance, which in turn positively influences the organizational profitability and 
performance (Ostroff, 1992, Podsakoff and MacKenzie, 1997, Sun et al., 2007, 
Subramony, 2009).  
H1: The level of an organization’s safety culture is positively associated with its 
financial performance. 
3.2. Safety culture, environmental practices, and environmental performance 
The similarities between workplace safety and environmental management are 
significant enough that they have been thought of as major components of the overall 
concept of sustainability in the operations management literature (Kleindorfer et al., 
2005). Activist groups interested in both environmental and occupational health issues 
have recognized the similarities between the two and have formed labor-environmental 
alliances across the United States known as “blue-green coalitions” (Mayer, 2009). 
However, to date, there has been a lack of research to establish a direct link between 
environmental management and workplace safety. In this paper, we argue that 
organizations with a positive safety culture are more likely to adopt an environmental 
sustainability perspective, implement ecologically friendly practices, and improve their 
environmental performance due to a number of factors. First, a prime component of 
safety culture relates to management commitment to safety and how it is demonstrated to 
the employees. The motives and drivers behind management commitment to safety are 
quite similar to the ones for seeking improvements in environmental performance 
(Taubitz, 2010). As a result, managers who are motivated to enhance their organizations’ 
workplace safety will also be willing to invest in environmental practices (Caprar and 
Neville, 2012). According to Corbett and Kleindorfer (2001), these drivers include 
enhancing corporate image and reputation (Vastag, 2004), increasing revenue and market 
share (Delmas, 2001), seeking regulatory compliance (Snir, 2001), avoiding liability and 
negligence (Wolf, 2001, Kleindorfer and Saad, 2005), and improving company’s 
relations with local communities and other stakeholders (Rothenberg et al., 2001). 
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Moreover, by encouraging and committing to a positive safety culture, top management 
can serve as champion of change and alter the culture of the organization to be more 
flexible and responsive to changes (Daily and Huang, 2001), hence increasing the 
chances of environmental practices’ success, that is, improved environmental 
performance. 
Second, it is frequently argued in the environmental management literature that 
motivated and empowered individuals can bring the critical ideas and deliver the efforts 
necessary to improve their organizations' environmental performance (Starik and Rands, 
1995, Zwetsloot and Marrewijk, 2004). One of the critical components of a positive 
safety culture is employees’ active involvement and participation in safety-related 
activities, which results in their empowerment. Therefore, it is possible to conclude that 
an organization with a positive safety culture will be able to implement environmental 
practices more effectively and improve its environmental performance due to employees’ 
motivation and active participation. 
Third, workplace accidents are sometimes associated with environmental 
problems. For example, air pollution due to the release of chemicals into the air is not 
only undesirable from an environmental point of view, but it also has an adverse impact 
on the working conditions of employees and their safety and well-being (Chandrashekar 
et al., 1999). Hence, being committed to eliminating workplace hazards and risks 
sometimes requires the organizations to implement environmental practices to prevent 
waste and pollution, which in turn results in improvements in their environmental 
performance. 
Finally, both environmental and safety management domains require large-scale 
behavior change for a meaningful impact to be realized. For example, the same mindset 
that underlies practices to prevent workplace injuries can be applied in efforts to reduce 
energy consumption (Cunningham et al., 2010). The organizations with positive safety 
culture are the ones who have successfully managed to change their managers’ and 
employees’ attitudes and behaviors to be safety-oriented. Hence, they do not need to 
reinvent the wheel to develop successful interventions for aligning the employees’ 
behaviors with environmental sustainability objectives. They can harness the momentum 
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of the safety culture and adapt successful behavioral interventions from the safety 
domain to achieve improvements in environmental sustainability. 
H2: The level of an organization’s safety culture is positively associated with the 
degree of investments in environmental practices within that organization. 
H3: The level of an organization’s safety culture is positively associated with its 
environmental performance. 
Further, it is expected that adopting the techniques and procedures which take 
into account the environmental considerations, namely environmental practices, reduce 
the organization’s negative impacts on the natural environmental (Melnyk et al., 2003). 
For example, organizations participating in emission and energy consumption reduction 
programs will reduce their carbon footprint by introducing energy conserving operation 
processes, conservation-oriented maintenance, and installing energy efficient lighting 
fixtures. Moreover, with proactive environmental practices, organizations can eliminate 
environmentally hazardous production processes, redesign their existing product systems 
to reduce life cycle impacts, and develop new products with lower life cycle costs (Hart, 
1995). Likewise, they can analyze and understand the impacts of their products and 
processes on the environment and improve their environmental performance by 
conducting life-cycle analysis (Matos and Hall, 2007). Several studies to date have 
provided empirical evidences to support the positive relationship between environmental 
practices and environmental performance in organizations (Klassen and Whybark, 1999b, 
Pullman et al., 2009, Russo and Fouts, 1997).  
H4: The degree of investments in environmental practices within an organization 
is positively associated with its environmental performance.   
3.3. Safety culture, safety practices, and safety performance 
Developing and maintaining a positive safety culture is an effective tool for 
improving safety-related outcomes at work, such as decreasing accidents and injuries and 
increasing safety compliance and safety knowledge of employees (Vecchio-Sadus and 
Griffiths, 2004, Hofmann and Stetzer, 1996, Neal et al., 2000). Organizations’ safety 
culture considerably affects the employees’ involvement in unsafe behaviors which, 
based on the Domino Model of Accident Causation (Heinrich, 1931), is one of the major 
root causes of workplace accidents in different industries (Mearns et al., 2003, Oliver et 
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al., 2002, Brown et al., 2000). Sulzer-Azaroff (1978) suggests that employees are 
“naturally” reinforced to engage in unsafe practices by taking shortcuts to achieve 
immediate positive results (e.g., completing the tasks in shorter time). Positive safety 
culture counteracts this “natural” reinforcement by increasing employees’ motivation to 
comply with safety rules and also by increasing their awareness of rules and the 
importance of following them (safety knowledge). In their survey study of 551 workers 
from two steel plants located in the southeastern US, Brown et al. (2000) demonstrate 
that a weak safety culture increases the presence of unsafe work behaviors through 
employees’ perceived work pressure and perceived barriers to safety. Similar findings 
have been reported by other studies such as Thompson et al. (1998) and Seo (2005). 
A few empirical studies in operations management literature have demonstrated 
that several aspects of a positive safety culture such as the creation of a blame-free 
environment, a commitment to be safety-centered, an openness about errors, and a safety-
over-productivity attitude lead to exceptionally good safety outcomes (McFadden et al., 
2009, McFadden and Hosmane, 2001, De Koster et al., 2011). The frequency and 
severity of occupational accidents and incidents are reduced through improved safety 
culture in terms of management commitment and employee participation and 
empowerment. Top management commitment has a dual effect on safety performance 
(Krause and Weekley, 2005). On the one hand, committed leaders allocate adequate 
resources to implement safety initiatives and safety enhancing systems. On the other 
hand, they influence employees’ behaviors simply by demonstrating support for 
improving workplace safety. When employees observe their management commitment, 
they will be more willing to co-operate to improve safety performance (Hofmann et al., 
2003). They will try to comply with regulations, to take the proper safety measures, and 
to actively participate in activities designed to promote improvements in their workplace 
safety. Therefore, management commitment enhances employees’ commitment and 
decreases occupational injuries (Zacharatos et al., 2005). In addition, employees’ 
participation and commitment to safety is likely to increase not only their personal safety 
consciousness (De Koster et al., 2011), but also the safety of the work environment, 
through actions on safety suggestions and the encouragement of safe behavior among 
coworkers (Michael et al., 2005).  
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H5: The level of an organization’s safety culture is positively associated with its 
safety performance. 
A culture which encourages shared vision of a strategy usually results in an 
internal drive and passion to develop new innovation and embrace change (Hamel and 
Prahalad, 2005). According to Shrivastava (1995b), an organization’s sustainability 
initiatives and its strategy must be closely interwoven, rather than being separate 
programs that are managed independently of one another. Top management’s verbal 
commitment must be supported by their actions to effectively influence the workplace 
safety performance. To be perceived as credible, their words should be supported by 
establishing safety-related practices in the organization and allocating money for safety 
supplies and initiatives.  
H6: The level of an organization’s safety culture is positively associated with the 
level of implemented safety practices within that organization. 
The preventive safety programs and practices are regarded in several studies as 
the antecedent of the employees' perceptions about the importance of safety in their 
organization and hence contribute to performing tasks in a safe manner (DeJoy et al., 
2004). Companies that have better safety initiatives in place and invest more money in 
safety management are expected to have better safety outcomes (Hoonakker et al., 2005). 
The extent to which these practices are implemented in an organization affects the 
probability, frequency, and severity of the accidents and incidents. For example, 
communication of safety information through either formal training or informal on-the-
job discussions enhances employees’ safety awareness and consciousness, decreases their 
involvement in unsafe behaviors and hence, improves organizations’ safety performance 
(De Koster et al., 2011).  
It also helps them to identify the hazards in the workplace, and the procedures 
available to prevent, correct or minimize their risks (Fernández-Muñiz et al., 2007). 
Employees’ involvement in the hazard identification and risk analysis process is another 
behavioral-oriented technique that provides them with authority, responsibility, and 
accountability for required decisions which in turn reduce their involvement in unsafe 
acts and consequently, the accidents rate (Rundmo, 2000, Cox and Cheyne, 2000, 
Vredenburgh, 2002).  
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H7: The level of implemented safety practices within an organization is positively 
associated with its safety performance. 
3.4. Safety, environmental, and financial performance 
It is widely believed that there is a trade-off between efforts in safety and 
profitability/production, that is, safety preventive measures require expenses that are not 
in line with production objectives, and consequently have negative impacts on 
organizations’ profitability and competitiveness (Carrillo, 2005). Conversely, researchers 
have suggested that accidents have adverse effects in terms of decreases in productivity 
and quality and deterioration of the firm’s public image or employee morale, all of which 
lead to decreased financial performance (Rechenthin, 2004, Brown, 1996). Evidences of 
both arguments have largely been anecdotal in nature. Therefore, to make a business case 
for safety, the level of invested resources in safety management should be compared to 
its impact on the organization’s profitability.  
Proactive safety engenders an increase in the organization’s costs through areas 
such as salaries paid for safety professionals, employees’ training, and protective 
equipment purchase. On the other hand, investing in safety can make changes in the 
organization’s processes and production technologies, which in turn can offer benefits in 
terms of savings in materials or energy, and hence cutting the real costs of such 
investment (Ashford, 1997). Lack of safety, however, can result in direct and indirect 
costs when accidents and incidents occur.  
The direct costs include such things as medical expenses, disability payments, 
attorney fees and property damage repair costs. The larger indirect costs with a long-term 
negative impact on the organization’s financial performance include increased insurance 
costs, increased operational costs due to disruptions to work progress, loss or injury of 
trained and experienced workers, and loss of production quality due to a non-experienced 
employee performing work normally handled by an experienced employee who has been 
injured and is away from work (Manuele, 2011, Brown et al., 2000).  
In addition, accidents also undermine the organization’s internal relationships, 
workers’ morale and motivation or harm its public image and cause a severe deterioration 
in its public relations (Smallman and John, 2001). They can also cause organizations to 
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miss delivery dates causing financial losses due to the delay itself and due to 
deterioration in the customers’ perception of the firm (Fernández-Muñiz et al., 2009). 
Finally, strong safety reputation helps companies attract and retain higher-quality 
employees and reduce the costs of recruiting and training of new employees (Howard-
Grenville et al., 2003). 
H8: An organization’s safety performance is positively associated with its 
financial performance.   
Similarly, many organizations perceive trade-offs between environmental 
performance and economic performance. Researchers and practitioners have tried for a 
long time to find out whether it “pays” to be green. A large number of studies have 
demonstrated that environmental management efforts and improved environmental 
performance can increase firms’ revenues and lower their overall costs (Melnyk et al., 
2003, Angell and Klassen, 1999a, King and Lenox, 2002, Ambec and Lanoie, 2008). 
Improved environmental performance reduces the amount of waste, the consumption of 
various production inputs including energy and materials, and the number of components 
in products (Rothenberg et al., 2001).  
Elimination of spills and other environmental damages prevents expenses 
associated with lawsuits and legal settlements (Karpoff et al., 2005). Pollution prevention 
can also allow a firm to avoid the cost of installing and operating pollution control 
devices and to reuse materials through recycling (Quazi et al., 2001, Hart, 1997). Waste 
reduction, another aspect of improved environmental performance, leads to better 
utilization of natural resources, improved efficiency and higher productivity, and reduces 
operation costs. Finally, an organization’s strong environmental reputation, similar to 
safety reputation, results in lower costs for recruiting and training of new employees 
(Howard-Grenville et al., 2003). 
In addition to its effects on costs, environmental performance can impact 
revenues either through gains in existing markets or access to new markets. Firms can 
benefit from their improved environmental performance as a powerful marketing tool 
which brings about increased revenue, market share, and new market opportunities 
(Klassen and McLaughlin, 1996, Rao and Holt, 2005). Examples of new 
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environmentally-conscious markets range from clothing produced with organic materials 
to hybrid vehicles. Hence, we expect that improved environmental performance in terms 
of lower levels of air emissions, waste water generation, solid waste disposal, and energy 
consumption contributes to better financial performance.  
H9: An organization’s environmental performance is positively associated with 
its financial performance.   
4. Methodology 
4.1. Data collection 
Data from a sample of 1,001 Canadian manufacturing plants located in Ontario 
and Quebec provinces was collected through a mail survey distributed in April-May 
2011, following a procedure inspired by Dillman (2000). We chose the plant as the level 
of analysis because it is generally where many safety and environmental issues are 
evaluated and operational decisions are implemented. The sample was randomly selected 
utilizing the Canadian Scott’s Directory and included the plants with more than 100 
employees (as it was reported by this database) from the industries included in the North 
American Industrial Classification Systems (NAICS) codes 315 to 337, excluding 
process-based industries such as paper, petroleum, and chemical products. These codes 
include leather goods, textile products, clothing, wood products, furniture, plastic and 
rubber products, machinery, transport equipment, electrical equipment, and fabricated 
metal industries. A follow-up phone call was made a couple of weeks after the mailing to 
confirm the reception of the questionnaire and to encourage participation. A total of 251 
usable responses, mostly from plant managers, were collected from that effort, that is, a 
response rate of 25%.  
4.2. Survey questionnaire and measures 
The survey instrument used for this research includes a total of 32 items 
measured on a seven-point likert-type scale for the six main constructs (listed in 
Appendix II-A). As noted earlier, safety culture construct represents management 
commitment to reinforcing safety as organizational priority and employees’ adherence to 
the established safety rules and guidelines and their participation in workplace safety 
activities. In this study, safety culture was measured by seven items adapted from a 
C h a p t e r  I I  P a g e  |  2 5  
 
previously published safety climate survey (Sexton et al., 2003). Similar to McFadden et 
al.’s approach (2009), we only included seven of the original 19 items which measured 
safety culture at the organizational level and were most closely aligned with our 
definition of safety culture in Section 2.1. A seven-item scale captured the degree and 
level of implementation of seven activities that aim to improve workplace safety, such as 
taking input from all stakeholders on hazard identification/assessment and 
incident/accident reduction methods, reporting incidents/accidents without blame, open-
ended discussion groups, safety training for employees, statistical analysis of 
incidents/accidents data, and system redesign for safety. These items were taken from 
McFadden et al.’s scale (2009) for patient safety initiatives and modified based on 
OHSAS 18001 (British Standards Institution, 2007) principles of a workplace safety 
management system. Safety performance was also measured by a five-item scale taken 
from McFadden et al.’s scale (2009) for safety outcomes. These items were modified to 
assess the changes in the workplace safety performance of the plant over a two-year 
period on five different dimensions, that is, severity, frequency, and impact of 
incidents/accidents, as well as increased awareness and understanding of 
incidents/accidents and their root causes.   
The extent of environmental practices was assessed using a five-item scale which 
captured the extent to which resources have been invested in five programs related to 
environmental management over the previous two years: ISO 14001 certification, 
pollution prevention, recycling of materials, life cycle analysis, and waste reduction. 
Environmental performance was measured by a five-item scale, in terms of 
improvements in the amount of air emissions, waste water generation, solid waste 
disposal, consumption of hazardous/harmful/toxic materials, and energy consumption 
over a two-year period. Lastly, financial performance was measured by a three-item 
scale, in terms of the level of a plant’s average return on investment, average profit, and 
profit growth compared to the industry average over a two-year period.  
In addition to the variables presented above, we also examined three control 
variables to avoid any unjustifiable influence of alternative factors, other than those 
included in our model, on the plant’s performance. First, we controlled for plant size 
because the safety, financial and environmental performance gains or failures we observe 
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may be explained by this factor as opposed to the mechanisms we model. On one hand, 
larger firms may have greater adverse environmental impacts or larger number of 
accidents/incidents and consequently be under more external pressure to improve their 
performance. On the other hand, they might have larger resource pools to invest in 
environmental technologies or safety practices and consequently higher levels of 
environmental/safety improvement (Vachon and Klassen, 2006a). In our study, plant size 
is measured as the number of employees (logarithmized). The second possible 
confounding effect relates to the complexity of a plant’s internal processes. Plants with a 
higher level of complexity could be prone to lower levels of performance. The number of 
plant’s product lines is taken as a proxy for the level of plant complexity. Finally, we 
controlled for the percentage of unionized shop floor workers, as it can affect a plant’s 
safety performance.   
4.3. Post-hoc tests of data appropriateness  
We assessed nonresponse bias using t-tests to compare the early and late waves 
of responses (Lambert and Harrington, 1990, Armstrong and Overton, 1977). Two 
groups of 63 surveys were chosen from the first and last waves of surveys received (i.e., 
the upper and lower quartiles of the returned surveys), and t-tests were performed on the 
responses of the two groups on four demographic-related as well as ten randomly-
selected items in the dataset. The t-tests yielded no statistically significant differences, 
suggesting that nonresponse may not be a problem to the extent that late respondents 
represent the opinions of non-respondents. 
To minimize key-informant bias, we contacted each plant by phone prior to 
sending the survey to identify the manager most knowledgeable about the financial, 
environmental, and safety issues (Kumar et al., 1993). Although responses from multiple 
informants may have been preferred, we believe that our informants were positioned to 
make the assessment asked of them. In addition, we checked for common method bias to 
assure that the observed relationships between variables are not confounded by the 
respondents’ social desirability, leniency, acquiescence, and other social, psychological, 
and measurement factors. To reduce the likelihood of common method bias, the 
dependent variables were placed after the independent variables in the survey to 
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diminish, if not avoid, the effects of consistency artifacts (Podsakoff et al., 2003). In 
addition to this precaution taken during the survey design, Harman’s single factor post 
hoc test (Harman, 1976) was performed. The exploratory factor analysis revealed seven 
factors with eigenvalues greater than 1.0 that accounted for 63.67% of the total variance. 
The first factor only accounted for 29.4% of the variance. These results suggested that 
common method bias was not a serious problem in our study (Podsakoff et al., 2003).  
Finally, in order to establish the validity of the answers provided by the single 
respondents and to enhance the rigor of research, the survey data on environmental 
performance were compared to the objective data which is publicly available from 
National Pollutant Release Inventory (NPRI) provided by the federal government of 
Canada (Environment Canada, 2010). This database contains information on more than 
300 pollutants released and transferred from individual plants across Canada (air, water, 
land and injected underground and transferred offsite to disposal, treatment, sewage, 
energy recovery and recycling). Of the 251 plants in our sample, we were able to identify 
56 of them in the NPRI database. In line with our definition of environmental 
performance in the survey data to be the improvement of plant’s environmental impacts 
over a two-year period (i.e., 2008-2010), we took three different measures of change in 
pollutant release over the same period from NPRI data of the 56 plants in our sample 
(Henri and Journeault, 2010). These measures include changes in onsite air emissions, 
changes in total onsite emissions, and changes in total onsite and offsite emissions. 
Nonparametric Spearman Rank Correlation test shows positive and significant 
correlations between the mean score of environmental performance as provided by the 
respondents and each of the abovementioned measures (correlations of 0.436, 0.406, 
0.385; p < 0.01). Hence, the self-rated improvement in environmental performance is 
positively correlated with the improvement in the level of pollutants released from 2008 
to 2010. These results are in line with Dixon-Fowler et al.’s (2013) meta-analysis 
findings which indicate that the use of self-report measures of environmental 
performance does not result in different outcomes than the use of archival data. 
Given that the majority of the firms in our sample were privately owned and also 
because the unit of analysis was the plant, unfortunately, a meaningful validation of 
financial performance data with a third party secondary data source was not possible. 
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Moreover, manufacturing plants’ accident/incident records were not publicly available 
and hence, we could not validate the safety performance data.   
5. Data Analysis 
Partial Least Squares (PLS) method and, more specifically, SmartPLS 2.0 (beta) 
software (Ringle et al., 2005) was selected as the modeling technique for testing the 
proposed conceptual model in this study for a number of reasons (Peng and Lai, 2012). 
The environmental management and safety management concepts have seldom been 
examined in one single study, and there are no well-established theories that can directly 
serve as the theoretical foundation of their hypothesized relationships, making PLS an 
appropriate analysis tool for the exploratory nature of this study. Second, PLS performs 
better relative to covariance-based structural equation modeling (CBSEM) techniques in 
testing complex models with small sample sizes. To test the hypothesized relationships 
using CBSEM techniques, the minimum required sample size would be 350 cases, while 
the minimum sample size of 60 cases is enough for PLS analysis (Tanaka, 1987, Chin 
and Newsted, 1999). Finally, unlike CBSEM, PLS does not assume multivariate 
normality in the data, making it useful where observations do not fit with this restriction. 
Kolmogorov-Smirnov and Shapiro-Wilk tests show that the variables in this study are not 
normally distributed (Statistics: 0.113-0.354 and 0.711-0.941; p < 0.01). Multivariate 
kurtosis of 136.803 with critical ratio value of 23.231 further confirms the data’s 
departure from multivariate normality requirement for using CBSEM techniques (Byrne, 
2010). 
As stated earlier, the items related to safety culture, practices, and performance 
constructs were adopted from McFadden et al.’s (2009) study with a healthcare context 
and applied to a manufacturing context in this study. Therefore, constructs’ uni-
dimensionality was tested prior to PLS data analysis to purify the measurement scales. 
The sample of 251 cases was randomly split in half for uni-dimensionality pre-test 
(Sample 1) and data analysis (Sample 2) to avoid the problem of capitalization on chance 
due to specification searches and model modifications aiming at improving the 
measurement models (MacCallum et al., 1992).  
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5.1. Uni-dimensionality of constructs 
Uni-dimensionality refers to existence of a single concept underlying a group of 
measures (Gerbing and Anderson, 1988). Following Kim, Kumar, & Kumar (2012), uni-
dimensionality of the six constructs was assessed through confirmatory factor analysis 
(CFA) employing IBM SPSS Amos 19 (Arbuckle, 2010) software. 
The measurement model for each construct was estimated first. Then, the 
constructs were combined into pairs and each pair was estimated separately. The 
measurement model including all constructs was estimated last. At each step, we 
assessed whether or not the model fit the data by examining the t-values, standardized 
residuals, modification indices, and a number of goodness-of-fit indices. These indices 
are reported for pair-wise and total measurement models in Table II-1.  
Table ‎II-1. Fit Indices for pair-wise and total measurement models (CFA) 
Model χ
2
 (df) χ2 /df  GFI CFI NFI RMR RMSEA 
(1) SC and S PR 56.618 (42) 1.348 0.925 0.983 0.938 0.066 0.054 
(2) SC and S PE 43.869 (33) 1.329 0.935 0.984 0.939 0.044 0.052 
(3) SC and E PR 20.844 (29) 1.097 0.959 0.995 0.950 0.083 0028 
(4) SC and E PE 31.474 (26) 1.211 0.945 0.984 0.918 0.072 0.042 
(5) SC and F PE 18.421 (19) 0.970 0.965 1.000 0.967 0.055 0.000 
(6) S PR and S PE 56.943 (41) 1.389 0.918 0.983 0.942 0.062 0.057 
(7) S PR and E PR 32.988 (24) 1.374 0.946 0.986 0.951 0.077 0.056 
(8) S PR and E PE 59.466 (33) 1.802 0.916 0.956 0.908 0.105 0.081 
(9) S PR and F PE 31.588 (25) 1.264 0.947 0.992 0.961 0.081 0.047 
(10) S PE and E PR 13.584 (18) 0.755 0.973 1.000 0.972 0.060 0.000 
(11) S PE and E PE 45.638 (25) 1.826 0.924 0.955 0.907 0.055 0.083 
(12) S PE and F PE 16.733 (18) 0.930 0.967 1.000 0.974 0.035 0.000 
(13) E PR and E PE 13.632 (12) 1.136 0.970 0.991 0.933 0.067 0.034 
(14) E PR and F PE 15.995 (8) 1.999 0.959 0.979 0.960 0.105 0.091 
(15) E PE and F PE 18.380 (13) 1.414 0.957 0.984 0.950 0.051 0.058 
Measurement Model 310.697 (280) 1.110 0.844 0.983 0.852 0.092 0.030 
Recommended value  < 3.0 >0.9 >0.9 >0.9 <0.07 <0.08 
During this stage, six items were dropped due to their low loadings or high cross-
loadings to establish uni-dimensionality of all six constructs (S PR-3, SC-5,6, E PR-1,2 
and E PE-3). A comparison of the goodness-of-fit statistics to the recommended values 
of these fit indices reveals an adequate fit of the modified measurement models to data.  
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5.2. Estimation of measurement model 
After establishing the uni-dimensionality of the constructs and identifying their 
measurement models’ structure, the next step is to test the measurement models in PLS 
and assess reliability, convergent, and discriminant validity of the constructs (Fornell and 
Larcker, 1981). The reliability study indicates the degree of internal consistency between 
the multiple variables that make up the scale, in other words, the extent to which the 
indicators or items of the scale are measuring the same concepts. In PLS, alternative 
ways of judging multiple-item consistency, rather than Cronbach’s alpha, are used. The 
methods look at (1) the reliability of the individual items that make up the measure, and 
(2) the composite reliability of the items as a group (comparable to Cronbach’s α). 
Individual item reliability is assessed using the item’s loading on the construct. A 
common rule of thumb is to accept items with more explanatory power than error 
variance (Carmines and Zeller, 1979), that is, with loadings greater than 0.7 (Fornell and 
Larcker, 1981).  
Table ‎II-2: Reliability and convergent validity  
Items Loadings 
Composite 
Reliability 
AVE Items Loadings 
Composite 
Reliability 
AVE 
S PR  0.89 0.57 SC  0.89 0.61 
S PR-1 0.81   SC-1 0.86   
S PR-2 0.78   SC-2 0.86   
S PR-4 0.71   SC-3 0.83   
S PR-5 0.78   SC-4 0.75   
S PR-6 0.66   SC-7 0.57   
S PR-7 0.79       
        S PE  0.91 0.68 E PE   0.80 0.50 
S PE-1 0.79   E PE-1 0.71   
S PE-2 0.76   E PE-2 0.72   
S PE-3 0.90   E PE-4 0.73   
S PE-4 0.84   E PE-5  0.67   
S PE-5 0.83       
        E PR  0.85 0.65 F PE  0.93 0.81 
E PR-3 0.68   F PE-1 0.88   
E PR-4 0.87   F PE-2 0.92   
E PR-5  0.86   F PE-3 0.90   
Of the 26 items in the various scales, four of them were below this threshold with 
minimum loading of 0.57, which were kept in the measurement model to retain the 
content validity of their underlying constructs. All factor loadings were also statistically 
significant (p < 0.01). Further, composite reliability assesses the inter-item consistency, 
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which should also have a minimum value of 0.7. All of the scales demonstrated 
acceptable performance on this basis (see Table II-2).  
Table ‎II-3: Discriminant validity  
Constructs SC S PR S PE  E PR E PE 
Safety Practices 8.164
a
     
Safety Performance 22.328 10.861    
Environmental Practices 11.500 6.028 13.693   
Environmental 
Performance 
45.445 39.724 44.738 23.354  
Financial Performance 40.877 29.58 37.193 24.203 30.322 
a
 Chi-square differences between each constrained model and unconstrained model. Difference in degree of 
freedom=1. All of the differences on pair-wise comparisons of the scales were significant at p-value of 
0.05. 
The standard for acceptable convergent validity is that the construct’s average 
variance extracted should exceed 0.5, indicating that the items share at least half of their 
variance with the construct (on average). Again, as depicted in Table II-2, all scales 
performed acceptably on this basis. Discriminant validity addresses the potential problem 
of having measures for one construct overlap the conceptual territory of another 
construct. To test the discriminant validity, we ran a series of nested measurement model 
comparisons in which we constrained the covariance between each pair of constructs to 
one (Bagozzi and Yi, 1988) employing IBM SPSS Amos 19 software. The chi-square 
difference tests for all pairs of constructs were statistically significant at p-value of 0.05 
(Table II-3). 
Table ‎II-4: Correlation matrix  
 
SC SPR SPE EPR EPE FPE PS PC PU 
Safety Culture 0.782         
Safety Practices 0.644 0.760        
Safety Performance 0.375 0.421 0.826       
Environmental Practices 0.327 0.355 0.291 0.806  
 
 
 
 
Environmental Performance 0.270 0.267 0.333 0.405 0.709 
 
 
 
 
Financial Performance 0.223 0.0926 0.131 0.062 0.053 0.900  
 
 
Plant Size (PS) 0.143 0.208 0.146 0.010 0.253 -0.018 ---   
Plant Complexity (PC) 0.064 0.126 0.104 0.083 0.106 0.041 0.035 ---  
Plant Unionization (PU) -0.179 -0.010 0.059 -0.114 0.082 -0.118 0.257 -0.016 --- 
Note: The diagonal elements are the square roots of the average variance extracted (AVEs); the off-
diagonal elements are the inter-construct correlations. 
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In addition, the square roots of the average variance extracted for all constructs 
were greater than all of the inter-construct correlations (Table II-4), which is the evidence 
of sufficient discriminant validity (Chin, 1998). Lastly, the examination of items’ cross-
loadings table revealed that each item loading in the table was higher on its assigned 
construct than on the other constructs, supporting adequate convergent and discriminant 
validity (Table II-5). In conclusion, analysis of measurement models shows that the 
underlying items have sound measurement properties. 
Table ‎II-5: Items' loadings and cross loadings  
 
SC S PR S PE E PR E PE F PE 
SC-1 0.856086 0.574074 0.335555 0.203486 0.193460 0.227667 
SC-2 0.861346 0.636442 0.400247 0.299042 0.260134 0.189557 
SC-3 0.833518 0.517873 0.272859 0.365991 0.182012 0.214257 
SC-4 0.751196 0.403083 0.253265 0.192810 0.264597 0.095844 
SC-7 0.571110 0.302853 0.138098 0.194353 0.152026 0.115093 
       
S PR-1 0.505175 0.810734 0.412488 0.302197 0.277991 0.105624 
S PR-2 0.469439 0.780191 0.366759 0.291825 0.320267 0.022419 
S PR-4 0.426686 0.712782 0.329754 0.296235 0.248036 0.053277 
S PR-5 0.578305 0.780517 0.278958 0.285101 0.120648 0.113758 
S PR-6 0.348686 0.657853 0.183378 0.253216 0.140738 0.071565 
S PR-7 0.554295 0.788583 0.304574 0.196274 0.105100 0.050754 
       
S PE-1 0.249454 0.280278 0.790960 0.145808 0.267561 0.074865 
S PE-2 0.231601 0.270760 0.761963 0.226765 0.165912 0.005269 
S PE-3 0.349595 0.387367 0.904002 0.290938 0.295493 0.099822 
S PE-4 0.397617 0.422307 0.836836 0.317523 0.350376 0.193498 
S PE-5 0.276561 0.336743 0.832791 0.187636 0.255772 0.119907 
       
E PR-3 0.011611 0.044205 0.061323 0.679766 0.255566 -0.030949 
E PR-4 0.362132 0.363395 0.282157 0.869028 0.380516 0.091470 
E PR-5 0.285333 0.332682 0.278294 0.855550 0.321731 0.043062 
       
E PE-1 0.232116 0.236627 0.221394 0.222662 0.707168 -0.013022 
E PE-2 0.240499 0.129715 0.213679 0.319833 0.725124 -0.035886 
E PE-4 0.177320 0.168694 0.285507 0.311707 0.730406 0.064413 
E PE-5 0.118834 0.217479 0.225827 0.295025 0.672866 0.127352 
       
F PE-1 0.198687 0.115876 0.141765 0.051190 0.017266 0.879212 
F PE-2 0.177816 0.032216 0.097317 0.022261 0.014962 0.923632 
F PE-3 0.220380 0.095946 0.113804 0.087719 0.100661 0.897033 
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5.3. Estimation of structural model 
The PLS structural model was assessed using bootstrapping procedure (Efron 
and Tibshirani, 1993) with 250, 500, and 1000 times of resampling. The magnitude and 
statistical significance of the structural paths were consistent across the three rounds of 
bootstrapping. Figure II-2 and Table II-6 show the path coefficients and the explained 
construct variances.  
Figure ‎II-2. Operational model with path coefficients 
 
The R
2
 values of 0.25, 0.21, and 0.06 indicate that the model explains a fair 
amount of variance for environmental, safety, and financial performance, respectively. 
As demonstrated in Figure II-2, the links between safety culture and financial 
performance, environmental practices, and safety practices are significant (t-values equal 
to 2.03, 4.12, and 12.68, respectively) offering evidence for hypotheses H1, H2, and H6. 
Environmental practices are also significantly related to environmental performance (t = 
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4.57), providing statistical support for H4.  
The significant safety culture-safety performance and safety practices-safety 
performance paths provide support for hypotheses H5 and H7 (t = 1.77 and t = 2.32). 
Sobel test (Preacher and Hayes, 2004) further demonstrates that the former relationship is 
partially mediated by safety practices (Sobel = 2.28; p < 0.05). Similarly, the significant 
safety culture-environmental performance path provides support for hypothesis H3 (t = 
2.04) and Sobel test confirms that this relationship is partially mediated by environmental 
practices (Sobel = 3.06; p < 0.01). As to hypotheses H8 and H9, Figure II-2 and Table II-
6 show that the safety and environmental performance do not significantly relate to 
financial performance. With regards to the three control variables included in the model, 
only plant size can significantly affect environmental performance.  
Table ‎II-6: PLS structural model results  
 Standardized Coefficient t-Value
a 
Safety Culture → Financial Performance 0.188 2.028* 
Safety Performance → Financial Performance 0.071 0.071 
Environmental Performance → Financial Performance -0.009 0.086 
Plant Size → Financial Performance -0.034 0.385 
Plant Complexity → Financial Performance 0.022 0.183 
Plant Unionization → Financial Performance -0.078 0.815 
Safety Culture → Safety Performance 0.205 1.770† 
Safety Practices → Safety Performance 0.275 2.317* 
Plant Size → Safety Performance 0.036 0.439 
Plant Complexity → Safety Performance 0.056 0.858 
Plant Unionization → Safety Performance 0.087 0.974 
Safety Culture → Environmental Performance 0.134 2.039* 
Environmental Practices → Environmental Performance 0.365 4.571** 
Plant Size → Environmental Performance 0.203 2.218* 
Plant Complexity → Environmental Performance 0.062 0.978 
Plant Unionization → Environmental Performance -0.096 1.048 
Safety Culture → Safety Practices 0.644 12.684** 
Safety Culture → Environmental Practices 0.327 4.119** 
Variance explained in the endogenous variables   
Financial Performance R
2
 = 0.061 Safety Practices R
2
 = 0.415 
Safety Performance R
2
 = 0.209 Environmental Practices R
2
 = 0.107 
Environmental Performance R
2
 = 0.250   
a
  ** = p < 0.01, * = p < 0.05, 
†
 = p < .10.    
Overall, the conceptual model that we originally proposed gained adequate 
support from the data. The safety culture proved to be related to the environmental, 
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safety, and financial performance through direct and indirect paths defined in the model.  
6. Discussion 
The significant results for the direct and indirect relationships between safety 
culture and all three dimensions of organizational performance (i.e., financial, 
environmental, and safety performance) lend support for the concept of reciprocity norm 
and organizational support theory in workplace safety context. Organizational support 
theory (Eisenberger et al., 1997) is built upon the underlying concept that employees’ 
perceived organizational support stimulates their felt obligation to return the profitable 
treatment they receive from their organization by caring about the organization's success 
and helping the organization reach its objectives.  
Our results suggest that organizations with a positive safety culture, where (i) top 
management is concerned about employees’ safety and well-being and (ii) employees are 
empowered and actively involve and participate in safety-related activities, are more 
likely to gain better financial, environmental, and safety outcomes as a result of their 
increased employees’ commitment in pursuing organization goals and objectives.  
These results are also in accord with total quality management literature 
(Kaynak, 2003, Samson and Terziovski, 1999, Nair, 2006, Curkovic et al., 2000), as well 
as human resource management literature (Huselid et al., 1997, Jayaram et al., 1999, 
Subramony, 2009), pointing out the beneficial effects of management commitment and 
employee empowerment on organizational performance. 
Our results also contribute to the workplace safety, sustainability, and operations 
management research in several ways. This is the first study to provide empirical 
evidence for the relationship between safety, environmental, and financial dimensions of 
sustainable development in one model. Prior research and managerial practices regarding 
sustainability in operations management emphasize the environmental issues as the entry 
point for operationalizing sustainability. Our results, however, suggest that commitment 
to safety and establishing a positive safety culture as the starting point towards achieving 
a sustainable business can yield great benefits not only in terms of improved safety 
performance, but also with regards to improvements in firms’ environmental and 
financial outcomes.  
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Our results also reaffirm the proposed safety chain concept put forth by 
McFadden et al. (2009) for patient safety in healthcare industry as we provide empirical 
evidence for their safety culture-initiative-outcome model in a manufacturing context. 
More specifically, this study demonstrates that a culture of safety within the workplace is 
tied to the successful implementation of safety practices and, ultimately, to improved 
safety performance in terms of reduction in the frequency, severity, and impact of 
incidents/accidents, as well as heightened awareness and understanding of 
incidents/accidents and their root causes. We have also extended their model and 
explored the connections among safety chain variables with financial performance and 
ecological sustainability. More specifically, given the similarities between a safety-
oriented and an environmental-friendly culture, our theoretical model and empirical 
results suggest that McFadden et al.’s model can be extended to environmental 
management domain. In other words, a strong safety culture directly relates to successful 
implementation of green practices and improved green performance of the firm. 
Our study is also consistent with a recent stream of studies in Corporate Social 
Responsibility (CSR) domain which focuses on the details of CSR activities and on how 
firms can maximize the beneficial effects of CSR on their financial outcomes (Basu and 
Palazzo, 2008, Margolis and Walsh, 2003, Tang et al., 2012, Houghton et al., 2009, Kim 
et al., 2010). Specifically, our findings provide partial support for Tang et al.’s (2012) 
study, suggesting that two “CSR engagement strategies” can increase the overall CSR 
benefits to the firm: (i) pursuing an “internal CSR” activity (in our case, safety culture) as 
the entry point of CSR engagement rather than an “external CSR” activity, and (ii) 
engaging in other “related” CSR dimensions with similar resources, skills, and 
knowledge requirements (in our case, environmental management) at the next steps.  
Unfortunately, the research reported here is of a purely cross-sectional snapshot 
and we are unable to test and account for the lags between the development of the safety 
culture and the existence of practices and performance changes, which is a limitation of 
all such studies. Therefore, we suggest that two further streams of field research are 
needed. The first is to conduct in-depth case studies to detail the impact of safety culture 
and improvement initiatives on the performance dimensions internally used by the firms, 
to determine the rich fabric of how the culture and these initiatives lead to performance 
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changes. Secondly, to increase the rigor of the study, a set of longitudinal studies are 
required to measure the extent of safety-oriented culture and the implementation level of 
safety and environmental practices and their impact on organizational performance 
across a three to five year period, examining the relationships and their development 
through time. These studies can collect secondary panel data for companies whose CSR 
and performance information are available on databases such as Compustat and 
Environmental, Social, and Governance factors (ESG) in addition to gathering primary 
survey data from the same companies. 
Lastly, the surprising findings of no significant relationship between 
safety/environmental performance and financial performance merit some discussion. One 
reason for the lack of such effects could well lie in a possible lagged relationship between 
these performance constructs, as suggested by Hart and Ahuja (1996). Their results 
provide some evidence that it may pay firms to be green, but only after a time lag. 
Specifically, they found that it takes up to two years for improved environmental 
performance in terms of emission reduction to improve accounting profitability 
measures, such as return on sales (ROS), return on assets (ROA), and return on equity 
(ROE). Therefore, our somewhat puzzling findings might not be surprising after all. 
Moreover, this lagged effect could be due to reputation considerations. For example, a 
firm that is sued in time period t may experience an immediate stock price reaction 
(Klassen and McLaughlin, 1996, Konar and Cohen, 2001), but the accounting returns 
may only be affected several years later if the litigation results in substantial legal or 
compliance costs. Similarly, although a firm may emit toxic chemicals in one year, this 
information is only released to the public with at least a one-year lag, which in turn takes 
one more year for it to affect the firm’s revenue and profit. Unfortunately, we did not 
perform a longitudinal study and cannot empirically investigate this suggestion. This will 
remain a topic for subsequent research. 
We must also acknowledge some other limitations of our study. First, reliance on 
single-respondent perceptual data is a potential shortcoming of survey methodology, 
creating grounds for bias. While any potential bias of this kind cannot be explicitly ruled 
out, earlier research suggests no major concerns (Vachon and Klassen, 2006b, Sarkis et 
al., 2010, Hajmohammad et al., 2013, Ellis et al., 2010, Jiang, 2009b, Gadenne et al., 
C h a p t e r  I I  P a g e  |  3 8  
 
2009). Moreover, studies suggest that self-reported data are highly consistent with more 
objective measures, especially when the respondents are at the appropriate level within 
the organization (Ketokivi and Schroeder, 2004, Miller and Roth, 1994). Besides, 
validation of our survey data on environmental performance with NPRI objective 
measure confirms that there is no major bias in the single respondent self-reported data in 
this study. Second, the plants included in this study were selected from a limited range of 
industries with moderate levels of safety and environmental risks. Indeed, our findings 
might not be completely applicable to industries with lower levels of workplace 
hazards/adverse environmental impacts. Exploring the effect of industry type - with 
regards to safety and environmental concerns - on our proposed model is a fruitful 
avenue for future research (Baird et al., 2012). 
In addition, the findings of this paper suggest other areas for future research. For 
example, it would be interesting to explore the connections between our proposed model 
and firms’ competitive advantage. Given that safety culture is shown here to be an 
important driver of sustainability, additional longitudinal research should examine 
whether it leads to, or is associated with, emergence of an environmental-friendly culture 
within the organizations.  
7. Conclusion  
This paper addresses Brown (1996) and Cantor’s (2008) almost-unanswered 
calls for workplace safety research in operations and logistics management, and puts the 
anecdotal trade-off between safety and productivity/profitability into question. The 
arguments advanced in this paper illuminated how two aspects of safety culture, that is, 
management commitment and employee participation, could directly enhance the three 
dimensions of the organization’s performance, i.e., safety, environmental, and financial 
performance. Specifically, we demonstrated that safety culture influences safety 
performance indirectly through the mediating effect of safety practices. We also showed 
that organizations with a safety-oriented culture were more likely to join the green 
movement, adopt green technologies and successfully implement green practices, and 
subsequently, improve their environmental performance.  
This study is distinct from previous works in the CSR and sustainability fields in 
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that it looks into the inter-relationships between safety and environmental management 
constructs and suggests using safety as an entry point for operationalizing sustainability 
for an organization. Further, it emphasizes on both the human benefits (safety 
performance) and the business case (environmental and financial performance) of 
achieving this broader conceptualization of sustainability. It also uses survey data from 
validated and reliable scales specifically designed to measure the defined constructs 
rather than the standard MSCI ESG (also known as KLD) data which is often the source 
of proxy variables for CSR-related constructs in CSR literature.  
On the practical level, the proposed model provides the organizations’ managers 
a path for designing or rethinking their approaches towards sustainability and a guideline 
for making the best out of their established environmental and safety management 
systems. To keep up with the worldwide quest for sustainability in various industries, 
many organizations have sought to become environment-oriented and establish 
environmental management systems such as ISO 14001, after becoming customer-
oriented and implementation of quality management systems such as ISO 9001 during 
late 20th and early 21st centuries. This study provides empirical support that both 
financial and environmental outcomes are tied to the safety culture, suggesting that 
organizations desiring to make environmental and financial improvements need to focus 
their attention on this infrastructural issue as the first step and emphasize the important 
role of the individuals’ commitment, empowerment, and participation. Our results 
suggest that managers interested in improving environmental and safety performance of 
their plants in parallel to their financial gains should follow a systematic approach in 
creating a culture of safety prior to pursuing ecological sustainability. Once employees’ 
safety becomes a priority within the organization and employees participate in building a 
safe workplace environment, organizations can transfer the gained momentum to 
successfully adopt environmental technologies, implement safety practices and, 
ultimately, improve their safety/environmental performance.  
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Appendix II-A: Survey Items 
Constructs and their Scale Items* Mean S.D. 
Safety Culture (SC)   
To what extent does your plant exhibit each of the following organizational characteristics? (1=not at all, 7=great 
extent) 
SC-1: Senior management listens to and cares about employees’ safety concerns. 
SC-2: The plant’s management is driving the workforce to be a safety-centered organization. 
SC-3: The plant’s management acts upon the employees’ suggestions regarding safety 
matters. 
SC-4: The plant’s employees encourage each other to report any safety concerns they might 
have. 
SC-5: Employees’ safety is constantly reinforced as a priority. 
SC-6: The plant’s management knowingly compromise safety concerns for productivity. 
SC-7: The plant’s employees adhere to the established safety rules and guidelines. 
6.24 
6.16 
5.93 
5.19 
Dropped 
Dropped 
5.26 
0.89 
0.88 
0.99 
1.33 
 
 
0.99 
Safety Practices (S PR)   
To what extent has your plant implemented the following practices as a means to reducing safety incidents/ 
accidents? (1=not at all, 7=great extent) 
S PR-1: Taking input from all stakeholders on hazard identification and assessment. 
S PR-2: Taking input from all stakeholders on incident/accident reduction methods. 
S PR-3: Reporting incidents/accidents without blame. 
S PR-4: Open-ended discussion groups (discuss openly about incidents/accidents). 
S PR-5: Safety training for employees. 
S PR-6: Statistical analysis of incidents/accidents data. 
S PR-7: System redesign for safety (restructuring the functioning of equipment, technology, 
procedures, etc.) 
5.59 
5.52 
Dropped 
5.39 
5.75 
5.18 
5.71 
1.12 
1.16 
 
1.33 
1.11 
1.59 
1.12 
Environmental Practices (E PR)   
Over the last two years, to what extent has your plant invested resources (money, time, and people) in programs 
in the following areas? (1=not at all, 7=great extent) 
E PR-1: ISO 14001 certification. 
E PR-2: Pollution prevention. 
E PR-3: Recycling of materials. 
E PR-4: Life cycle analysis. 
E PR-5: Waste reduction. 
Dropped 
Dropped 
4.88 
2.68 
4.57 
 
 
1.55 
1.64 
1.59 
Safety Performance (S PE)   
Over the last two years, to what extent have the following safety performance indicators changed? (1=much 
worse, 7=much better) 
S PE-1: Frequency of incidents/accidents. 
S PE-2: Severity of incidents/accidents. 
S PE-3: Understanding of incidents/accidents. 
S PE-4: Awareness of possible incidents/accidents. 
S PE-5: Impact of incidents/accidents. 
5.21 
5.26 
5.39 
5.56 
5.27 
1.08 
1.15 
0.98 
0.90 
1.05 
Environmental Performance (E PE)   
Over the last two years, to what extent has your plant’s environmental performance changed in the following 
areas? (1=much worse, 7=much better) 
E PE-1: Air emissions. 
E PE-2: Waste water generation. 
E PE-3: Solid waste disposal. 
E PE-4: Consumption of hazardous/harmful/toxic material. 
E PE-5: Energy consumption. 
4.63 
4.65 
Dropped  
4.78 
 5.04 
0.89 
1.01 
 
1.04
1.07 
Financial Performance (F PE)   
Rate the following plant’s performance over the last two years against the industry average. (1=well below, 
7=well above) 
F PE-1: Average returns on investments. 
F PE-2: Average profits. 
F PE-3: Profit growth. 
4.57 
4.39 
4.40 
1.15 
1.33 
1.25 
  
 
   
Chapter III 
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Chapter III.   Managing Supplier Sustainabili ty  
Risk: Strategies ,  Predictors, and Outcomes
1
 
1. Introduction 
Over the years, suppliers’ questionable practices with regard to sustainability-
related
2
 issues such as climate change, labor regulations, and workplace safety standards 
are increasingly projected to the buying organizations (Jiang, 2009a). The buyers
3
 caught 
up in such social or ecological scandals face stakeholders’ criticism and adverse publicity 
followed by substantial recalls and litigation costs, market share and revenue losses, and 
reputational damage (Parmigiani et al., 2011). At the same time, with the revolutionary 
growth of the social media industry making bad news travel globally at the speed of a 
tweet, the adverse consequences of such events has increased dramatically (Eccles et al., 
2007). Several anecdotes from the literature suggest that trying to separate the actions of 
suppliers from their responsibility does not protect the buyers – as popular brand 
powerhouses like Nike, Nestlé, BP, and Apple have discovered the hard way over the 
past two decades. The study by Lefevre et al. (2010) shows that buyers, on average, face 
12% reduction in their market capitalization after a sustainability-related problem is 
detected within their supply chains. Thus, suppliers’ ecological or social misconducts 
pose an inherent risk to buyers, coined as “supplier sustainability risk” (Foerstl et al., 
2010).  
Surprisingly, however, supply chain risk management (SCRM) literature has 
largely neglected this type of risk (Seuring and Müller, 2008), except for a few recent 
studies (Foerstl et al., 2010, Hofmann et al., 2014, Klassen and Vereecke, 2012).  
As with any other type of risk, buyers’ ability to manage supplier sustainability 
risk is critical to their long-term competitiveness (Eccles et al., 2007). In doing so, 
                                                          
1
 An abridged and refined version of this chapter has been submitted for publication to Journal of Supply 
Chain Management. 
2
 Throughout this paper, we use the term ‘sustainability’ to refer to ecological and social aspects of an 
organization’s operations. 
3
 Throughout this paper, we use the term “buyer” to refer to the buying organization contracting work to a 
“supplier” organization. The term “supply manager” refers to a middle manager in the buying organization, 
who is responsible for managing the relationship with one or multiple groups of supplier organizations.  
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anecdotal evidence suggests that buyers may apply sustainable supplier development 
initiatives, such as monitoring the suppliers (like Ford and GM) (Zhu et al., 2007) or 
collaborating with them (like IKEA) (IKEA, 2012) to improve their social or ecological 
performance and mitigate the risk. In certain cases, buyers like Staples may take extreme 
measures and avoid the risk all together by phasing out the supplier (Grant and Ando, 
2008). On the other hand, the re-emergence of events such as the massive collapse of 
Rana Plaza in Bangladesh in April 2013, killing more than 1,100 workers at the textile 
sweatshops which were suppliers to international brands including Primark, Bon Marche, 
and Joe Fresh suggests that, in some cases, buyers simply accept the risk and practice 
damage control by taking no actions and addressing the risk after its occurrence (Reuter 
et al., 2010). The question remains as to “Why, how and under what conditions buyers 
respond to supplier sustainability risks within their supply chains?”. 
To answer this question, this paper aims to take a step toward building a theory 
of supplier sustainability risk management. More specifically, given the crucial role of 
supply managers as the decision makers in the supply chain context (Ellis et al., 2010, 
Tazelaar and Snijders, 2013), we focus on the strategies they undertake at the operational 
level (Pagell and Gobeli, 2009). Since supplier sustainability risk is an inter-
organizational phenomenon, we adopt the exchange relationship between a buyer and a 
specific supplier as the context and the buyer–supplier transaction as the unit of analysis 
in our study. The focal decision is the supply managers’ decision to select among four 
abovementioned risk management strategies. 
We draw on resource dependence (Pfeffer and Salancik, 2003) and 
agency/management control (Eisenhardt, 1989, Ouchi, 1979) theories to explain different 
responses to supplier sustainability risk. Each of these theoretical lenses provides valid, 
yet incomplete, insights into the factors that affect the supply managers’ choice. The 
agency and management control theories explain how the uncertainties and risks inherent 
in a buyer-supplier relationship affect the control mechanisms used by supply managers 
to mitigate the supplier sustainability risks at suppliers’ facilities. The resource 
dependence perspective, however, emphasizes the supply managers’ ability to implement 
the intended control mechanism, as their choice may be constrained given the 
dependence structure of their relationship with the other party. Integrating these different 
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foci, our conceptual framework suggests that supply managers’ response to supplier 
sustainability risks is contingent upon their perceived risk as well as the level of buyer 
and supplier dependence on each other. We further extend this framework to include the 
slack resources available to supply managers and how it can shift their choices toward 
options which require fewer resources for implementation. 
The contributions of this paper to the supply chain management literature are 
three-fold. First, despite the growing number of studies in sustainable supply chain 
management and supply chain risk management areas, their literature streams have 
unfolded largely independent of one another with few exceptions (Cousins et al., 2004, 
Kocabasoglu et al., 2007) and the issues that exist at their intersection have remained 
largely unexplored (Krysiak, 2009). Specifically, the majority of studies on supply chain 
risks tend to address two general categories of supply risk, i.e., coordination risks (Souza 
et al., 2004) and disruption risks (Craighead et al., 2007). The present paper contributes 
to these literatures by explicitly focusing on supplier sustainability risk and the 
contingent operational-level strategies used to manage it.  
The second contribution of this study is to the sustainable supply chain 
management (SSCM) literature. Whereas prior studies have established that supply chain 
characteristics affect buyers’ approach toward SSCM, the mechanisms underlying such 
relationships, explaining why and how they exist, have not been investigated. For 
instance, Awaysheh & Klassen (2010) suggest that product visibility as well as distance 
from suppliers are positively related to the use of supplier socially-responsible initiatives. 
Another example is Klassen & Vereecke’s (2012) case study which proposes that 
monitoring or collaborative initiatives with regard to social issues in supply chains are 
prompted by increased accountability to stakeholders and by comparing actual social 
performance with regulatory, customer, and community expectations. Our study, 
however, suggests that such initiatives are basically employed as risk mitigation 
strategies and explains the conditions under which each of them is more likely to be used.    
Third, by integrating the agency/management control and resource dependence 
theories, this paper responds to the ever-growing need for drawing on established 
organizational theories to describe and predict supply chain phenomena (Ketchen and 
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Hult, 2007a, Sarkis et al., 2011).  
The following section begins by reviewing the literature on supplier 
sustainability risk management and positioning the paper within the wider SCRM 
literature. Section 3 provides the theoretical underpinnings of the proposed conceptual 
framework and its related propositions. We conclude by discussing the paper’s 
implications and limitations in Section 4. 
2. Supply Chain Risks and Sustainability 
Supply chain risk management literature is generally concerned with “pure risks” 
within supply chains which, in contrast to “speculative risks”, involve the situations 
where no gain relative to the starting position is possible as the outcome of the risk event 
(Yates and Stone, 1992). In other words, supply chain risk refers to the possibility of 
unpredictable events resulting in negative consequences for the firm under investigation 
in a supply chain (Narasimhan and Talluri, 2009). In an attempt to differentiate supply 
chain risks from other adverse events in the business, early studies on SCRM developed 
various supply chain risk typologies or taxonomies based on risk sources (i.e., the events 
through which supply chain risks materialize) or consequences (Manuj and Mentzer, 
2008, Oke and Gopalakrishnan, 2009).  
A review of the literature indicates that studies focusing on the upstream supply 
chain risks (i.e., supply risks as opposed to demand risks) are traditionally concerned 
with the events negatively affecting the interconnected flows of material, information, 
and funds in supply chains (Sodhi et al., 2012). Such risks are classified into two 
categories: (i) coordination risks, materializing through incoordination between supply 
and demand, such as delays, forecast inaccuracies, or procurement failures (Souza et al., 
2004), and (ii) disruption risks, materializing through unexpected internal or external 
process failures or disruptions, such as equipment malfunctions, strikes, or natural 
hazards (Kleindorfer and Saad, 2005). In contrast, “supplier sustainability risks”4 (Foerstl 
et al., 2010) materialize through adverse stakeholder reactions (Hofmann et al., 2014) 
and occur when buyers are held accountable by customers, NGOs, or other salient 
                                                          
4
 Throughout this paper, we maintain the term “supplier sustainability risk” as it has already been used 
within the SCRM literature. Alternatively, these risks could also be coined as reputational risks (Jiang et 
al., 2009; Roehrich et al, 2014) because of their detrimental direct effects on the buyer’s reputation. 
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stakeholders (Mitchell et al., 1997) for their suppliers’ misconducts related to natural 
environment or social communities (Amaeshi et al., 2008, Parmigiani et al., 2011).  
Our review of SCRM literature indicates that supplier sustainability risk is an 
emerging notion with different scopes and definitions. It was first identified by Cousins 
et al. (2004) as the driver of environmentally-oriented supplier management initiatives to 
avoid reputational loss. However, Foerstl et al. (2010) were the first to coin the term and 
define it as “the risk of corporate reputational damage to the buying firm, caused by 
supplier [sustainability-related] misconduct[s]” (p. 118). Klassen & Vereecke (2012), 
further, focused on the social sustainability risks within supply chains and highlighted 
their adverse effects on buyers’ costs and revenues. Only recently, however, a concise 
conceptualization of supplier sustainability risk based on a theory-driven approach was 
provided by Hofmann et al. (2014), which lays the basis for our study (p. 168):  
“[a sustainability-related] condition or a potentially occurring event”, located 
within a buyer’s supply base, that “may provoke harmful stakeholder 
reactions.” 
Based on this literature, we suggest that the source-consequence mechanism 
underlying a specific supplier sustainability risk is as follows: a sustainability-related 
problem occurs in buyer’s supply base, this event is detected and noticed by concerned 
stakeholders, and stakeholders regard it as illegitimate and unacceptable and hold the 
buyer responsible for the event. As such, supplier sustainability risk is the cumulative 
likelihood of these events and their consequences (Roehrich et al., 2014). Hence, the 
level of supplier sustainability that buyers face depends not only the probability and 
immediate consequences of suppliers’ misconducts, but also on other factors such their 
size and visibility in the marketplace (Bowen, 2002), location of their supply base 
(Reuter et al., 2010), salience of concerned stakeholders (Parmigiani et al., 2011), and 
their industry (Neef, 2004). 
2.1. Managing supplier sustainability risk 
The purpose of supply chain risk management is to address the likelihood of 
supply chain risks and their consequences by analyzing the risk sources and 
implementing proactive or reactive risk management strategies to protect the 
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organizations from such unexpected events and their adverse effects (Yates and Stone, 
1992, Ritchie and Brindley, 2007). Although they may try to do this in a number of ways, 
their responses would fit into three generic categories of risk management strategies: 
avoidance, acceptance, and mitigation (Ritchie and Brindley, 2007, Blome and 
Schoenherr, 2011). 
In an attempt to develop a new concept for supplier sustainability risk 
management, Hofmann et al. (2014) introduced four functions which fully integrated 
stakeholder management into the buyer’s supply chain risk management system: (i) 
stakeholder involvement function to identify those stakeholders that are most important 
to buyer’s specific business environment, (ii) translator function to process implicit 
stakeholder expectations and explicate them into more clear assessment criteria, (iii) 
supplier management function to convert these criteria into strict operating instructions 
and enforce them throughout the supply chain, and (iv) stakeholder management function 
to interact with the stakeholders and present them with the buyer’s efforts toward 
meeting their expectations. The focus of this study is on operational-level actions which 
supply managers undertake to manage the supplier sustainability risk within their supply 
base. So, the scope of our risk management framework is limited to the actions pursued 
by the supplier management function in Hofmann et al.’s framework. Foerstl et al. (2010) 
suggest that such actions include supplier phase-out and sustainable supplier 
development. 
2.1.1. Supplier phase-out (risk avoidance) 
By implementing supplier phase-out, supply managers terminate their 
relationship with their incumbent risky supplier and switch to another alternative supplier 
with a clean sustainability record. Hence, supplier phase-out fits into the category of risk 
avoidance strategies which entails the elimination of risk by withdrawing from the risky 
situations (Jüttner et al., 2003). In other words, it is geared toward driving the risk event 
probability to zero by removing the risk source. Some organizations immediately inhibit 
further business undertakings with suppliers by blacklisting them in their order placement 
system once a misconduct is detected at their facilities (Reuter et al., 2010). For example, 
in June 2013, Wilmar International Ltd., the world’s largest palm oil trader, decided to 
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cut ties with all Indonesian suppliers who were found to clear land for cultivation with 
illegal fires (Yun et al., 2013). 
2.1.2. Sustainable supplier development (risk mitigation) 
Sustainable supplier development (SSD) initiatives fit into the risk mitigation 
category (Ritchie and Brindley, 2007). Such initiatives are defined as the buyers’ plans 
and strategies to integrate the ecological and social issues into supply management 
process to improve the ecological and social performance of the upstream suppliers (Bai 
and Sarkis, 2010, Krause et al., 2007). Therefore, they are the buyers’ means for reducing 
the probability of supplier sustainability risk through enhancing supplier’s ecological and 
social performance. The practices and activities that collectively define SSD can be 
classified in two categories: monitoring-based and collaboration-based initiatives 
(Vachon and Klassen, 2008, Zhao et al., 2007).  
Monitoring-based SSD initiatives, also known as “buyer-to-supplier” 
mechanisms (Jiang, 2009a), focus on assessing the processes or actual performance of 
suppliers against speciﬁc characteristics or particular performance criteria to verify their 
compliance with the requirements. As part of this approach, buyers usually gather and 
process suppliers’ information, set proper criteria, and assess the sustainability-related 
aspects of incoming goods and the suppliers that provide them through surveys and 
audits, and ask suppliers to report on different dimensions of their social and ecological 
performance (Seuring and Müller, 2008, Bowen et al., 2001). These are usually enforced 
through written social/ecological requirements within contracts (Neef, 2004, Ciliberti et 
al., 2008), requiring third-party certifications (Morali and Searcy, 2013), or imposing the 
buyers’ codes of conducts on the suppliers (Andersen and Skjoett-Larsen, 2009). For 
instance, Bristol-Myers Squibb, IBM, and Xerox encouraged their Chinese suppliers to 
develop environmental management systems consistent with ISO 14001 and Ford, GM, 
and Toyota required their suppliers to obtain ISO 14000 certification (Zhu et al., 2007). 
In 2010, IBM extended its Social and Environmental Management System to its first-tier 
suppliers, requiring them to diffuse the same program to the sub-suppliers involved in the  
IBM supply chain (Friedman, 2013). 
However, collaboration-based SSD initiatives, also known as “peer-to-peer” 
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mechanisms (Jiang, 2009a), aim at improving the suppliers’ ecological and social 
performance through partnership, i.e., direct interaction with them and implementation of 
jointly-developed ecological and social solutions (Golicic and Smith, 2013). They 
encompass a broad range of activities like providing training programs to suppliers, 
compensating them for the costs associated with their compliance (e.g., joint investments 
in environmental friendly equipment), and sponsoring ecological or social summits to 
encourage the suppliers to share their information and experience (Vereecke and Muylle, 
2006). For example, IKEA tries to change the mind-set of its suppliers particularly in 
developing countries by improving their knowledge and understanding of sustainability-
related issues. It also provides financial supports to its suppliers in the form of a loan for 
their sustainability-related capital-intensive investments, such as a building wastewater 
treatment plants at their sites (Spence and Bourlakis, 2009).  
2.1.3. No proactive actions: damage control (risk acceptance) 
In addition to the proactive strategies suggested by Foerstl et al. (2010), we also 
include risk acceptance as a reactive strategy that buyers might use to manage supplier 
sustainability risk. Taking on this strategy, supply managers simply retain the risk by 
taking no preventive actions, budgeting for damage control, and dealing with the 
potential risk event should it happen at some point (Sodhi and Tang, 2012). A notable 
example is BP’s oil spill case in Gulf of Mexico in 2010, causing an explosion that killed 
11 of the 126 crew members and an oil spill that took 87 days to get under control. 
Although BP’s chief contractors, Transocean, which owned the mobile drilling rig, and 
Halliburton, which was responsible for the cementing operations, shared the blame for 
many of the fatal mistakes, BP was ultimately responsible for the accident and paid close 
to $40 billion in fines, cleanup costs, and settlements, with an additional $16 billion due 
to the Clean Water Act (Broder, 2011).  
3. Conceptual Framework for Managing Supplier Sustainability Risk  
As mentioned in the previous section, there is no one way to manage the supplier 
sustainability risk and supply managers may select from amongst a range of risk 
management strategies. Based on resource dependence (Pfeffer and Salancik, 2003) and 
agency/management control (Eisenhardt, 1989, Ouchi, 1979) theories, we suggest that 
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two major predictors drive the supply managers’ strategy choice: the level of supplier 
sustainability risk they perceive as well as the dependence dynamics of the specific 
buyer-supplier relationship.  
Figure ‎III-1. Conceptual framework 
 
We further propose that the risk management strategies improve buyers’ 
financial performance directly or indirectly through their enhanced organizational 
reputation. Finally, as illustrated in Figure III-1, we suggest that selecting desirable 
strategies that fit the external environment contingencies (i.e., risk and dependence) and 
the positive performance and reputational outcomes significantly depend on the slack 
resources available to implement those strategies. 
3.1. Theoretical lenses 
3.1.1. Agency and management control theories 
Agency and management control theories (Eisenhardt, 1989, Ouchi, 1979) 
generally provide a useful framework for looking into the buyer and supplier interactions 
in supply chain context and understanding the buyers’ responses to supply chain risks 
(Zsidisin and Ellram, 2003, Ketchen and Hult, 2007a). In this framework, the buyer 
serves as the principal delegating work to the agent, i.e., the supplier. Both agent and 
principal are motivated by self-interest (i.e., are opportunistic) and seek to receive as 
much possible utility with the least possible expenditure (Davis et al., 1997). These 
theories are concerned with two kinds of agent opportunistic behaviors that a principal 
Perceived Supplier 
Sustainability Risk Risk Management Strategies 
 
1- Acceptance (no actions) 
2- Mitigation (monitoring- or 
collaboration-based SSD) 
3- Avoidance (supplier phase-
out)  
Slack Resources 
Buyer-Supplier 
Dependence 
Structure 
Buyer Reputation 
Buyer Financial 
Performance 
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must control: pre-contractual opportunism, aka “adverse selection” (e.g., withholding and 
misrepresentation of information) and post-contractual opportunism, aka “moral hazard” 
(e.g., shirking and cheating behaviors) (Lassar and Kerr, 1996, Williamson, 1979).  
Control is generally defined as any process used by an individual, a group, or an 
organization to affect or determine what another individual, group, or organization does 
under different situations (Tannenbaum, 1968). According to agency and management 
control theories, principals can take three distinct control mechanisms to keep their 
agents’ behaviors in check: output, behavior, and input control mechanisms (Eisenhardt, 
1989, Ouchi, 1979). Output controls focus on agents’ performance, i.e. evaluating it 
against predetermined targets and giving them the authority to choose the means to 
achieve those goals (Ouchi, 1979). Behavior controls, on the other hand, concentrate on 
the transformation process of agents’ work, i.e., the processes, tasks, and activities that 
are expected to lead to their performance outcomes (Ouchi, 1977). Although output 
controls mainly motivate agents through the use of incentives and behavior controls 
ensure of their motivation through close supervision, both mechanisms are centred on 
evaluation and feedback processes (Gencturk and Aulakh, 1995). However, input 
controls emerge from a socialization process between principal and agent, which results 
in shared beliefs and values (Patzelt and Shepherd, 2008). They influence the agents’ 
behaviours in a way that their commitment to the relationship is enhanced, and adjust the 
antecedent conditions of their performance (i.e., their knowledge, skills, abilities, values, 
and motives) to ensure that they have the required ability to perform well (Snell, 1992, 
Ouchi, 1979). 
The focus of this study is on the post-contractual stage, where suppliers’ 
misconducts in terms of labor standards, ecological issues, or other sustainability-related 
concerns giving rise to supplier sustainability risks are considered as opportunistic 
behaviors which need to be controlled by the buyers (Moore, 2001, Jiang, 2009a). The 
premises of agency and control theories apply to such situations because: (i) suppliers 
may not share the same interests as the buyers (goal incongruence) and might have 
different risk preferences, (ii) there is information asymmetry between two parties, and 
(iii) there are costs associated with buyers’ verification of suppliers’ behaviors 
(Eisenhardt, 1989). A control mechanism, here, refers to any process or initiative used by 
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buyers to influence the behavior and performance of suppliers to decrease the likelihood 
of suppliers’ opportunistic behaviors, i.e., their sustainability-related misconducts 
(Handley and Benton, 2013).  
The more efficient these behaviors are controlled, the less supplier sustainability 
risk the buyer will face. Hence, control mechanisms perform as risk mitigation strategies. 
Output controls mitigate supplier sustainability risks by assessing suppliers’ social and 
ecological performance against a set of pre-specified objectives such as a code of 
conduct. Behavior controls, however, reduce the risk by close monitoring and evaluation 
of suppliers’ actions over time and providing constructive feedbacks for correcting the 
deviations (Handley and Benton, 2013). Hence, in this study, the combination of output 
and behavior control mechanisms resembles the monitoring-based SSD initiatives 
(Vachon and Klassen, 2006a, Golicic and Smith, 2013). In contrast, when buyers use 
input controls, they decrease the probability of suppliers’ misconducts by contributing to 
suppliers’ awareness building, encouraging them to promote a socially and ecologically 
responsible culture, and helping them develop related capabilities rather than a speciﬁc 
short-term outcome (Ciliberti et al., 2008). Therefore, in this study, the input control 
mechanisms are exemplified by the collaboration-based SSD initiatives (Golicic and 
Smith, 2013, Vachon and Klassen, 2008).  
3.1.2. Resource dependence theory 
The dependence concept in supply chains has been argued to be one of the key 
attributes influencing supply chain management issues such as buyer-supplier 
relationship (Cox, 2004), supplier development (Carr et al., 2008), and supply chain 
performance (Gulati and Sytch, 2007). According to resource dependence theory, 
organizations are not self-sufficient and depend on each other for resources, and such 
interdependency introduces uncertainty into their decision-making environment (Pfeffer 
and Salancik, 2003). As a result, they adjust their structure and behaviors to acquire and 
maintain their required resources and try to reduce their environmental uncertainties and 
dependencies by means of control mechanisms (Hillman et al., 2009). Resource 
dependence theory predicts that the type of such control mechanism depends on the level 
and nature of dependence they develop, and the relative power of all players (Pfeffer and 
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Salancik, 2003). Consequently, in a supply chain context, we expect that the buyers’ risk 
management strategies applied as control mechanisms to deal with the supplier 
sustainability risks would depend on the buyer-supplier dependence structure of the 
specific relationship (Cox, 2004).   
3.2. Risk management predictors 
In order to develop a series of propositions linked to the front-end of the 
proposed conceptual framework, an approach composed of a series of systematic steps is 
needed. First, the concepts of perceived risk and buyer-supplier dependence structure are 
defined and presented in this section. These two concepts are then pulled together in 
Sections 3.3 and 3.4 to develop a series of contingency-based propositions.  
3.2.1. Supply managers and their perception of risk 
As discussed earlier, supplier sustainability risk is the cumulative likelihood and 
consequence of a series of events: occurrence of a sustainability-related misconduct in 
buyers’ supply base, stakeholders’ detection of the misconduct, and stakeholders’ 
attribution of the misconduct responsibility to the buyers. There is no doubt that buyers’ 
response to this cumulative risk may depend on many different factors, including the 
nature of suppliers’ misconducts, their size, and ownership (Klassen and Vereecke, 
2012), stakeholders’ salience (Parmigiani et al., 2011), buyer’s orientation toward 
sustainability (Pagell and Wu, 2009), the relevant laws and regulations in place (Jiang, 
2009a), and the individual attributes of the decision makers, such as their experience as 
well as their sustainability-related values (Ellis et al., 2011).  
However, behavioral research on decision-making in uncertain situations has 
shown that the effect of such factors on the decision outcome is mediated through the 
decision makers’ perception of risk (Pablo et al., 1996, March and Shapira, 1987). More 
specifically, management responses to supplier sustainability risks are essentially not 
motivated by completely objective evaluations of risks but by their subjective risk 
perceptions (Ellis et al., 2010, Kocabasoglu et al., 2007), defined as their assessment of 
the risk inherent in a situation (Sitkin and Weingart, 1995). In the same vein, there are 
studies suggesting that one of the prevalent drivers of implementation of SSD initiatives 
by buyers is their managers’ perception of the risks involved (Zhu and Sarkis, 2007, 
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Walker and Jones, 2012). Particularly, supply managers have been found to play a 
critical role in developing management systems (Angell and Klassen, 1999b) and to be 
the most significant driving force of extending sustainability-related initiatives 
throughout the supply chains (Ehrgott et al., 2011, Carter and Jennings, 2004).  
Therefore, in this study, we focus on the level of supplier sustainability risk (the 
cumulative risk) perceived by supply managers as one of the major predictors of their 
choice amongst the four risk management strategies. In addition, since this study focuses 
on how the perceived supplier sustainability risk - rather than its determinants - 
influences the decision outcome, we do not differentiate between the risks associated 
with social and ecological aspects of sustainability. 
3.2.2. Buyer-supplier dependence structure 
Based on Cox et al.’s (2003) seminal work on supply chain dependence 
structure, there are four dependence regimes that buyers and suppliers can find 
themselves in: (1) buyer dominance, which implies that supplier is highly dependent on 
buyer and this is not reciprocated by the latter, (2) interdependence, which occurs when 
both buyer and supplier are highly dependent on each other, (3) supplier dominance, 
which is precisely the reverse situation of buyer dominance, and (4) independence, which 
indicates a situation where both buyer and supplier have little or no dependence on the 
other party.  
Our conceptual framework suggests that the strategies selected by supply 
managers to deal with supplier sustainability risk heavily depend on the dependence 
regime of the specific buyer-supplier relationship because it signifies the power of buyer 
in implementing the strategy. 
3.3. Managing supplier sustainability risk: buyer dominance or interdependence 
situations 
High level of supplier dependence on the buyer has been shown to increase the 
buyer’s relative power in the relationship, enabling it to significantly influence the 
actions and intentions of the supplier (Benton and Maloni, 2005, Bastl et al., 2013). The 
dependent suppliers are more likely to cooperate with the buyers (Carr et al., 2008) and 
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to make changes to their production processes and product specifications to meet their 
requirements (Hartley and Choi, 1996). More specifically, recent studies suggest that 
high supplier dependence is a traditional requirement for supplier’s compliance to 
buyer’s specific social and ecological standards and requirements (Locke et al., 2009, 
Pedersen, 2009). It follows that supply managers can mitigate the supplier sustainability 
risk either through monitoring-based or collaboration-based SSD initiatives when 
supplier is highly dependent on buyer, i.e., in “buyer dominance” or “interdependence” 
situations.  
In these two situations, high level of supplier dependence translates into 
increased influence of the dominant buyers, allowing them to contractually set out 
socially or ecologically responsible conditions for suppliers (Cramer, 2008) and 
successfully implement their SSD strategies (Spence and Bourlakis, 2009, Pedersen, 
2009, Hoejmose et al., 2013). As a result, suppliers will have to act in a responsible 
manner (Jenkins, 2006, Andersen and Skjoett-Larsen, 2009) or they will be excluded 
from the buyers’ supply base (Perry and Towers, 2009, Gulati and Sytch, 2007). This 
conclusion is in line with Kraljic’s (1983) strategic recommendation to buying 
organizations to exploit their full bargaining power so as to minimize the supply risks if 
they are the dominant player in the supply chain, or to get defensive and start looking for 
substitute material and suppliers if the supplier has the upper hand in the game. Hence, 
high supplier dependence is a precursor for implementing either of the SSD-based risk 
mitigation strategies.  
P1: When supplier dependence on buyer is high (i.e., buyer dominance and 
interdependence situations), supply managers are more likely to mitigate the 
supplier sustainability risk through SSD initiatives rather than to avoid or to 
accept it (Cells A,B,E; Fig. III-2). 
3.3.1. Effect of perceived risk in buyer dominance situation 
As outlined in P1, supply managers in a buyer dominance situation are more 
likely to mitigate the supplier sustainability risk either through monitoring-based or 
collaboration-based SSD initiatives rather than to avoid or to accept it. In this section, we 
draw on agency and management control theories to look into the effect of their 
perceived risk on their choice between these two risk mitigation strategies.  
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Based on the agency theory, behavior and output control mechanisms are used 
when the agents’ performance ambiguity and the environmental uncertainties are at a low 
level and when there is not a substantial incongruence between agent and principal goals 
(Eisenhardt, 1989, Ouchi, 1980, Rowe et al., 2012). These conditions reflect a situation 
where the decision makers perceive a low level of risk. For instance, the global fashion 
brand Zara faces a relatively low level of supplier sustainability risk because almost 70% 
of its suppliers are based in Europe (Ghemawat and Nueno, 2006). Therefore, it suffices 
to merely enforce its code of conduct throughout its supply chain (Inditex, 2013). In 
contrast, its US-based competitor, Gap Inc., with the majority of its suppliers operating in 
Asia, has to take further steps, like pursuing a stakeholder engagement strategy (Smith et 
al., 2011) or providing a $20 million of capital to support fire safety improvements at 
supplier facilities (Gap Inc., 2013). Therefore, we can conclude that: 
P1-a: In buyer dominance situations, supply managers are more likely to mitigate 
low level of perceived supplier sustainability risk through monitoring-based 
rather than collaboration-based SSD initiatives (Cell A; Fig. III-2). 
As the level of perceived risk increases, monitoring-based controls will not be a 
viable option for supply managers (Ouchi, 1977) since this mechanism limits their span 
of control (e.g., limited number of audits conducted at suppliers sites) and increases the 
probability of suppliers’ misconducts, and thereby amplifies supplier sustainability risk 
(Ouchi, 1979, Handley and Benton, 2013). In addition, even with these initiatives in 
place, supplier deception may emerge since supply managers, at best, can take a snapshot 
of what is happening at a suppliers’ facilities but often do not explore why it is happening 
or how the situation can be improved. An exclusive reliance on this strategy may create a 
system in which suppliers’ main objective is to pass the audits, rather than to address the 
substantive issues that are the focus of the audit (Jiang, 2009a, Roth et al., 2008). Hence, 
monitoring-based SSD initiatives are not suitable for risk mitigation if supply managers 
perceive a high level of supplier sustainability risk.  
Input control mechanisms, however, are shown to be used in situations where 
high levels of complexity and uncertainty create a high risk situation for the principal 
(Ouchi, 1980). When the need for goal congruence between the principal and agent is 
high, in other words, when the probability of agent’s opportunistic behavior is 
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significant, employing input control mechanism is more appropriate (Rowe et al., 2012, 
Wilkins and Ouchi, 1983). In the same vein, when supply managers’ perceived supply 
risk increases, they become more eager to develop closer relationships with their 
suppliers to deal with the uncertainty and risk because such relationships increase their 
social capital, promote effective communication, enhance the trust in their relationship, 
and improve suppliers’ performance (Zsidisin and Ellram, 2003). Besides, suppliers are 
found to be more likely to perform in compliance with what buyers require in terms of 
sustainability issues when the buyers’ governance efforts are toward persuasion and 
cooperation rather than threats and compulsion (Jiang, 2009a, Locke et al., 2009). 
Thereby, with collaboration-based initiatives in place, the high probability of suppliers’ 
misconducts is more likely to decrease (Cousins and Menguc, 2006). In addition, buyers 
with a prior experience of reputational damage due to their suppliers’ sustainability-
related misconducts shift toward more cooperative relationship with their suppliers to 
properly diffuse their concerns and values (Spence and Bourlakis, 2009). This can be the 
result of an increase in the risk they perceive. A notable example is Nike’s new approach 
toward supplier management: establishing close relationships with fewer but more 
capable suppliers, through frequent communication, information sharing, and joint 
problem-handling. To improve suppliers’ compliance with its code of conduct, Nike 
moved from a market relationship to a collaborative partnership where suppliers had a 
deeper and more secure association with Nike and internalized its sustainability-related 
values and practices (Lim and Phillips, 2008). More recently, it has decided to provide its 
suppliers with its own state-of-the-art screening tools, called bluesign technologies, that 
will allow them to select more sustainable dyes, detergents, and chemicals for use in the 
textile manufacturing process (Fellow, 2013). Therefore, we can conclude that: 
P1-b: In buyer dominance situations, supply managers are more likely to mitigate 
high level of perceived supplier sustainability risk through collaboration-based 
rather than monitoring-based SSD initiatives (Cell B; Fig. III-2). 
3.3.2. Effect of perceived risk in interdependence situation 
The interdependence between buyer and supplier is likely to result in their long-
term relationship with permanent inter-organizational linkages in order to ensure stable 
flow of resources (Casciaro and Piskorski, 2005). It creates an environment which fosters 
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partnership (Mentzer et al., 2000) and strategic alliance (McCarter and Northcraft, 2007). 
In general, the more mutually-dependent buyer and supplier are on each other, the more 
they will be willing to develop collaborative norms (Cai and Yang, 2008), i.e., to trust 
and commit resources (Lund-Thomsen and Lindgreen, 2013), meet frequently and share 
key information (Zacharia et al., 2011), and participate in joint planning and action 
(Gulati and Sytch, 2007). Besides, within an interdependent relationship, consequences 
of the risks associated with sustainability-related misconducts in supply chain can affect 
both buyer and supplier. Therefore, regardless of the level of supplier sustainability risk 
perceived, both parties will develop a mutual understanding of the importance of 
sustainability-related issues and will be more likely to mutually address the problems 
with a sense of common purpose (Hoejmose et al., 2013). Given this, we can conclude 
that buyer-supplier interdependence provides the ideal circumstances for the supply 
managers to pursue collaboration-based SSD initiatives to mitigate the supplier 
sustainability risk (Millington, 2008, Van Tulder et al., 2009).  
P1-c: When both buyers and suppliers are highly dependent on each other (i.e., 
interdependence situation), supply managers are more likely to mitigate the 
supplier sustainability risk through collaboration-based rather than monitoring-
based SSD initiatives, regardless of their perceived level of risk (Cell E; Fig, III-
2). 
3.4. Managing supplier sustainability risk: independence or supplier dominance 
situations 
In contrast to buyer dominance and interdependence situations, neither one of the 
two risk mitigation strategies can be effectively used when supplier dependence is low 
(Parmigiani et al., 2011), i.e., in supplier dominance or independence situations. In other 
words, buyers can only enforce sustainability-related requirements at their suppliers’ 
facilities when they are in a good bargaining position and their threat to terminate the 
relationship will ensure that suppliers act according to their social and ecological 
expectations. When supplier dependence on the buyer is at a low level, however, the 
supply manager perceiving any level of supplier sustainability risk can neither shape or 
alter supplier’s behaviors and practices nor can it use direct sanctions and threat of 
leaving to force the supplier to behave in a responsible manner (Pedersen and Andersen, 
2006). This means that supply manager will normally have to either continue the 
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relationship with the supplier without initiating any actions with regard to social or 
ecological issues at the supplier facilities or phase out the supplier to avoid the supplier 
sustainability risk all together. 
P2: When supplier dependence on buyer is low (i.e., supplier dominance or 
independence situations), supply managers are more likely to accept or avoid the 
supplier sustainability risk rather than to mitigate it (Cells C,D,F; Fig. III-2). 
3.4.1. Effect of perceived risk in independence situation 
As outlined in P2, supply managers in independence situations cannot mitigate 
the supplier sustainability risk either through monitoring- or collaboration-based SSD 
initiatives when supplier is not highly dependent on the buyer (Carr et al., 2008). In such 
cases, they have to either phase out the supplier and avoid the risk or accept the risk and 
take no proactive actions. We suggest that for low levels of perceived risk, supply 
managers are more likely to take the “why bother” approach (Cousins et al., 2004), also 
named as “corporate self-responsibility” (Van Tulder et al., 2009), and suffice to comply 
with relevant sustainability-related laws and regulations and take no further actions. In 
other words, they would prefer to retain the relationship with the suppliers despite the 
risks associated with their misconducts and suffer the negative impacts if the risk 
materializes in future (risk acceptance). 
P2-a: In independence situations, supply managers are more likely to accept low 
level of perceived supplier sustainability risk rather than avoid it (Cell C; Fig. 
III-2). 
However, the most ultimate risk management strategy, risk avoidance, is 
employed when supply managers perceive a high level of risk while their firm (i.e., the 
buyer) can exert low or no influence over the supplier to mitigate it. In these situations, 
they decide to exclude the risk by breaking off the relationship with the supplier. For 
example, Staples Inc., the largest U.S. office supplies retailer, terminated an 11-year 
relationship with Asia Pulp and Paper (APP) in January 2008 because APP failed to 
improve its ecological performance and remained as one of the preferred targets for 
ecological activists’ campaigns (Grant and Ando, 2008).  
P2-b: In independence situations, supply managers are more likely to avoid high 
level of perceived supplier sustainability risk rather than accept it (Cell D; Fig. 
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III-2). 
3.4.2. Effect of perceived risk in supplier dominance situation 
Finally, in dominant supplier situations in which buyers are highly dependent on 
suppliers who, in turn, are aware that buyers have limited alternatives, suppliers are 
likely to become complacent and do not respond to buyers’ demands and requirements 
(Handfield and Bechtel, 2002). In such situations, on the one hand, the increased level of 
buyer dependence diminishes buyers’ ability to enforce either form of SSD initiatives 
(Awaysheh and Klassen, 2010), which in turn amplifies the ability of powerful suppliers 
to resist to adhere to their social and ecological responsibilities (Hoejmose et al., 2013). 
Figure ‎III-2. Supply manager’s choice among risk management strategies 
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On the other hand, buyers are locked into and held hostage to such a relationship 
where suppliers take the lead in establishing all relationship management policies 
(Narasimhan et al., 2009). In such a setting, buyers have limited room for manoeuvring 
and substituting suppliers with alternative sources to deal with the supplier sustainability 
risk (Wagner and Bode, 2008, New, 1996). Therefore, the buyers’ scope for switching is 
reduced (Kim et al., 2008) and the only risk management strategy available to supply 
managers, regardless of the level of risk they perceive, will be to accept the risk and 
maintain the relationships with the suppliers as is. 
P2-c: When buyer dependence on supplier is high and supplier dependence on 
buyer is low (i.e., supplier dominance situation), supply managers are more likely 
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to accept the supplier sustainability risk and take no action rather than to avoid it 
by phasing-out the supplier, regardless of their perceived level of risk (Cell F; 
Fig. III-2). 
Figure III-2 provides a summary of the proposed relationships in Sections 3.3 
and 3.4. 
3.5. Effect of slack resources 
As discussed in Section 3.3 and 3.4, perceived supplier sustainability risk is the 
primary factor to discriminate between two risk mitigation strategies in buyer dominance 
situation or between risk acceptance and risk avoidance strategies in independence 
situation. In addition, low level of supplier dependence restrains the supply managers’ 
ability to mitigate the risk and shifts their choice toward risk acceptance or avoidance 
strategies. This situation combined with high level of buyer dependence leaves no choice 
for the supply manager but to accept the risk and take no actions. Finally, the mutual 
dependence of both partners on each other naturally forms their collaborative efforts and 
joint actions toward the risk situation.  
In practice, however, buyers competing in the same industry with similar 
external dynamics such as stakeholders, supply bases, and buyer-supplier dependence 
structures appear to follow different risk management strategies. One explanation for this 
is that despite the similarities in their external environment, these organizations might 
differ in their resource endowments, especially the level of their organizational slack 
(Bowen et al., 2001, Voss et al., 2008). This is in line with Meszaros’s (1999) study 
conclusions suggesting that managers utilize a form of threshold-based heuristic, namely 
“affordability heuristic” in their decision making, picking options that are not perceived 
to deteriorate their organizations’ profitability. Therefore, the decision outcome of 
“which risk management strategy to adopt” may vary depending on the desired strategy 
to be affordable or not. 
Based on Bourgeois’ (1981) seminal definition, organizational slack is the 
cushion of actual or potential resources which is not consumed by the necessity of the 
continued daily operations of the organization and allows it to adapt successfully to the 
internal or external pressures and to initiate changes in strategy with respect to the 
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external environment. More specifically, it includes the resources available to the 
managers (in this case, supply managers) that enable them to adopt certain types of 
strategic actions (in this case, risk management strategies) to counter the external threats 
(in this case, the supplier sustainability risk) and to adjust to the required changes 
imposed by them (Sharma, 2000, Sharfman et al., 1988). Slack resources can take several 
forms including management time, excess skilled employees, discretionary budget, and 
unused capacity (Tan and Peng, 2003, Voss et al., 2008). These resources can ease the 
adoption of a proactive strategic behavior and influence managerial decision outcomes 
(Singh, 1986). For example, financial slack allows the managers to invest in initiatives 
such as risk management strategies with positive performance implications that do not 
have an immediate pay-off and require a longer investment horizon (George, 2005, 
Bowen, 2002). Such discretionary investments might have lower potential returns, but at 
the same time they are highly visible to the stakeholders and the media (Chiu and 
Sharfman, 2011).  
To implement the proactive risk management strategies discussed in this paper 
(i.e., both SSD initiatives and supplier phase-out), supply managers may have to 
implement some changes in the scope and/or volume of their supplier management 
processes and activities. Thereby, carrying them out without a sizeable level of excess 
resources available to be devoted to such activities can be highly challenging for them. 
For example, conducting audits or training programs at overseas supplier facilities can be 
costly and time consuming. Supplier phase-out, too, comes with substantial switching 
costs. Beside costs and financial factors, personnel related factors such as competences 
and skills (Bowen et al., 2001) and commitment (Walker et al., 2008) play a major role in 
the failure or success of such initiative. Therefore, the type of strategy supply managers 
select may well be limited by the resources at their disposal. Organizational slack 
essentially helps them afford their intended response strategy to their perceived risks 
(Latham and Braun, 2009). If the risk management strategy entails a significant cost and 
engagement of resources (e.g., risk mitigation through collaboration-based SSD 
initiatives), supply managers with more slack are more capable of absorbing those costs 
and undertaking the required actions.  
This argument is reinforced by a number of studies showing that slack resources 
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are the pre-requisite for the choices made by managers in favor of sustainability-related 
issues (Adams and Hardwick, 1998, Chiu and Sharfman, 2011, Sharma, 2000, Hofer et 
al., 2012), as well as initiating supplier development projects, exploring new supply 
markets, and training of the supply and purchasing personnel (Ogden et al., 2007). 
Particularly, Cousins et al. (2004) propose that the resources available to the purchasing 
functions for managing the ecological issues are the crucial enabler of their environment-
related supplier management initiatives. Based on their framework, a high level of 
resources is associated with performing basic supplier development initiatives and 
forming collaborative relationships with the suppliers to improve their performance. 
However, lack of adequate resources forces the purchasing functions to either take a 
“why bother” approach and suffice to comply with relevant laws and regulations or, at 
the most, to do simple supplier monitoring activities. Hence, we conclude that: 
P3: Slack resources moderate the relationships between the predictors of supplier 
sustainability risk management strategies and the selected strategy. Particularly, 
the proposed relationships in P1~2 are contingent upon availability of slack 
resources to supply manager. 
More specifically, if supply managers are constrained by the resources available 
to them for implementing their intended strategy, their choice of strategy will be shifted 
toward other strategies which require less budget and fewer resources (see Figure III-3). 
As a result, 
P3-a: In buyer dominance situations where supply managers perceive a low level 
of supplier sustainability risk, they are more likely to accept the risk (rather than 
to mitigate it through monitoring-based SSD initiatives) when slack resources are 
not available to them compared to when they are available. 
P3-b: In buyer dominance situations where supply managers perceive a high level 
of supplier sustainability risk, they are more likely to select any strategy other 
than collaboration-based SSD risk mitigation strategy when slack resources are 
not available to them compared to when they are available. 
However, since buyer-supplier dependence structure remains constant regardless 
of the level of organizational slack available to supply managers, they cannot choose 
more affordable strategies which require higher levels of supplier dependence for 
implementation (i.e., risk mitigation strategies). Thus, 
P3-c: In independence situations where supply managers perceive a high level of 
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supplier sustainability risk, they are more likely to accept the risk (rather than to 
phase out the supplier), when slack resources are not available to them compared 
to when they are available. 
Nevertheless, unavailable slack resources in an interdependence situation may 
influence the supply managers’ response to supplier sustainability risk in a different way 
because of the unique dynamics of the symmetric buyer-supplier dependence. In these 
relationships, both parties have already constrained their alternatives by making their 
exchange partner irreplaceable, or replaceable with very high switching costs (Oliver, 
1990). In effect, they are both locked into the relationship, a situation which creates a 
joint tendency to show tolerance and flexibility in the relationship (Heide, 1994) and 
promotes strategies that ensure its continuance (Narasimhan et al., 2009, Williamson, 
1983). Therefore, avoiding the supplier sustainability risk by switching to alternative 
suppliers will not be an option in such situations even if the supply managers do not have 
slack resources to mitigate the risk through collaborative initiatives. 
On the other hand, joint dependence creates a culture of trust in the relationship 
where it is not rational for either party to behave opportunistically (Nyaga et al., 2010, 
Ketchen and Hult, 2007a). As such, implementing monitoring-based initiatives to 
mitigate the supplier sustainability risk becomes unnecessary (Zsidisin and Siferd, 2001), 
and even detrimental, to the trust culture and supplier’s commitment to the relationship 
(Kwon and Suh, 2004). Therefore, when faced with shortage of slack resources to 
perform collaborative activities to mitigate the supplier sustainability risk, the supply 
managers will have no choice but to accept the risk and take no further actions. 
P3-d: In interdependence situations, supply managers are more likely to accept 
the risk (rather than to mitigate it through collaboration-based SSD initiatives), 
when slack resources are not available to them compared to when they are 
available.  
Figure III-3 presents a summary of the shifts in supply managers’ choice among 
risk management strategies when slack resources for implementing the strategies 
suggested in Figure III-2 are not available.  
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Figure ‎III-3. Supply manager’s choice among risk management strategies (case of unavailable slack 
resources) 
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of boycott from activists, threats of illegitimacy from the community, and threats of 
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exposure from the media (McWilliams et al., 2006, Gardberg and Fombrun, 2006).  
As the stakeholders increasingly favor the organizations that are known for 
making extra efforts to be ecologically friendly and socially responsible, buyers’ 
reputation is enhanced if they go beyond the required standards to improve their 
suppliers’ social and ecological performance via monitoring-based or collaboration-based 
SSD initiatives (Ehrgott et al., 2013, Ehrgott et al., 2011). In addition, avoiding the 
supplier sustainability risk through termination of the relationship with the irresponsible 
suppliers sends a positive signal to the stakeholders, implying that the buyers are 
responsive to stakeholders’ social and ecological concerns and are willing to go the extra 
mile to reduce waste and damage to the environment and be considerate toward their 
social responsibilities (Fombrun and Shanley, 1990). Although these strategies do not 
necessarily lead to consistently high sustainability standards throughout the buyers’ 
supply base, they still can have a positive impact on their reputation because of the 
visible and significant resource commitments the buyers make for implementing them 
(Bai and Sarkis, 2010).  
The enhanced positive reputation, in turn, acts as a safety net for the buyers, 
buffering them from future negative events and enabling them to easily bounce back 
(Rhee and Valdez, 2009). For example, it may lead the stakeholders to give the buyers 
the benefit of the doubt (Pfarrer et al., 2010) and reduce the damage from negative 
publicity during a crisis (Vanhamme and Grobben, 2009). It also provides an opportunity 
platform for their future growth as it shows their stakeholders that they are good citizens 
of the planet and society (Bhattacharya et al., 2009). Lastly, it has a positive direct effect 
on their economic and financial outcomes: it becomes a source of competitive advantage 
(Ehrgott et al., 2013) with positive effects on their cost of capital (Gardberg and 
Fombrun, 2006), return on assets (Deephouse, 2000), market value (Porter and Kramer, 
2006), and profitability (Roberts and Dowling, 2002). It also helps them to charge 
premium prices for their products (Benjamin and Podolny, 1999), to attract employees of 
higher quality (Turban and Cable, 2003), and to succeed in their acquisitions (Saxton and 
Dollinger, 2004).  
P4: Implementation of risk mitigation and avoidance strategies to deal with 
supplier sustainability risk is positively associated with buyers’ financial 
C h a p t e r  I I I  P a g e  |  7 4  
 
performance through enhancing their reputation. 
Several studies in SSCM literature, such as Carter & Easton (2011), Gimenez et 
al. (2012), Golicic & Smith (2013), Green et al. (2012), Rao & Holt (2005), Vachon & 
Klassen (2008), Wang & Sarkis (2013), and Zhu & Sarkis (2004) have found that SSD 
initiatives have a positive impact on buyers’ financial performance. Besides, the 
alignment of the risk management strategy with the level of perceived risk and the buyer-
supplier dependence structure orchestrates the resources allocated to risk management 
strategies across diverse supplier groups. This, in turn, is expected to contribute to cost 
savings and, hence, improvements in financial performance. For example, the buyers can 
financially benefit if, when faced with low risk suppliers, they select the risk acceptance 
strategy and take no actions or, at the most, mitigate the risk through monitoring 
initiatives rather than investing in capital intensive collaboration-based programmes or 
phasing out the supplier. Therefore,  
P5: Implementation of risk management strategies according to P1~2 is 
positively associated with buyers’ financial performance. 
4. Discussion and Conclusion 
Given the growing evidence of supplier misconducts in terms of sustainability-
related issues and their associated risks to the buyers, the dearth of studies in operations 
and supply chain management field looking into this phenomenon from a risk 
management perspective is surprising. Addressing this need, the current study focused on 
the choice supply managers face among different risk management strategies to deal with 
the supplier sustainability risks: whether to mitigate the risk by employing monitoring-
based or collaboration-based SSD initiatives, to avoid the risk altogether by phasing out 
the supplier, or to accept the risk and decide to deal with the consequences should it 
materialize. Evidences from the business world discussed throughout the paper indicate 
that buyers take different paths to manage their supplier sustainability risk. But what are 
the factors that affect their choices? Is it a question of the level of risks threatening the 
buyers, or is it due to their available internal resources, or is it simply because of the way 
their organization is positioned within the supply chain? Are the managers’ perceptions 
and characteristics influential in this setting?  
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Since purchasing and supply management function has a boundary-spanning role 
in buying organizations and is influential in extending their sustainability ambitions to 
the suppliers (Krause et al., 2009), we specifically focused on supply managers as the 
decision makers in this study and introduced three different factors which together could 
explain why they might select diverging risk management strategies. These factors 
include supply managers’ perceived risk, buyer-supplier dependence structure, and the 
slack resources available to supply managers for implementing their intended strategy. 
Drawing on the resource dependence theory, we further argued that supply 
managers can employ risk mitigation strategies only if their company has a reasonable 
amount of influence over the suppliers, which is the case of high supplier dependence. If 
not, they would have to decide to take no actions if the supplier was the dominant party 
in the exchange relationship or if their level of perceived risk was low, and to phase out 
the supplier if they perceived a high level of risk. In addition, we used the agency and 
management control theories to explain the relationship between supply managers’ level 
of perceived risk and their choice between collaboration-based and monitoring-based risk 
mitigation strategies when the supplier was highly dependent on the buyer. We suggested 
that in such cases, low levels of supply managers’ perceived risk would result in 
enforcing monitoring-based risk mitigation strategy, whereas a more collaborative 
approach would be employed should the supply managers perceive high levels of risk. In 
addition, we discussed the effect of slack resources availability on the supply managers’ 
choice amongst four risk management strategies. 
On the practical level, this study provides useful tools for purchasing and supply 
management functions to manage supplier sustainability risks strategically. Only when 
companies can understand and manage such risks properly can they ensure that they have 
reduced the ecological and social impacts of their activities not only within the 
boundaries of their own organization, but across the whole supply chain. As the first 
stage, supply managers should be encouraged to rethink the way they manage their 
supply base from a sustainability point of view and to assess the potential sustainability 
risks associated with each of their suppliers. The next step would be for them to decide 
on the suitable strategy for managing the evaluated risks considering the power-
dependence structure of the relationships with the suppliers. Finally, focal firms are 
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required to support their purchasing and supply chain management functions by 
providing them with adequate resources to deploy their intended risk management 
strategies, particularly for cases which are perceived to be high risk. 
In addition, we suggested that the supply managers’ decisions were directly 
driven by their perceptions of the supplier sustainability risk. Buying organizations may 
foster improved decision-making by establishing sustainability-oriented purchasing 
policies and procedures that facilitate supply managers’ translation of the information 
available to them into accurate risk assessments. Further, to create accurate views of the 
situation and to steer the risk management actions in the desired direction, buyers should 
also (i) employ appropriate training and information systems to promote the supply 
managers’ knowledge regarding different aspects of supplier sustainability risk, such as 
the salient stakeholder pressures in their external environment, and (ii) establish 
performance evaluation and reward systems that provide incentives for supply managers 
to closely interact with suppliers to have a fairly accurate perception of their 
sustainability-related intentions and behaviors.  
To advance this work, we recommend a number of avenues for future research. 
First, the proposed conceptual framework needs further validation through empirical 
research. An experimental study using scenarios seems appropriate as it would be 
difficult to find a fair number of companies functioning in each condition of the 
hypothesized matrices. Second, the propositions are limited to the operations strategy 
level and do not transcend to the corporate-level strategies toward reputational risk or 
brand management. For instance, some buyers have recently employed “stakeholder 
bridging” strategy and begun to actively approach and cooperate with critical NGO’s and 
other salient stakeholders to reduce the stakeholder pressures, to enhance the legitimacy 
of their sustainability-related initiatives, to improve their sustainability risk management 
processes, and to be able to respond more effectively to their suppliers’ misconducts 
(Foerstl et al., 2010, Matos and Hall, 2007). For example, DuPont partnered with 
Environmental Defense Fund in 2005 to ensure the responsible development of Nano-
scale materials and to develop a tool to share information with stakeholders. The project 
also aimed at facilitating public understanding of the new technology and providing input 
for future government policy. These cooperative relationships provide independent third 
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party validation of buyers’ claims of social and ecological performance and improve their 
image and credibility (GEMI-EDF, 2008). 
Third, although supply managers’ risk perception is considered as one of the 
major factors in their choice among management strategies, the determinants of this 
construct, such as supplier’s size and ownership (Klassen and Vereecke, 2012), 
stakeholders’ salience (Parmigiani et al., 2011), or supply managers’ personal 
characteristics such as their risk propensity (Sitkin and Weingart, 1995) have not been 
included in the framework and can be explored in future studies. Finally, supply 
managers are human beings and their decisions are boundedly rational especially when 
making decisions in complex situations which involve risk and uncertainty within supply 
chains (Kahneman et al., 1982, Simon, 1979). The scope of this study, however, did not 
include the supply managers’ biases and the simplifying heuristics they use to filter and 
assimilate the information when making decisions. Looking into these influential factors 
from a behavioral operations perspective is also a fruitful avenue for future research. 
Finally, prior studies have considered trust as one of the crucial factors affecting 
different supply chain decisions and processes including information sharing (Özer et al., 
2014), resource allocation (Pulles et al., 2014), collaboration (Nyaga et al., 2010), 
integration (Lockstroem et al., 2010), and commitment (Kwon and Suh, 2004), as well as 
supply chain performance (Johnston et al., 2004, Brinkhoff et al., 2015). Hence, looking 
into how the buyer’s trust in supplier or vice versa can affect the decision making process 
proposed in our conceptual framework would be an interesting future research project. 
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Chapter IV.  Managing Supplier Sustainabili ty  
Risk: The Interacting Effect  of  Supplier 
Dependence,  Perceived Risk,  and Slack Resources  
1. Introduction 
A growing number of buying organizations
1
 are suffering an increased exposure 
to different types of risk within their global supply chains which need to be proactively 
managed to protect them against financial loss and reputational damage (Sheffi, 2005). 
These risks may originate from a wide range of sources, such as disruptions in supplier 
operations, natural disasters, or supplier financial defaults (Kleindorfer and Saad, 2005, 
Bode et al., 2014). A particularly important topic is supplier sustainability risk, which 
originates from a negative sustainability-related
2
 condition or potentially occurring event 
within the buyer’s supply base (e.g., suppliers’ unsafe or unhealthy work conditions or 
their environmentally unfriendly operations or products) that may provoke harmful 
stakeholder reactions (Foerstl et al., 2010, Hofmann et al., 2014). In such situations, 
buyers, such as Nike, Apple, and Nestle, may be held responsible by stakeholders (e.g., 
customers, NGOs, and regulators) for their suppliers’ misconducts and, thereby, 
experience substantial market share loss, revenue reduction, adverse publicity, and 
reputational damage (Zhu and Sarkis, 2007, Parmigiani et al., 2011). A study by Lefevre 
et al. (2010) shows that these organizations face, on average, a 12% reduction in their 
market capitalization after a social or ecological problem is detected within their supply 
chains and publicized by concerned stakeholders.  
Anecdotal evidence suggests that buyers manage this type of risk in four 
different ways: many of them, like BP in the 2010 oil spill case in the Gulf of Mexico 
(Herron, 2010), tend to accept the risk and practice damage control by addressing the 
                                                          
1
 Throughout this paper, we use the term “buyer” to refer to the buying organization contracting work to a 
“supplier” organization. The term “supply manager” refers to a middle manager within the buying 
organization, who is responsible for managing the relationship with one or multiple groups of supplier 
organizations. 
2
 Throughout this paper, we use the term ‘sustainability’ to refer to ecological and social aspects of an 
organization’s operations. 
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problem after its occurrence; others try to mitigate the risk either through monitoring 
their suppliers’ activities (like Ford and GM) (Zhu et al., 2007) or through collaborative 
initiatives to enable them to improve their social or ecological performance (like IKEA) 
(IKEA, 2012); and a few of them, like Staples (Grant and Ando, 2008), take extreme 
measures and avoid the risk all together by phasing out the irresponsible suppliers. Such 
differences, however, have not been currently accounted for within supply chain risk 
management (SCRM) literature. Specifically, the questions as to “what underlying 
factors can shape these diverse responses and how” have remained unanswered.  
In order to fill this gap and to respond to the ever-growing need for using 
established organizational theories to describe, explain, and predict supply chain 
phenomena (Ketchen and Hult, 2007a), we draw on agency and management control 
theories (Ouchi, 1979, Eisenhardt, 1989), as well as resource dependence theory (Pfeffer 
and Salancik, 2003), to develop a contingent conceptual model of supplier sustainability 
risk management. In this model, we particularly concentrate on three contextual factors, 
i.e., perceived risk, supplier dependence, and slack resources, and their noticeable effects 
on the risk management strategies. Supplier sustainability risk is an inter-organizational 
phenomenon. Therefore, we take the exchange relationship between a buyer and a 
specific supplier as the context and the buyer–supplier transaction as the unit of analysis 
in our study. Given the crucial role of supply managers as the decision makers in the 
supply chain context (Ellis et al., 2010, Mantel et al., 2006, Tazelaar and Snijders, 2013), 
we focus on the strategies they undertake at the operational level (Pagell and Gobeli, 
2009). Hence, the focal decision is the supply manager’s choice among the four risk 
management strategies: acceptance, avoidance, monitoring-based mitigation, and 
collaboration-based mitigation. A vignette-based experiment methodology is then 
employed to empirically test the hypothesized relationships.  
In addition to its major contribution to the SCRM literature, this study also 
contributes to the sustainable supply chain management (SSCM) literature. Prior studies 
have established that different supply chain characteristics affect the buyers’ approach 
toward SSCM. For instance, Vachon and Klassen (2006a) conclude that the buyer-
supplier integration increases the buyers’ use of monitoring and collaboration practices 
regarding environmental management issues. Based on their case study of five firms, 
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Klassen & Vereecke (2012) also propose that implementing monitoring or collaborative 
initiatives with regard to social issues within supply chains is prompted by increased 
accountability to stakeholders and compared actual social performance with regulatory, 
customer, and community expectations. However, the extant literature remains somewhat 
silent about the mechanisms underlying such relationships. Our study, however, suggests 
that sustainable supplier development (SSD) including monitoring- and collaboration-
based initiatives is employed as a risk mitigation strategy to reduce supplier sustainability 
risk, and explains the conditions under which each of these initiatives are more likely to 
be used.    
Lastly, although the role of supply managers as the decision makers in the supply 
chain context has been recently recognised in a number of studies such as Ellis et al. 
(2010) and Tazelaar & Snijders (2013), this view has not been extended to the SSCM 
literature. However, a number of studies suggest that one of the prevalent drivers of the 
buyers’ decision to diffuse sustainability throughout their supply chains is their 
managers’ perception of the risks involved (Zhu and Sarkis, 2007, Walker and Jones, 
2012). We attempt to address this issue by focusing on supply managers’ decisions and, 
specifically, their choice of risk management strategy. 
In Section 2, we discuss the concept of supplier sustainability risk and the 
strategies for managing it. Section 3 provides the theoretical underpinnings of the 
proposed conceptual model and its related hypotheses. After presenting the research 
methodology and data analysis results in Sections 4 and 5, we conclude the paper by 
discussing its theoretical and managerial implications in Sections 6 and 7. 
2. Supplier Sustainability Risk Management 
A review of the supply chain risk management (SCRM) literature indicates that 
this literature is traditionally concerned with two types of risk: (i) coordination risks, 
originated from incoordination between supply and demand (Souza et al., 2004), and (ii) 
disruption risks, originated from unexpected internal or external process failures or 
disruptions (Kleindorfer and Saad, 2005). Although different in their source, both risk 
categories materialize through a disorder within the interconnected flows of material, 
information, and funds in supply chains (Sodhi et al., 2012). In this study, however, we 
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focus on a recently emerging type of risk, namely “supplier sustainability risk”3 (Foerstl 
et al., 2010) which materializes through adverse stakeholder reactions (Hofmann et al., 
2014). More specifically, it may occur when buyers are held responsible and accountable 
by their salient stakeholders (Mitchell et al., 1997) for their suppliers’ misconducts 
related to the natural environment or social communities (Amaeshi et al., 2008, Klassen 
and Vereecke, 2012, Parmigiani et al., 2011).  
Supplier sustainability risk was first identified by Cousins et al. (2004) as the 
driver of environmentally-oriented supplier management initiatives to avoid reputational 
losses. However, Foerstl et al. (2010) were the first to coin the term “supplier 
sustainability risk”, defining it as “the risk of corporate reputational damage to the 
buying firm, caused by supplier [sustainability-related] misconduct[s]” (p. 118). 
Focusing on suppliers’ labor-related behaviors in global supply chains and, specifically, 
their associated reputational risks, Jiang et al. (2009) identified the root causes of job 
dissatisfaction leading to turnover at supplier facilities. Klassen & Vereecke (2012), 
further, focused on the social sustainability risks within supply chains and highlighted 
their adverse effects on buyers’ costs and revenues. Only recently, however, a concise 
conceptualization of supplier sustainability risk based on a theory-driven approach was 
provided by Hofmann et al. (2014), which lays the basis for our study (p. 168):  
“[a sustainability-related] condition or a potentially occurring event”, located 
within a focal firm’s supply base, that “may provoke harmful stakeholder 
reactions.” 
The supplier sustainability risk materialization process starts with a 
sustainability-related misconduct in buyer’s supply base, followed by its detection by the 
concerned stakeholders. Once salient stakeholders regard the misconduct as illegitimate 
and hold the buyer responsible for supplier’s misconduct, they might initiate some 
adverse reactions resulting in substantial financial and reputational losses for the buyer. 
As such, supplier sustainability risk is the cumulative likelihood of these events and their 
consequences (Roehrich et al., 2014). Hence, the level of supplier sustainability that 
buyers face depends not only on the probability and immediate consequences of 
                                                          
3
 Throughout this paper, we maintain the term “supplier sustainability risk” as it has already been used 
within the SCRM literature. Alternatively, these risks could also be coined as reputational risks (Jiang et 
al., 2009; Roehrich et al., 2014) because of their detrimental direct effects on the buyer’s reputation. 
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suppliers’ misconducts, but also on other factors such as their size and visibility in the 
marketplace (Bowen, 2002), location of their supply base (Reuter et al., 2010), salience 
of concerned stakeholders (Parmigiani et al., 2011), and their industry (Neef, 2004). 
2.1. Risk management strategies 
As with any other type of risk, buyers’ ability in managing supplier sustainability 
risk is critical to their competitiveness and long-term success (Eccles et al., 2007). 
Although they may try to do it in a number of ways, their responses would fit into three 
generic categories of risk management strategies: avoidance, acceptance, and mitigation 
(Ritchie and Brindley, 2007, Blome and Schoenherr, 2011, Lemke and Petersen, 2013). 
The focus of this study is on operational-level strategies which supply managers 
undertake to manage the supplier sustainability risk within their supply base. Foerstl et al. 
(2010) suggest that such responses include supplier phase-out and sustainable supplier 
development (SSD). By implementing supplier phase-out, supply managers terminate the 
relationship with the incumbent risky supplier and switch to another alternative supplier 
with a clean sustainability record. Hence, supplier phase-out fits into the risk avoidance 
category (Jüttner et al., 2003), which entails the elimination of risk by withdrawing from 
the risky situations. For example, Wilmar International Ltd., the world’s largest palm oil 
trader, decided in June 2013 to cut ties with all Indonesian suppliers who were found to 
clear land for cultivation with illegal fires (Yun et al., 2013). 
Sustainable supplier development (SSD) initiatives, on the other hand, fit into 
risk mitigation category (Ritchie and Brindley, 2007). They are defined as the buyers’ 
plans and strategies to integrate the ecological and social issues into supply management 
process to improve the ecological and social performance of the suppliers (Klassen and 
Vereecke, 2012, Krause et al., 2007). Therefore, they are the buyers’ means for reducing 
the probability of supplier sustainability risk through enhancing suppliers’ ecological and 
social performance. The initiatives that collectively define SSD are further classified in 
two categories: monitoring-based and collaboration-based initiatives (Vachon and 
Klassen, 2008, Zhao et al., 2007). Monitoring-based SSD initiatives focus on assessing 
the processes or actual performance of suppliers against speciﬁc characteristics or 
particular performance criteria to verify their compliance with the requirements. As part 
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of this approach, buyers usually gather and process suppliers’ information, set proper 
criteria and assess the sustainability-related aspects of incoming goods and the suppliers 
that provide them through surveys and audits, and ask suppliers to report on different 
dimensions of their social and ecological performance (Seuring and Müller, 2008, Bowen 
et al., 2001). These are usually enforced through written social and ecological 
requirements within contracts (Ciliberti et al., 2008), requiring third-party certifications 
(Morali and Searcy, 2013), or imposing the buyers’ codes of conducts on the suppliers 
(Andersen and Skjoett-Larsen, 2009). For instance, Bristol-Myers Squibb, IBM, and 
Xerox have encouraged their Chinese suppliers to develop environmental management 
systems consistent with ISO 14001 and Ford, GM, and Toyota have required their 
suppliers to obtain ISO 14000 certification (Zhu et al., 2007).  
However, collaboration-based SSD initiatives aim at improving the suppliers’ 
ecological and social performance through partnership, i.e., direct interaction with them 
and implementation of jointly-developed ecological and social solutions (Golicic and 
Smith, 2013). They encompass a broad range of activities such as providing training 
programs to suppliers, compensating them for the costs associated with their compliance 
(e.g., joint investments in environmental friendly equipment), and sponsoring ecological 
or social summits for suppliers to encourage the sharing of information and experience 
(Vereecke and Muylle, 2006). IKEA’s strategy to provide its suppliers with technical as 
well as financial support regarding their sustainability endeavors is an example of this 
strategy (IKEA, 2012).  
Finally, in addition to the proactive strategies suggested by Foerstl et al. (2010), 
we also include risk acceptance as a reactive strategy that buyers might use to manage 
supplier sustainability risk. Taking on this strategy, supply managers simply retain the 
risk by sufficing to comply with the regulations and taking no further actions and 
budgeting for dealing with the potential risk event should it happen at some point (Sodhi 
and Tang, 2012). 
3. Hypotheses Development 
In the previous section, four different strategies pertaining to the management of 
supplier sustainability risk were presented. In this section, the focus is on the contextual 
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factors that determine which strategy is more likely to be selected by the supply 
managers. Based on resource dependence (Pfeffer and Salancik, 2003) and 
agency/management control (Eisenhardt, 1989, Ouchi, 1979) theories, we focus on two 
major predictors of supply managers’ strategy choice: supplier sustainability risk they 
perceive as well as supplier dependence on the buyer. We further suggest that selection 
of a risk management strategy that fits these contingencies depends on the availability of 
slack resources to implement the intended strategy.  
Figure ‎IV-1. Conceptual model 
 
In order to develop a series of hypotheses linked to our conceptual model (Fig. 
IV-1), an approach composed of a series of systematic steps is needed. First, the concept 
of perceived risk and supplier dependence are defined and presented. These two concepts 
are then pulled together to form a matrix demonstrating four possible scenarios from their 
different combinations. This matrix is then populated with different risk management 
strategies hypothesized to be selected by the supply managers for each scenario (Fig. IV-
2). Finally, the section concludes by introducing the impact of availability of slack 
resources on the positioning of the strategies in Figure IV-2. 
3.1. Theoretical foundations 
3.1.1. Agency and management control theories 
Agency and management control theories (Eisenhardt, 1989, Ouchi, 1979) 
generally provide a useful framework for understanding the buyers’ responses to supply 
chain risks (Zsidisin and Ellram, 2003, Zsidisin et al., 2005, Ketchen and Hult, 2007a). In 
this framework, the buyer serves as the principal delegating work to the agent, i.e., the 
Perceived Supplier 
Sustainability  
Risk 
Risk Management Strategies 
1- Acceptance  
(No actions) 
2- Mitigation  
(Monitoring or Collaboration-
based SSD) 
3- Avoidance  
(Supplier phase-out) 
Supplier Dependence  
Slack Resources  
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supplier. These theories put forth three mechanisms that can be used by principals to 
control agents’ opportunistic behaviors: output, behavior, and input control mechanisms 
(Eisenhardt, 1989, Ouchi, 1979). Output control mechanisms focus on agents’ 
performance, i.e., evaluating it against predetermined targets and giving agents' the 
authority to choose the means to achieve those goals (Ouchi, 1979). Behavior control 
mechanisms concentrate on the transformation process of agents’ work, i.e., the 
processes, tasks, and activities that are expected to lead to their performance outcomes 
(Ouchi, 1977). Although output controls mainly motivate agents through the use of 
incentives and behavior controls ensure of their motivation through close supervision, 
both mechanisms are centred on evaluation and feedback processes (Gencturk and 
Aulakh, 1995). However, input control mechanisms emerge from a socialization process 
between principal and agent, which results in shared beliefs and values (Patzelt and 
Shepherd, 2008). It influences the agents’ behaviour in a way that their commitment to 
the relationship is enhanced, and adjusts the antecedent conditions of their performance 
(i.e., their knowledge, skills, abilities, values, and motives) to ensure that they have the 
required ability to perform well (Snell, 1992, Ouchi, 1979). 
In this study, suppliers’ misconducts in terms of labor standards, ecological 
issues, or other sustainability-related concerns giving rise to supplier sustainability risk 
can be considered as their opportunistic behaviors which need to be controlled by the 
buyers (Moore, 2001, Jiang, 2009a). The more efficient these behaviors are controlled, 
the less supplier sustainability risk the buyers will face. Hence, control mechanisms 
perform as risk mitigation strategies. Output controls mitigate supplier sustainability risks 
by assessing suppliers’ social and ecological performance against a set of pre-specified 
objectives, such as a code of conduct. Behavior controls, however, reduce the risk by 
close monitoring and evaluation of suppliers’ actions over time and providing 
constructive feedbacks for correcting the deviations (Handley and Benton, 2013). Hence, 
in this study, the combination of output and behavior control mechanisms resembles the 
monitoring-based category of SSD initiatives (Vachon and Klassen, 2006a, Golicic and 
Smith, 2013). In contrast, when buyers use input controls, they decrease the probability 
of suppliers’ misconducts by contributing to suppliers’ awareness building, encouraging 
them to promote a socially and ecologically responsible culture, and helping them 
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develop related capabilities rather than a speciﬁc short-term outcome (Ciliberti et al., 
2008). Therefore, in this study, the input control mechanisms are exemplified by the 
collaboration-based category of SSD initiatives (Golicic and Smith, 2013, Vachon and 
Klassen, 2008).  
3.1.2. Resource dependence theory 
The dependence concept in supply chains has been argued to be one of the key 
attributes influencing supply chain management issues, such as buyer-supplier 
relationship (Cox, 2004), supplier development (Carr et al., 2008), and supply chain 
performance (Gulati and Sytch, 2007). According to resource dependence theory, 
organizations are not self-sufficient and depend on each other for resources, and such 
interdependency introduces uncertainty into their decision-making environment (Pfeffer 
and Salancik, 2003). As a result, they adjust their structure and behaviors to acquire and 
maintain their required resources and try to reduce their environmental uncertainties and 
dependencies by means of control mechanisms (Hillman et al., 2009). Resource 
dependence theory predicts that the type of such control mechanisms depends on the 
level and nature of dependence they develop, and the relative power of all players 
(Pfeffer and Salancik, 2003). Consequently, in a supply chain context, we expect that the 
buyers’ risk management strategies applied as control mechanisms to mitigate the 
supplier sustainability risks would depend on the level of buyer and supplier dependence 
on each other. 
Given that supplier dependence is one of the most influential factors affecting 
buyer-supplier relationships (Tangpong et al., 2008) as well as supplier development 
processes (Carr et al., 2008), this study focuses on situations where buyer dependence on 
supplier is low. By doing so, we examine the isolated effect of supplier dependence on 
the risk management strategies selected to deal with the supplier sustainability risk. More 
specifically, we investigate the risk management strategies used in two scenarios: high 
vs. low supplier dependence.   
3.1.3. Supply managers’ perception of risk  
As discussed earlier, supplier sustainability risk is the cumulative likelihood and 
consequence of a series of events: occurrence of a sustainability-related misconduct in 
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buyer’s supply base, stakeholders’ detection of the misconduct and their attribution of the 
misconduct responsibility to the buyer. There is no doubt that buyer’s response to this 
cumulative risk depends on many different factors, including (i) the events’ 
characteristics, such as nature of the misconduct, supplier’s size, and ownership (Klassen 
and Vereecke, 2012) or stakeholders’ salience (Parmigiani et al., 2011), (ii) the decision 
making context, e.g. buyer’s orientation toward sustainability (Pagell and Wu, 2009) or 
the relevant laws and regulations in place (Jiang, 2009a), and (iii) the individual 
attributes of the decision makers, such as their experience as well as their sustainability-
related values (Ellis et al., 2011).  
However, behavioral research on decision-making has shown that the effect of 
such factors on the decision outcome is mediated through the decision maker’s 
perception of risk (Sitkin and Weingart, 1995, Pablo et al., 1996, March and Shapira, 
1987). More specifically, management responses to supplier sustainability risks are 
essentially not motivated by completely objective evaluations of the risks but by their 
subjective risk perceptions (Yates and Stone, 1992, Ellis et al., 2010, Kocabasoglu et al., 
2007), defined as their general assessment of the risk inherent in a situation (Sitkin and 
Weingart, 1995). In addition, there are studies suggesting that one of the prevalent 
drivers of implementation of SSD initiatives by buyers is their managers’ perception of 
the risks involved (Walker and Jones, 2012). Particularly, supply managers have been 
found to play a critical role in developing management systems (Angell and Klassen, 
1999b) and to be the most significant driving force of extending sustainability initiatives 
throughout the supply chains (Ehrgott et al., 2011, Carter and Jennings, 2004).  
Therefore, in this study, we focus on the level of supplier sustainability risk 
(cumulative risk) perceived by supply managers as one of the major predictors of their 
choice amongst the four risk management strategies. In addition, since this study focuses 
on how the perceived supplier sustainability risk - rather than its determinants - 
influences the decision outcome, we do not differentiate between the risks associated 
with social and ecological aspects of sustainability. 
3.2. Supplier dependence and risk management strategy 
Supplier dependence is shown to increase the buyer’s relative power in the 
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buyer-supplier relationship, enabling it to significantly influence the actions and 
intentions of the supplier (Bastl et al., 2013, Lanier et al., 2010). Dependent suppliers are 
more likely to cooperate with buyers (Modi and Mabert, 2007) and to make changes to 
their processes and products to meet buyer requirements (Hallen et al., 1991). The 
presence of powerful buyers who reflect the market pressures onto their suppliers is 
suggested to be the main trigger for suppliers to pursue sustainability objectives (Hall, 
2000). Particularly, supplier dependence enhances the buyers’ ability to effectively 
implement monitoring-based or collaboration-based SSD initiatives because such 
initiatives usually include practices that take place at the supplier facilities which are out 
of buyers’ direct control (Gulati and Sytch, 2007, Hoejmose et al., 2013). 
In addition, buyers with a high level of bargaining power over their suppliers 
(i.e., high supplier dependence) are found to take two different paths to diffuse 
sustainability principles throughout their supply base (Vurro et al., 2009). They may 
either follow a “dictatorial” governance model through which they assume the role of a 
commander and impose their rules of the sustainability game (e.g., codes of conduct) on 
suppliers, or they pursue a “participative” governance model through which they remain 
open to interaction and involvement with their suppliers in the sustainability-related 
decision making and implementation process. These two mechanisms correspond to the 
monitoring-based and collaboration-based SSD initiatives. Hence, buyers will have the 
opportunity to influence suppliers’ sustainability-related behaviors and mitigate supplier 
sustainability risk through collaboration-based or monitoring-based SSD initiatives only 
when suppliers are highly dependent on them (Parmigiani et al., 2011). Hence, supplier 
dependence is a precursor for employing either of the risk mitigation strategies.  
H1: Supply managers are more likely to mitigate the supplier sustainability risk 
through either of the SSD initiatives when supplier dependence is high rather 
than low. 
In contrast, when the supplier is not highly dependent on the buyer, neither one 
of the two risk mitigation strategies is an option for the buyer (Parmigiani et al., 2011). In 
other words, buyers can only enforce sustainability-related requirements at their 
suppliers’ facilities when they are in a good bargaining position and their threat to 
terminate the relationship will ensure that the suppliers act according to their 
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social/environmental expectations. When supplier dependence is at a low level, however, 
buyers perceiving any level of supplier sustainability risk can neither shape or alter the 
suppliers’ behaviors nor can they use direct sanctions and threat of leaving to force the 
supplier to behave in a responsible manner (Pedersen and Andersen, 2006). This means 
that buyers will normally have to either continue the relationship with the suppliers 
without initiating any actions with regard to social or ecological issues at supplier 
facilities or to terminate the relationship with the supplier to avoid the supplier 
sustainability risk all together. 
H2: Supply managers are more likely to avoid the supplier sustainability risk or 
accept it when supplier dependence is low rather than high. 
3.3. Perceived risk and risk management strategy (high supplier dependence) 
As we proposed in Hypothesis 1, supply managers in high supplier dependence 
situations are more likely to decide to mitigate supplier sustainability risk either through 
monitoring-based or collaboration-based SSD initiatives. In this section, we draw on 
agency/management theories to explain the effect of their perceived risk on the choice 
between these two mitigation strategies.  
Based on the agency theory, monitoring-based SSD initiatives (i.e., behavior and 
output control mechanisms) are used when suppliers’ performance ambiguity and 
environmental uncertainties are at a low level and when there is not a substantial 
incongruence between the buyer and supplier goals (Eisenhardt, 1989, Ouchi, 1980, 
Rowe et al., 2012). These conditions reflect a situation where the supply managers 
perceive a low level of risk. For instance, the global fashion brand Zara faces a relatively 
low level of supplier sustainability risk because almost 70% of its suppliers are based in 
Europe (Ghemawat and Nueno, 2006) and hence, suffices to merely enforce its Code of 
Conduct for Manufacturers and Suppliers throughout its supply chain (Inditex, 2013). In 
contrast, its US-based competitor, Gap Inc., with the majority of its suppliers operating in 
Asia, has to take further steps, like pursuing a stakeholder engagement strategy (Smith et 
al., 2011) or providing a $20 million of capital to support fire safety improvements at 
supplier facilities (Gap Inc., 2013). Therefore, we can conclude that: 
H1-a: In high supplier dependence situations, supply managers are more likely to 
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mitigate the supplier sustainability risk through monitoring-based SSD initiatives 
when their perceived risk is low rather than high.  
On the other hand, when a supply manager’s knowledge of supplier’s processes 
and activities is incomplete or the standards of desirable performance are ambiguous, the 
level of perceived risk increases and neither behavior control nor output control is likely 
to be a viable option (Ouchi, 1977). Pursuing such control mechanisms requires the 
supply managers to formally specify their expectations and be able to determine whether 
these agreed-to expectations are being achieved or observed (Ouchi, 1979, Handley and 
Benton, 2013). Hence, they incur substantial costs of surveillance, which may limit their 
span of control (e.g., the number of audits they conduct at supplier sites might decrease) 
and increase the probability of supplier’s unsustainable behavior (Eisenhardt, 1985). In 
addition, even with the monitoring initiatives, supplier deception may emerge and the 
overall reliance on this strategy may create a system in which a supplier’s main objective 
is to pass the audits, rather than address the substantive issues that are the focus of the 
audit (Jiang, 2009a, Roth et al., 2008). Hence, monitoring-based SSD initiatives are not 
likely to be used by supply managers who face a high level of supplier sustainability risk.   
Input control mechanisms, however, are shown to be used in situations where 
high levels of complexity and uncertainty create a high risk situation for the principal 
(Ouchi, 1980). When the need for goal congruence between the principal and agent is 
high, in other words when the probability of agent’s opportunistic behavior is significant, 
employing input control mechanism is more appropriate (Rowe et al., 2012, Wilkins and 
Ouchi, 1983). In the same vein, other studies have shown that when the supply risk 
increases, buyers become more eager to develop closer relationships with their suppliers 
because such relationships increase their social capital, promote effective 
communications, enhance their trust in the relationship, and improve their suppliers’ 
performance (Cheng et al., 2012, Zsidisin and Ellram, 2003). In addition, it has been 
found that buyers with a prior experience of reputational damage due to their suppliers’ 
misconducts develop more cooperative relationships with their suppliers to coordinate 
the exchange of their values in the supply chain (Spence and Bourlakis, 2009). We 
suggest this is due to the fact that these buyers perceive a higher level of risk due to their 
previous negative experiences. A notable example is Nike’s new approach toward 
C h a p t e r  I V  P a g e  |  1 0 1  
 
supplier management: to improve suppliers’ compliance with its code of conduct, Nike 
moved from a market relationship to a collaborative partnership where suppliers had a 
deeper and more secure association with Nike and internalized the sustainability-related 
values and practices (Lim and Phillips, 2008). For instance, it provided its suppliers with 
its own state-of-the-art screening tools, called bluesign technologies, that allows them to 
select more sustainable dyes, detergents, and chemicals for use in their textile 
manufacturing process (Fellow, 2013). Hence, we can conclude that: 
H1-b: In high supplier dependence situations, supply managers are more likely to 
mitigate the supplier sustainability risk through collaboration-based SSD 
initiatives when their perceived risk is high rather than low.  
3.4. Perceived risk and risk management strategy (low supplier dependence)  
As discussed in Section 3.2, buyers can proactively mitigate the supplier 
sustainability risk either by implementing monitoring-based or collaboration-based SSD 
initiatives if they are the dominant partner in the relationship. However, they can exert 
very limited influence over their suppliers if suppliers hold the dominant power because 
of their low dependence (Carr et al., 2008). Because source of the risk is external to their 
control, supply managers will not be able to mitigate the supplier sustainability risk they 
perceive either by monitoring the suppliers’ processes and performance or by developing 
their sustainability-related capabilities. In such cases, they have to pursue risk 
management strategies other than risk mitigation (Kraljic, 1983).  
We suggest that for low levels of perceived risk, supply managers are more 
likely to take the “why bother” strategy (Cousins et al., 2004, Van Tulder et al., 2009) 
and suffice to comply with relevant sustainability-related laws and regulations and 
maintain the status quo. In other words, they prefer to retain the relationship with 
suppliers despite the risk associated with them and suffer the negative impacts if the risk 
materializes (risk acceptance). 
H2-a: In low supplier dependence situations, supply managers are more likely to 
accept the supplier sustainability risk when their perceived risk is low rather than 
high.  
Conversely, the most ultimate risk management strategy, risk avoidance, is 
employed when supply managers perceive a high level of risk while their firm can exert 
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low or no influence over the suppliers to mitigate it. In this situation, they will decide to 
exclude the risk all together by blacklisting the suppliers in their order placement system, 
breaking off the relationship with them, and switching to alternative suppliers (Reuter et 
al., 2010). For example, in January 2008, Staples Inc., the largest U.S. office supplies 
retailer, terminated an 11-year relationship with Asia Pulp and Paper (APP) company, as 
APP failed to improve its environmental performance and remained as one of the 
preferred targets for environmental activists’ campaigns (Grant and Ando, 2008). 
Therefore, we can conclude that: 
H2-b: In low supplier dependence situations, supply managers are more likely to 
avoid the risk and phase out the supplier when their perceived risk is high rather 
than low.  
Figure ‎IV-2. Supply manager’s choice among risk management strategies 
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3.5. Moderating effect of slack resources  
As noted above, a low level of supplier dependence restrains the supply 
managers’ ability to mitigate the risk and shifts their choice toward risk acceptance or 
avoidance strategies. In addition, the perceived supplier sustainability risk is the primary 
factor to differentiate between two risk mitigation strategies in high supplier dependence 
situations and between risk acceptance and avoidance strategies in low supplier 
dependence situations. In practice, however, buyers competing in the same industry with 
similar external dynamics, such as stakeholder salience, supply base, and buyer-supplier 
dependence structure appear to pursue different risk management strategies. One 
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explanation for this is that, despite the similarities in their external environment, these 
organizations might differ in their resource endowments, especially the level of their 
organizational slack (Bowen et al., 2001, Voss et al., 2008).  
Based on Bourgeois’s (1981) seminal definition, organizational slack is the 
cushion of actual or potential resources which is not consumed by the necessity of the 
continued daily operations of the firm and allows it to successfully adapt to the internal 
or external pressures and to initiate changes in strategy with respect to the external 
environment. More specifically, it includes the resources available to the managers (in 
this case, supply managers) that enable them to pursue certain types of strategic actions 
(in this case, risk management strategies) to counter the external threats (in this case, the 
supplier sustainability risk) and to adjust to the required changes imposed by them 
(Sharma, 2000, Sharfman et al., 1988). Slack resources can take several forms including 
management time, excess skilled employees, discretionary budget, and unused capacity 
(Tan and Peng, 2003, Voss et al., 2008). They can ease the adoption of a proactive 
strategic behavior and influence managerial decision outcomes (Singh, 1986). 
Specifically, financial slack allows the managers to invest in initiatives with positive 
performance implications such as risk management strategies that do not have an 
immediate pay-off and require a longer investment horizon (George, 2005, Bowen, 
2002).  
To implement the proactive risk management strategies discussed in this paper 
(i.e., monitoring/collaboration-based SSD initiatives or supplier phase-out), supply 
managers may have to change the scope and/or volume of their supply management 
processes and activities. Thereby, carrying them out without a sizeable level of excess 
resources would be very challenging for them. In other words, the type of strategy they 
select may well be limited by the amount of resources at their disposal and the slack 
helps them afford their intended strategies in response to their perceived supplier 
sustainability risk (Latham and Braun, 2009). If the risk management strategy entails a 
significant cost and engagement of resources (e.g., risk mitigation through collaboration-
based SSD initiatives), buyers with more slack are more capable of absorbing those costs 
and undertaking the required actions.  
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This argument is reinforced by a number of studies showing that existence of 
slack resources is a pre-requisite for the choices made by managers in favor of 
sustainability-related issues: initiating supplier development projects, exploring new 
supply markets, and training of the supply and purchasing personnel (Bowen, 2007, Chiu 
and Sharfman, 2011, Sharma, 2000, Hofer et al., 2012). Particularly, Cousins et al. 
(2004) propose that the stock of resources available to the purchasing functions for 
managing the environmental issues is a crucial enabler of their environment-related 
supplier management initiatives. Based on their framework, a high level of available 
resources is associated with performing basic supplier development initiatives and 
forming collaborative relationships with suppliers to improve their performance. 
However, lack of adequate resources makes the purchasing functions to either take a 
“why bother” strategy and suffice to comply with relevant laws and regulations or, at 
most, to do simple supplier monitoring activities.  
Hence, we conclude that slack resources moderate the relationships between the 
predictors of supplier sustainability risk management strategies and the selected strategy. 
Specifically, the proposed relationships are all contingent upon availability of slack 
resources. Otherwise, the supply managers’ choice of strategy will be shifted toward 
other available options requiring less budget and fewer resources if they are constrained 
by the resources available to them for implementing their intended strategy. It should be 
noted that since supplier dependence remains constant regardless of the level of 
organizational slack available to supply managers, they cannot choose more affordable 
strategies which require higher levels of supplier dependence for implementation.  
H3: As the slack resources available to supply managers decrease, they are more 
likely to accept the supplier sustainability risk. 
H4: As the slack resources available to supply managers decrease, they are less 
likely to mitigate the supplier sustainability risk or avoid it. 
H4-a: As the slack resources available to supply managers decrease, they are 
more likely to accept the supplier sustainability risk rather than mitigate it 
through monitoring-based SSD initiatives in low risk-high dependence situations. 
H4-b: As the slack resources available to supply managers decrease, they are 
more likely to use any risk management strategy other than collaboration-based 
mitigation in high risk-high dependence situations. 
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H4-c: As the slack resources available to supply managers decrease, they are 
more likely to accept the supplier sustainability risk rather than avoid it by 
phasing out the supplier in high risk-low dependence situations.  
Figure IV-3 presents a summary of the shifts in supply managers’ choice of risk 
management strategies when slack resources available to supply managers decrease.  
Figure ‎IV-3. Supply manager’s choice among risk management strategies (low level of slack 
resources) 
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(Alexander and Becker, 1978). Although the vignette-based experiment looks like a 
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survey, it contains all the components of an experimental design (i.e., random assignment 
to the cells, manipulated independent variables, and measured dependent variables) and 
thus can be shown to eliminate the possibility of systematic differences in the participants 
or the environment that could affect the outcomes (Creswell, 2013). Therefore, the 
observed differences noted can be attributed to the experimental manipulations, thus 
allowing a step beyond correlation tests to actual tests of causality (Siemsen, 2011). It 
also reduces the biases from memory lapses, rationalization tendencies, and consistency 
factors (Grewal et al., 2008). In addition, there is evidence that when given information 
about a hypothetical situation (e.g., a scenario), people properly anticipate the situation 
that is similar to what actual participants would do (Angrist and Pischke, 2008).   
In addition to these general advantages, this methodology helped us overcome 
two major challenges we faced for assessing our proposed framework with real world 
data. First, it would have been difficult, if not impossible, to account for the variety of 
factors colouring the supply managers’ decisions, such as their firms’ organizational 
structure and existing business processes. In other words, framing the scenario in 
vignettes minimized the need for respondents to impute their own contextual 
information, whereas direct-question-based techniques could stimulate unreliable and 
biased self-reports (Fredrickson, 1986). Second, it would have been difficult to find 
companies functioning in each condition of the hypothesized matrices. In other words, 
there might not have been adequate variance of proposed independent variables in the 
actual firms to capture their effects on the supply managers’ decisions by other 
methodologies, such as survey or archival data. Experiment methodology allowed for 
consistent treatments to manipulate the independent variables among participants and 
made it possible to have more precise assessment of each study variable (Hyman and 
Steiner, 1996).  
4.1. Vignette development and experimental design 
Drawing from real supplier sustainability risk events, we developed two basic 
scenarios about two fictitious mid-sized multinational companies ─ the first one 
operating in the apparel retail sector (the second one in food industry) ─ whose CEO 
recently extended their safety (environmental) policy to include the suppliers’ operations. 
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No brand names were provided in the scenarios to eliminate any biases against particular 
companies. In each scenario, the participants were asked to assume the role of 
Procurement and Supply Management Director and review the profile of one supplier 
and indicate what actions, if any, they would take with regard to the safety 
(environmental) issues at the supplier facilities. The scenarios were carefully designed to 
allow the manipulation of all three independent variables (i.e., treatment factors) at two 
levels: supplier sustainability risk (high vs. low), supplier dependence (high vs. low), and 
slack resources (high vs. low). This resulted in a 2 x 2 x 2 full factorial design where all 
other elements of the scenarios were held constant. As a result, eight vignettes for each 
scenario were generated (Table IV-1) to examine not only the effects of each treatment 
factor separately, but also the effect of the three of them in combination (Montgomery, 
2012). The scenarios including the manipulation of three factors are presented in 
Appendix IV-A. 
Each participant was given an introductory cover letter and the questionnaire 
including two assigned vignettes (one from each scenario). The ordering of vignettes was 
S1+E8, S2+E7, S3+E6, S4+E5. After reading the first vignette, the participant responded 
to a set of items that captured the likelihood of pursuing each of the four risk 
management strategies (i.e., the dependent variables): acceptance, avoidance, 
monitoring-based, and collaboration-based mitigation. To operationalize the constructs of 
monitoring-based and collaboration-based risk mitigation strategies, we adapted and 
modified two sets of measures (each including five items) from earlier work on supply 
chain governance (Jiang, 2009a), sustainable supply management (Vachon and Klassen, 
2006a), and supplier development (Gimenez and Sierra, 2013, Ehrgott et al., 2013, 
Krause et al., 2007). The risk avoidance strategy was also operationalized by a five-item 
measure adapted from similar measures available in the supplier switching literature 
(Hung et al., 2009, Bharadwaj and Matsuno, 2006). Finally, we used a single item 
measure to operationalize risk acceptance strategy (i.e., taking no actions). A discrete 
choice question was also included in the questionnaire asking the participants to choose 
only one strategy among the four options as their major and ultimate approach to manage 
the supplier in the vignette.  
The first section of the questionnaire was then concluded by asking a series of 
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manipulation check questions regarding the treatment factors. This process was repeated 
with a second vignette. Finally, participants reported their basic demographic 
information: industry and size of their employer, age, gender, experience, educational 
degree, position, professional certification, risk propensity (Sitkin & Weingart (1995)), 
and sustainability-related knowledge. Dependent variable measures, as well as 
manipulation check items, are presented in Appendix IV-B. 
Table ‎IV-1. Vignettes and their combination of treatment factors’ manipulations 
Vignette  
ID 
Perceived  
risk 
Supplier  
dependence 
Slack  
resources 
Manipulation 
combination 
S1
 a
 /E1
b
 High High High HHH 
S2/E2 High High Low HHL 
S3/E3 High Low High HLH 
S4/E4 High Low Low HLL 
S5/E5 Low High High LHH 
S6/E6 Low High Low LHL 
S7/E7 Low Low High LLH 
S8/E8 Low Low Low LLL 
a
 S1 to S8 are the vignettes drawn from Scenario 1 (supplier with safety problem in apparel industry). 
b
 E1 to E8 are the vignettes drawn from Scenario 2 (supplier with environmental problem in food 
industry). 
To build the internal validity and to control for any sequence effects, the 
vignettes were rotated so that each vignette version was equally likely to be in the first or 
second sequential position. One major concern in the experimental design is the issue of 
demand artifacts which refers to “all aspects of the experiment which cause a subject to 
perceive, interpret and act upon what he believes is expected or desired of him by the 
experimenter” (Sawyer, 1975). We reduced this bias and its potential confounding effects 
by (i) utilizing a between-subject design that is less prone to demand characteristics, (ii) 
instructing the participants that there were no “right” or “wrong” answers, and (iii) not 
explicitly mentioning the labels of the treatment factors (i.e., risk, dependence, and slack 
resources) within the vignettes (Sawyer, 1975). 
4.1.1. Perceived risk manipulation 
As mentioned in Section 2, supplier sustainability risk is the cumulative 
likelihood and consequence of a series of events: occurrence of a sustainability-related 
misconduct in buyer’s supply base, stakeholders’ detection of the misconduct, and 
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stakeholders’ attribution of the misconduct responsibility to the buyer. The probability of 
occurrence of a supplier’s misconducts increases if there is evidence of such events in 
supplier’s past performance (Foerstl et al., 2010). Since such information is used as an 
indicator of the likelihood of unsatisfactory future performance, it can influence the 
perceived riskiness of the supplier (Pablo et al., 1996). Further, supplier’s size is used as 
proxy for the visibility of the supplier’s misconducts and hence, the perceived risk of 
being caught ignoring their behavior (Roberts, 1992). For example, small suppliers are 
not perceived to be visible enough to attract NGO’s and other concerned stakeholders’ 
attention (Klassen and Vereecke, 2012).  
As a result, to manipulate the supply manager’s perceived risk, two different 
vignettes were developed for each scenario. In the low risk vignette, the respondents 
dealt with a small supplier which had received one safety violation citation from the local 
government authorities because of the unsafe and unhealthy work conditions at their 
facilities (or had been found guilty by a local court and ordered to pay a fine for violating 
the environmental laws and clearing an area of protected peat forest). Conversely, in the 
high risk vignette, they were faced with a large supplier which was targeted by a 
reputable international human rights (or environmental) activist group and highlighted on 
their website because of the unsafe and unhealthy work conditions at their facilities (or 
for violating the environmental laws and clearing an area of protected peat forest). 
4.1.2. Supplier dependence manipulation 
It is well-established in the supply chain literature that when a significant 
proportion of a supplier’s sales are to a buyer, its dependence increases (Carr et al., 
2008). Hence, inspired by Lanier et al.’s (2010) operationalization of this construct, 
supplier dependence was manipulated by describing a supplier which 90% of its total 
sales were to the buyer in the scenario (high dependence) versus a supplier which 
provided products to a number of other companies and only 10% of its total sales were 
allocated to the buyer in the scenario (low dependence). 
4.1.3. Slack resources manipulation 
A series of changes in the supplier management strategies, including taking part 
in monitoring-based or collaborative-based SSD initiatives or switching to new suppliers 
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requires human, technical, and financial resources to deploy (Sharma, 2000, Lee and 
Klassen, 2008). Financial slack represents the excess uncommitted financial resources 
which are unabsorbed and highly flexible and can be easily redeployed to a wide range of 
activities (e.g., investment in new technologies, recruitment of specialized staff). 
Thereby, it is well established as the most discretionary or unabsorbed and readily-
available slack resources (Sharfman et al., 1988, George, 2005).  
Hence, this study specifically focuses on this category of slack resources 
available to the supply mangers to allocate them to alternate uses other than their current 
operations and activities. To manipulate the financial slack resources, the participants 
assigned to the “high slack resources” vignette were informed that the CEO had allocated 
a special annual budget to their department for making the necessary changes to supplier 
management activities, whereas those assigned to the “low slack resources” vignette 
were informed that the CEO had asked them to make the necessary changes to supplier 
management activities within their department’s current budget limits and stated that no 
budget adjustments would be approved. 
4.2. Pre-test 
A qualitative analysis of the vignettes’ content validity was conducted among 
five purchasing and supply management academicians and professionals. After making 
appropriate adjustments to the scenarios and questionnaires, a pre-test using 141 MBA 
students at two major business schools in Canada was conducted to verify the scenarios’ 
plausibility and the manipulations’ validity (Rungtusanatham et al., 2011). Students were 
randomly assigned two of the sixteen vignettes (one from each scenario) and we received 
54 complete responses (total of 108 vignettes). The plausibility of scenarios was assessed 
during the pre-test along three dimensions (Eckerd et al., 2013): realism (one item scale: 
“the presented case scenario is realistic”), believability (one item scale: “the presented 
case scenario is believable”), and role involvement (one item scale: “I took my assumed 
role seriously while filling out the questionnaire”), on scales from 1 (strongly disagree) to 
7 (strongly agree). Results showed that all vignettes had a mean of at least 5.40 on all 
three scales.  
As noted earlier, sixteen seven-point items (where 1=very unlikely to 7=very 
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likely) were used to measure the likelihood of pursuing each of the four risk management 
strategies by asking the respondents how likely they were to take those actions with 
regard to the supplier mentioned in the vignette. Based on the pre-test data, four items 
were dropped due to their low loadings or high cross-loadings to establish reliability and 
uni-dimensionality of all four constructs. These results were further re-confirmed using 
the main experiment data (Table IV-2).  
Table ‎IV-2. Dependent variable items’ loadings and cross loadings and scale reliabilities 
Item Risk acceptance Risk avoidance 
Risk mitigation: 
monitoring-based 
Risk mitigation: 
collaboration-based 
Q-1 0.972 -0.061 -0.146 -0.104 
     
Q-3 -0.080 0.884 -0.034 -0.154 
Q-6 0.019 0.907 -0.091 -0.079 
     
Q-7 -0.164 -0.136 0.836 0.025 
Q-8 -0.027 -0.042 0.829 0.158 
Q-9 -0.040 0.067 0.721 0.318 
Q-10 -0.094 -0.159 0.850 0.139 
Q-11 0.027 0.040 0.761 -0.011 
     
Q-13 -0.067 -0.065 0.190 0.862 
Q-14 -0.125 -0.082 0.167 0.884 
Q-15 -0.038 -0.082 0.053 0.859 
Q-16 0.050 -0.103 0.080 0.861 
Reliability (α) --- 0.79 0.87 0.90 
Rotation Method: Varimax with Kaiser Normalization 
The pre-test also assessed the validity of the manipulations to ensure that the 
perceived risk, supplier dependence, and slack resources varied significantly among 
vignettes as intended (Perdue and Summers, 1986). The mean responses for all three 
treatment factors were significantly different between their two levels for both scenarios, 
except for the perceived risk factor in Scenario 1. To address this shortcoming, 
modifications were made to the scenario and a second round of pre-test was conducted 
using 60 MBA students at another major Canadian business school (including only one 
vignette per participant). The results from 39 complete responses confirmed the validity 
of the perceived risk manipulation in Scenario 1. 
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4.3. Sample and data collection 
Perception and experience play a major role in evaluating the risks associated 
with the complex supply chain relationships, and the “real” business people are the ideal 
sample for supply chain risk management research (Mantel et al., 2006, Hora and 
Klassen, 2013). Hence, for the purpose of increasing the internal validity as well as the 
generalizability of the research findings, a sample of experienced supply/purchasing 
managers was used in this study.  
Table ‎IV-3. Experimental cells and assignment of participants 
Panel A: Experimental cells and number of observations 
 High slack resources Low slack resources 
Total 
 
Low supplier 
dependence 
High supplier 
dependence 
Low supplier 
dependence 
High supplier 
dependence 
Low risk 50 vignettes 49 vignettes 50 vignettes 49 vignettes 198 vignettes 
High risk 49 vignettes 50 vignettes 49 vignettes 50 vignettes 198 vignettes 
      
Total 99 vignettes 99 vignettes 99 vignettes 99 vignettes 396 vignettes 
Panel B: Assignment of participants 
Questionnaire # 
Version of scenario 1  
(safety) 
Version of scenario 2  
(environmental) 
Number of 
respondents 
Q1 HHH LLL 13 
Q2 HHL LLH 12 
Q3 HLH LHL 12 
Q4 HLL LHH 12 
Q5 LHH HLL 12 
Q6 LHL HLH 12 
Q7 LLH HHL 13 
Q8 LLL HHH 12 
Q9 LLL HHH 13 
Q10 LLH HHL 12 
Q11 LHL HLH 13 
Q12 LHH HLL 12 
Q13 HLL LHH 13 
Q14 HLH LHL 12 
Q15 HHL LLH 13 
Q16 HHH LLL 12 
    
Total   198 
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We chose to administer the experiment electronically, since previous research 
has suggested that electronic data collection is comparable to (Boyer et al., 2002), and 
more efficient than (Klassen and Jacobs, 2001), paper data collection. In addition, it is 
more cost effective and convenient, enhances the researcher ability to reach subjects, and 
results in fewer missing responses (Klassen and Jacobs, 2001). Our sample was drawn 
from an internet panel administered by Qualtrics. The data was generated using Qualtrics 
software, Version 56686 of the Qualtrics Research Suite, Copyright © 2014 Qualtrics.  
Table ‎IV-4. Demographic data of experiment participants 
Size (no. of employees) Percent of sample  Industry Percent of sample 
100-1,000  33.5%  Manufacturing 70.5% 
1,001-5,000 35.0%  Retail 29.5% 
5,001-10,000 15.0%    
More than 10,000 16.5%    
Education Percent of sample  Age Percent of sample 
High School 6.0%  21-30 5.0% 
College 23.5%  31-40 33.0% 
Undergraduate degree 36.0%  41-50 30.5% 
Master degree 30.5%  51-60 24.5% 
Doctorate degree 4.0%  61 and over 7.0% 
Total work experience Percent of sample  Purchasing experience Percent of sample 
0-5 years 2.0%  0-5 years 7.5% 
6-10 years 11.0%  6-10 years 30.5% 
11-15 years 21.0%  11-15 years 23.5% 
16-20 years 14.0%  16-20 years 14.5% 
21-25 years 16.0%  21-25 years 12.0% 
26 years or more 36.0%  26 years or more 12.0% 
Gender Percent of sample  Purchasing certification Percent of sample 
Male 62.5%  Yes 41.5% 
Female 37.5%  No 58.5% 
Title Percent of sample  Other control variables Mean (SD) 
Purchasing/Supply Manager 54.5%  Sustainability knowledge 5.38 (1.11) 
Purchasing/Supply Director 19.0%  Risk propensity 3.89 (1.34) 
Purchasing/Supply VP 13.0%    
Other 13.5%    
For reasons noted earlier, full-time supply managers currently working for U.S-
based medium or large size companies (with more than 100 employees) were targeted as 
our key respondents. Besides, drawing on the arguments by Amaeshi et al. (2008) and 
Seuring & Müller (2008), we limited the respondent pool to two socially- and 
environmentally-sensitive industries: manufacturing (including food; CIS code 31-33) 
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and retail trade sectors (CIS code: 443,445,446,448,451). Based on the estimated 
response rate of 30-40% (according to Qualtrics records), an estimated time of 20 
minutes to complete the survey, and the challenge of specifically targeting 
purchasing/supply managers and providing enough incentive to get them to participate in 
the survey, it was agreed that participants would receive a $25 incentive.  
Sixteen different versions of the questionnaire were loaded on Qualtrics platform 
and potential participants were asked a set of qualifying questions to make sure that they 
fit the target sample specifications. To increase the quality of the data, two attention 
questions were designed after each scenario to screen out the respondents who attempted 
to complete the survey without reading the scenarios. The data collection was stopped 
after two weeks, once our predetermined sample size of 200 complete quality responses 
(minimum 12 responses per each vignette) was achieved from the initial pool of 1,064 
potential participants (19% response rate). Two of the responses were excluded because 
of their undesirable response pattern (straight-lining), reducing the sample size to 198 
responses (total of 396 vignettes). The assignment of vignettes and respondents for each 
experimental treatment is reported in Table IV-3. A summary of the respondents’ 
demographic information is provided in Table IV-4.   
5. Data Analysis 
As with the pre-test, after each participant read and responded to a vignette, it 
was important to verify that he/she perceived differences in the treatment factors, as 
intended. 
The manipulation check results reported in Table IV-5 indicate that the risk 
perceived by the respondents was significantly different between the low risk and high 
risk vignettes for both scenarios (t1=5.34 and t2=4.64, p<0.001). Similarly, the 
respondents’ perceptions of supplier dependence and slack resources were significantly 
different at the two levels of each factor for both scenarios (SD: t1=5.98 and t2=6.56, 
p<0.001; SR: t1=2.95, p<0.01 and t2=4.89, p<0.001). To test our conceptual model and its 
associated hypotheses, we conducted two different set of data analysis: 
MANCOVA/ANCOVA, using the scale-type dependent variables, and logistic 
regression, using the discrete choice question for the dependent variable. 
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Table ‎IV-5. Independent variables' manipulation checks for both scenarios
Scenario 
context 
Treatment factor Descriptive statistics Manipulation test results 
Safety, Apparel 
retail industry 
Risk perception 
High: N=100; Mean=5.40; SD=1.04 
Low: N=100; Mean=4.44; SD=1.46 
t(df)=5.34(179)
***
 
Supplier 
dependence 
High: N=100; Mean=5.62; SD=1.40 
Low: N=100; Mean=4.55; SD=1.13 
t(df)=5.98(189)
***
 
Slack resources 
High: N=104; Mean=5.26; SD=1.13 
Low: N=96; Mean=4.68; SD=1.60 
t(df)=2.95(169)
**
 
Environmental, 
Food industry 
Risk perception 
High: N=100; Mean=5.55; SD=1.00 
Low: N=100; Mean=4.88; SD=1.01 
t(df)=4.64 (198)
***
 
Supplier 
dependence 
High: N=100; Mean=5.47; SD=1.05 
Low: N=100; Mean=4.37; SD=1.35 
t(df)=6.56 (186)
***
 
Slack resources 
High: N=104; Mean=5.47; SD=0.98 
Low: N=96; Mean=4.50; SD=1.74 
t(df)=4.89 (165)
***
 
** p<0.01; *** p<0.001 
5.1. MANCOVA/ANCOVA  
Due to the categorical nature of the treatment factors, the hypothesized simple 
main effects and interaction effects were analyzed through MANCOVA/ANCOVA (Hair 
et al., 2010). While controlling for the respondents’ demographics as well as the vignette 
versions and sequencing, a 2 x 2 x 2 MANCOVA was performed on the four dependent 
variables (risk management strategies): acceptance, avoidance, monitoring-based 
mitigation, and collaboration-based mitigation strategies. The results (Table IV-6) 
showed that all three treatment factors, including perceived risk, supplier dependence, 
and slack resources, as well as their interactions, significantly influenced the risk 
management strategies as a set. The partial eta squared values, interpreted as the amount 
of variance in dependent variables that is explained by the factors, show that 22.4% of 
difference in risk management strategies can be explained by supply managers’ perceived 
risk, 10.8% by supplier dependence on the buyer, 6.5% by slack resources, 3.4% by the 
interaction of perceived risk and supplier dependence, and another 4.1% because of the 
interaction of all three factors.  
After finding significant main and interaction effects in MANCOVA, a series of 
univariate ANCOVA’s was conducted to investigate the effect of three treatment factors 
and their interactions on each risk management strategy separately to test the hypotheses. 
The ANCOVA results indicated that compared to low supplier dependence, high supplier 
dependence was associated with greater probability of using collaboration-based risk 
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mitigation strategy (F=3.096, p<0.1). However, results found no difference in the 
probability of using monitoring-based risk mitigation strategy in high versus low supplier 
dependence situations. Thus, H1 is partially supported. We also found support for H2. 
Managers reported a greater probability of employing risk acceptance and risk avoidance 
strategies in low supplier dependence situations than in high supplier dependence 
situations (F=35.789, p<0.001; F=7.185, p<0.01, respectively).  
H1-a/b and H2-a/b state that perceived risk moderates the effect of supplier 
dependence on monitoring-based/collaboration-based risk mitigation and risk 
acceptance/risk avoidance strategies, respectively. The results showed that the perceived 
risk had a significant direct effect on all four risk management strategies: high level of 
perceived risk was associated with greater use of collaboration-based risk mitigation 
(F=16.113, p<0.001) and risk avoidance strategies (F=21.256, p<0.001), whereas low 
level of perceived risk was associated with greater use of monitoring-based risk 
mitigation (F=4.157, p<0.05) and risk acceptance strategies (F=49.947, p<0.001). The 
interaction of the two predictors, however, only significantly affected the risk acceptance 
(F=3.277, p<0.1) and monitoring-based risk mitigation (F=7.831, p<0.01) strategies, and 
not the other two. A planned contrast analysis revealed that marginal mean of risk 
acceptance strategy when the supply manager perceived a low level of risk (rather than 
high) was significantly higher when supplier dependence was at a low level (MDHL-LL=-
1.649, p<0.001). Similarly, the marginal mean of monitoring-based risk mitigation 
strategy when the supply manager perceived a low level of risk (rather than high) was 
significantly higher when supplier was highly dependent on the buyer (MDHH-LH=-0.544, 
p<0.001). Taken together, these findings provide strong support for H1-a and H2-a with 
partial support for H1-b and H2-b. The results also indicated that compared to the 
situations where the amount of slack resources was high, low amount of slack resources 
led to greater use of risk acceptance strategy (F=14.018, p<0.001) and less use of 
collaboration-based mitigation strategy (F=14.873, p<0.001). However, we found no 
difference in the extent to which risk avoidance or monitoring-based risk mitigation 
strategies were used in situations with low versus high amount of slack resources. These 
results provide support for H3, while H4 is only partially supported.  
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Table ‎IV-6. MANCOVA/ANCOVA results 
 
MANCOVA
a
 
ANCOVA 
 Risk acceptance Risk avoidance Risk mitigation-M Risk mitigation-C 
 F-value Ƞ2 F-value Ƞ2 F-value Ƞ2 F-value Ƞ2 F-value Ƞ2 
PR
d
 26.673
***
 0.224 49.947
***
 
MDbH-L=-1.287
***(0.188) 
0.112 21.256
***
 
MDH-L=0.561
***(0.122) 
0.054 4.157
*
 
MDH-L= -0.220
* (0.104) 
0.011 16.113
***
 
MDH-L=0.481
*** (0.119) 
0.041 
SD
d
 11.228
***
 0.108 35.789
***
 
MDH-L=-1.123
***(0.188) 
0.088 7.185
**
 
MDH-L=-0.326
**(0.122) 
0.019   3.096
Ɨ
 
MDH-L=0.211
Ɨ (0.119) 
0.008 
SR
d
 6.394
***
 0.065 14.018
**
 
MDH-L=-0.703
***(0.188) 
0.037     14.873
***
 
MDH-L=0.463
*** (0.120) 
0.039 
PR x SD 3.268
*
 0.034 3.277
 Ɨ
 
MDLH-LL=-1.485
*** 
MDHH-HL=-0.761
**  
MDHL-LL=-1.649
*** 
MDHH-LH=-0.925
**  
(0.270) 
0.009   7.831
**
 
MDHH-LH=-0.544
***(0.155) 
0.021   
PR x SD x SR 3.966
***
 0.041 3.118
*
 
MDLHH-LHL=-0.934
*  
MDHLH-HLL=-1.523
*** 
(0.392) 
0.024   12.065
***
 
MDHHH-HHL=-0.886
*** 
(0.216) 
0.088   
Company  
size 
e
 
2.684
**
 0.028 4.965
**
 0.038 3.412
*
 
 
0.027     
Age 
f
 2.891
***
 0.030 3.395
*
 0.035 4.368
**
 0.045     
Work 
experience 
g
 
2.014
**
 0.026 2.690
*
 0.035 3.267
**
 0.042     
Sustainability 
knowledge  
2.731
*
 
 
0.029 
 
3.895
* 
B= -0.174* (0.088) 
0.010 5.132
*
 
B=0.129* (0.057) 
0.014     
Risk 
propensity 
5.153
***
 
 
0.053 
 
6.780
*
 
B=-0.208* (0.080) 
0.018     5.785
*
 
B=0.123* (0.051) 
0.015 
a. MANCOVA F and partial eta-squared values are based on Wilks’ lambda approach.  
b. MDs are marginal mean differences for the factors levels; standard deviations are shown in parentheses. For the interactions, MDABC represents the 
marginal mean difference for level A of perceived risk, level B of supplier dependence, and level C of slack resources. 
c. *** p-value<0.001; ** p-value<0.01; * p-value<0.05; Ɨ p-value<0.1 
d. PR: Perceived risk (Low=0, High=1), SD: Supplier dependence (Low=0, High=1), SR: Slack resources (Low=0, High=1) 
e. Base category: 100-1000 employees 
f. Base category: 21-30 years old 
g. Base category: 0-5 years 
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Finally, H4-a~c simply state that slack resources positively moderate the 
hypothesized relationships in H1-a,b and H2-b. According to Table IV-6, the interaction 
of the slack resources with the other two predictors significantly affected the risk 
acceptance (F=3.118, p<0.05) and monitoring-based risk mitigation (F=12.065, p<0.001) 
strategies. The results of a planned contrast analysis showed that when the amount of 
slack resources was low (rather than high), the marginal mean of risk acceptance strategy 
was significantly higher in low risk-high dependence (MDLHH-LHL=-0.934, p<0.05), as 
well as high risk-low dependence (MDHLH-HLL=-1.523, p<0.001) situations, providing 
support for H4-a and H4-c. Similarly, the marginal mean of monitoring-based risk 
mitigation strategy was significantly higher in high risk-high dependence situations 
(MDHHH-HHL=-0.886, p<0.001), providing support for H4-b. 
The ANCOVA results for the covariates (i.e., the control variables) showed that 
the size of respondents’ employer firm significantly affected their use of risk acceptance 
and avoidance strategies: those working for larger firms were more likely to accept, and 
less likely to avoid, the supplier sustainability risk. The findings also showed that 
managers with more experience and sustainability-related knowledge were more inclined 
to avoid the risk and less motivated to accept it. In addition, the respondents’ risk 
propensity had a significant negative effect on use of risk acceptance strategy and a 
significant positive effect on the use of collaboration-based risk mitigation strategy. The 
results identified no relationship between respondents’ industry, gender, purchasing work 
experience, education, and certification, and their use of any of the risk management 
strategies and, as such, we removed them for the ease of exhibition.  
To examine the robustness of these results, we ran a set of other tests. Firstly, a 
Roy-Bargmann stepdown analysis was performed to avoid the potential biases in 
ANCOVA results due to the significant correlation between two of the dependent 
variables, i.e., monitoring-based and collaboration-based mitigation strategies (Pearson 
correlation = 0.299, p<0.01). The results confirmed our conclusions drawn from the 
univariate ANCOVA. Secondly, a Kruskal-Wallis test was conducted to relax the 
normality assumption, which further confirmed the same statistically significant main 
effects as the ANCOVA results. Finally, because every participant responded to two 
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vignettes, it was possible that the experience of responding to the first vignette may have 
influenced their responses to the second vignette. While we controlled for this order 
effect by balancing and reversing the order of treatments, we also reran a MANCOVA 
with only the first vignette. The results remained qualitatively similar to that reported 
earlier.  
5.2. Logistic regression 
Because of the categorical nature of the discrete choice question (strategy 
selection among four options), moderated logistic regression technique was used to 
supplement our MANCOVA analysis results and assess the effect of perceived risk, 
supplier dependence, and slack resources on supply managers’ choice among four 
different risk management strategies. In this technique, the log odds of the outcome 
categories are modeled as a linear combination of the predictor variables. To reduce the 
complications associated with interpreting the multinomial logistic regression results 
involving an outcome variable with four categories, we split the outcome variable into 
four binary variables: selection of risk acceptance (yes or no), risk avoidance (yes or no), 
monitoring-based risk mitigation (yes or no), or collaboration-based risk mitigation 
strategy (yes or no). The three predictor variables were modeled as dummy variables, 
with the reference group being an independent supplier posing a low level of 
sustainability risk on a buyer which had a high amount of slack resources to deal with the 
situation. The interaction analysis in logistic regression uses a hierarchically well-
formulated (HWF) model in which all lower-order components of a higher-order 
interaction term are included in the model. Hence, the typical strategy used to evaluate 
interactions is hierarchical analysis, i.e., if the higher-order interaction term was not 
significant, it was eliminated (Jaccard, 2001). The logistic regression model describing 
the relationship between 𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑖𝑡(𝜋1) (i.e., the log odds that the strategy 1 is selected) and 
our set of predictors is: 
𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑖𝑡(𝜋1) = 𝐵0 + 𝐵1𝑋1 + 𝐵2𝑋2 + 𝐵3𝑋3+ 𝐵4𝑋1𝑋2 + 𝐵5𝑋1𝑋3+𝐵6𝑋2𝑋3+𝐵7𝑋1𝑋2𝑋3         (Eq.1) 
If the model includes only the main effects and not the interaction terms, the 
exponent of the logistic coefficient (i.e., 𝐸𝑥𝑝(𝐵𝑖)) will be equal to the odds ratio in which 
the predicted odds for the group scored 1 on 𝑋𝑖 is divided by the predicted odds for the 
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reference group, holding constant all other predictor variables in the equation. For an 
interactive logistic model including the product terms (i.e., 𝑋𝑖𝑋𝑗), however, the logistic 
coefficient for 𝑋𝑖 is conditioned to the reference group for 𝑋𝑗. In other words, the 
exponent of the logistic coefficient for 𝑋𝑖 is the odds ratio that divides the predicted odds 
for the group scored 1 on 𝑋𝑖 by the predicted odds for the reference group on 𝑋𝑖, for the 
case where the dummy variable on 𝑋𝑗 equals zero. In addition, the exponent of the 
logistic coefficient for the product term is the ratio of predicted odds ratios: it focuses on 
the predicted odds for the group scored 1 on 𝑋𝑖 divided by the predicted odds for the 
reference group on 𝑋𝑖 for the case where 𝑋𝑗 equals 1 and divides it by the corresponding 
odds ratio for the reference group on 𝑋𝑗 (Jaccard, 2001). The results are presented in 
Table IV-7. 
The main effect models (A to D) were used to test the hypotheses H1, H2, H3, 
and H4. The significant main effects of supplier dependence in models A and B indicated 
that it negatively influenced the likelihood of risk avoidance and risk acceptance 
strategies being selected regardless of the level of risk perceived or the slack resources 
available. Risk acceptance (avoidance) strategy was 4.76 (4.85) times more likely to be 
selected to manage supplier sustainability risk associated with an independent supplier 
(B=-1.561; B=-1.580, p<0.001). 
Similarly, the significant main effects of supplier dependence in models C and D 
showed that supply managers were 4.40 (2.73) times more likely to choose monitoring-
based (collaboration-based) risk mitigation strategy (B=1.481; B=1.007, p<0.001) to 
manage the supplier sustainability risks associated with highly dependent suppliers. 
These results provide strong support for H1 and H2. The results in these models also 
indicated that risk acceptance strategy was 3.40 times more likely to be selected when 
slack resources were not available to supply managers (B=1.225, p<0.001), whereas risk 
avoidance and collaboration-based risk mitigation strategies were significantly less likely 
to be used in this condition (B=-0.547, p<0.01; B=-1.157, p<0.001). Monitoring-based 
risk mitigation strategy, however, was found to be used equally likely in situations with 
high vs. low slack resources. Hence, H3 is strongly supported by the findings, whereas 
H4 is only partially supported.  
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Table ‎IV-7. Binary logistic regression models for four outcome variables 
a
 
Predictors 
Risk acceptance Risk avoidance Risk mitigation-M Risk mitigation-C 
B Wald Exp(B) B Wald Exp(B) B Wald Exp(B) B Wald Exp(B) 
Main effect models Model A Model B Model C Model D 
PR
b
 -2.005 41.211
***
 0.135 1.035 14.568
***
 2.815 -0.564 5.967
**
 0.569 1.552 29.654
***
 4.723 
SD
b
 -1.561 28.018
***
 0.210 -1.580 30.059
***
 0.206 1.481 38.521
***
 4.398 1.007 13.824
***
 2.739 
SR
b
 1.225 18.188
***
 3.405 -0.547 4.277
**
 0.579 0.445 3.734 1.560 -1.157 17.855
***
 0.315 
Constant -0.498 4.112 0.608 -0.988 15.731 0.372 -1.523 38.218 0.218 -2.219 54.072 0.109 
Complete models Model A’ Model B’ Model C’ Model D’ 
PR
b
 -3.791 13.055
***
 0.023 1.553 12.071
**
 4.727 -0.481 0.895 0.618 1.909 10.346
**
 6.744 
SD
b
 -2.650 16.136
***
 0.071 -0.704 1.616 0.495 1.524 11.968
**
 4.592 1.799 9.140
**
 6.042 
SR
b
 0.240 0.360 1.272 -0.121 0.060 0.886 -0.364 0.539 0.695 0.676 1.196 1.965 
PR x SD 2.629 2.792 13.865 -1.576 4.290
*
 0.207 -1.705 5.707
*
 0.182 0.155 0.062 1.167 
PR x SR 2.813 6.192
*
 16.652 -0.800 1.541 0.450 0.028 0.001 1.029 -0.919 2.230 0.399 
SD x SR 2.033 6.868
**
 7.636 -1.781 2.184 0.168 0.033 0.003 1.033 -2.087 13.538
***
 0.124 
PR x SD x SR -5.086 6.880
**
 0.006 2.878 4.182
* 
17.787 2.781 7.689
**
 16.135 ---
a
 --- 
a
 --- 
a
 
Constant -0.080 0.080 0.923 -1.266 13.744 0.282 -1.153 12.117 0.316 -2.973 28.334 0.051 
Nagelkerke R
2
  0.370   0.210   0.252   0.279  
a. The interaction analysis in logistic regression uses a hierarchically well-formulated (HWF) model in which all lower-order components of a higher-order 
interaction term are included in the model. Hence, the typical strategy used to evaluate interactions is hierarchical analysis, i.e., if the higher-order 
interaction term is not significant, it can be eliminated (Jaccard, 2001).  
b. PR: Perceived risk (base category=low), SD: Supplier dependence (base category=low), SR: Slack resources (base category=high) 
c. *** p-value<0.001; ** p-value<0.01; * p-value<0.05 
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To better appreciate the results of the interactive logistic models A’~D’, we used 
Equation 1 and the coefficients reported in Table IV-7 to calculate the predicted 
𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑖𝑡(𝜋1) for each cell of the 2 X 2 X 2 factorial design for all four outcome variables. 
We then converted these log odds to odds by calculating the exponent of each. According 
to the results, if the amount of slack resources was high, supply managers were 8.89 
times (i.e., 1.449/0.163) more likely to select monitoring-based strategy to mitigate the 
supplier sustainability risk associated with a dependent supplier if they perceived a low 
level of risk rather than a high level of risk (p<0.001). They were, however, 7.88 (i.e., 
2.435/0.309) times more likely to select collaboration-based risk mitigation strategy if 
they perceived a high level of risk than a low level of risk (p<0.001). In contrast, supply 
managers were 4.72 (i.e., 1.330/0.282) times more likely to decide to avoid the risk 
associated with an independent supplier if they perceived a high level of risk versus a low 
level of risk (p<0.01) and about 44 times more likely to choose to take no actions and 
accept the risk if the risk they perceived was low (p<0.001). Taken together, these 
findings provide strong support for H1-a, H1-b, H2-a, and H2-b. 
As the next step, we compared the odds values of high vs. low slack resources 
situations. The monitoring-based risk mitigation strategy was almost equally likely to be 
selected for low risk-high dependence cells in both situations (odds ratio=1.00/0.718, 
p>0.05). Although risk acceptance strategy was found to be 9.7 (i.e., 0.633/0.065) times 
more likely to be selected in this cell for the low slack resources situation, this effect was 
not found to be statistically significant because of its large standard error. 
As a result, our findings do not support H4-a. Comparing the odds values for 
high risk-high dependence cells for high vs. low slack resources conditions, we found 
that supply managers were 0.097 (p<0.001) times less likely to decide to mitigate the 
supplier sustainability risk through collaboration-based initiatives and 11.917 (p<0.001) 
times more likely to choose to mitigate it through monitoring-based initiatives if the 
amount of slack resources was low. However, the likelihood of using risk acceptance or 
avoidance strategies were not significantly different in these two conditions. Taken 
together, these results provide partial support for H4-b. Finally, we found strong support 
for H4-c as the results showed that the supply managers were 21 (i.e., 0.441/0.021) times 
more likely to accept the risk and 0.398 (i.e., 0.530/1.33) times less likely to avoid the 
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risk if the amount of discretionary slack resources was low in high risk-low dependence 
situations (p<0.01 and p<0.05, respectively). 
Table IV-8 presents a summary of MANCOVA/ANCOVA and logistic 
regression results for each hypothesis. 
Table ‎IV-8. Summary of M/ANCOVA and logistic regression results
Hypothesis Description M/ANCOVA Logistic Regression 
H1 High-SD  Mitigation Partially Supported Supported 
H1-a High-SD x Low-PR   Mitigation-M   Supported Supported 
H1-b High-SD x High-PR  Mitigation-C Partially Supported Supported 
H2 Low-SD  Acceptance/Avoidance Supported Supported 
H2-a Low-SD x Low-PR   Acceptance   Supported Supported 
H2-b Low SD x High-PR  Avoidance Partially Supported Supported 
H3 Low-SR  Acceptance Supported Supported 
H4 High-SR  Avoidance/Mitigation  Partially Supported Partially Supported 
H4-a 
Low-SR & (High-SD x Low-PR)   
Acceptance (+), Mitigation-M (-) 
Partially Supported Not Supported 
H4-b 
Low-SR & (High-SD x High-PR)   
Acceptance (+), Mitigation-M (+), 
Avoidance (+), Mitigation-C (-) 
Partially Supported Partially Supported 
H4-c 
Low-SR & (Low-SD x High-PR)   
Acceptance (+), Avoidance (-) 
Partially Supported Supported 
Note: SD= Supplier Dependence; PR=Perceived Risk; SR: Slack Resources 
6. Discussion 
The purpose of this research was to test theoretically-derived hypotheses related 
to the different strategies pursued by supply managers for managing supplier 
sustainability risks. Since purchasing and supply management function has a boundary-
spanning role in the buying organizations and is influential in extending their 
sustainability ambitions to the suppliers (Krause et al., 2009), we specifically focused on 
supply managers as the decision makers in this study. The effects of high and low levels 
of perceived supplier sustainability risk were assessed at two levels of supplier 
dependence (high vs. low) within two organizational contexts (where the amount of slack 
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resources was either high or low). Overall, the results indicate that these multi-level 
contextual factors significantly impact supply managers’ intended risk management 
strategy: whether to mitigate the risk by monitoring-based or collaboration-based SSD 
initiatives, to avoid the risk altogether by phasing out the supplier, or to accept the risk 
and decide to deal with the consequences should it materialize.  
The empirical results of this paper extend the literature to date in four essential 
ways. First, prior studies built on resource dependence theory suggest that buyer 
dominant relationships enable the buyers to successfully implement their monitoring-
based or collaboration-based SSD initiatives (Spence and Bourlakis, 2009, Pedersen, 
2009, Hoejmose et al., 2013). Besides, supplier dependence on the buyer is considered as 
a major requirement for suppliers’ compliance to buyers’ specific social and 
environmental standards and requirements (Locke et al., 2009, Pedersen, 2009). The 
results of this study provide additional support for this premise from a risk management 
perspective. Collaboration-based and monitoring-based risk mitigation strategies were 
found more likely to be used in buyer dominant situations where the participants believed 
they had the power to enforce such initiatives to improve suppliers’ safety or 
environmental performance. The likelihood of using risk avoidance and risk acceptance 
strategies, however, increased when supplier dependence on the buyer was low. These 
findings are in line with Kraljic’s (1983) strategic recommendation to buying 
organizations to exploit their full bargaining power so as to minimize the supply risks if 
they are the dominant player in the supply chain, or to get defensive and start looking for 
substitute material and suppliers if the supplier has the upper hand in the game.  
Second, this study provides empirical support for merging the agency and 
management control theories to explain the relationship between the risk inherent in an 
agent-principal relationship and the control mechanism used by the principal for 
managing the agent’s opportunistic behavior. In line with these theories’ predictions, in 
high supplier dependence situations, the likelihood of using collaboration-based risk 
mitigation strategy (parallel to input control mechanism) increased when the participants 
perceived a high level of risk threatening their organization. However, the likelihood of 
pursuing a monitoring-based risk mitigation strategy (parallel to behavior and output 
control mechanisms) was significantly higher when the participants perceived a low level 
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of risk from the supplier’s sustainability-related misconducts.  
Third, our findings call for more scholarly attention to the crucial effect of slack 
resources on the strategic decisions made by middle managers, in this case, supply 
managers. The empirical results confirmed that the slack resources moderated the defined 
predictor-outcome relationships in risk management decision making: as the amount of 
available slack resources decreased, the participants became more inclined to (1) choose 
monitoring-based risk mitigation strategy over collaboration-based one to deal with high 
risk suppliers in high supplier dependence situations, (2) take no actions and accept the 
risk rather than to avoid it by terminating the relationship even when they perceived a 
high level of risk in low supplier dependence situations. This is in line with Meszaros’s 
(1999) study conclusions showing that managers utilize a form of threshold-based 
heuristic, namely “affordability heuristic”, in their decision making, picking options that 
are not perceived to deteriorate their organizations’ profitability. Therefore, the decision 
outcome of “which risk management strategy to use” varies depending on the desired 
strategy to be affordable or not. 
Fourth, our findings add depth to the literature on SSCM by extending it to a 
risk-based framework and empirically examining the concept of supplier sustainability 
risk management and its predictors. Particularly, while this literature is mainly 
concentrated on the effect of different supply management initiatives which could fit into 
monitoring or collaborative activities (Pagell and Wu, 2009, Awaysheh and Klassen, 
2010, Vachon and Klassen, 2006a, Klassen and Vereecke, 2012), we provide new 
insights on why and under what conditions either of these initiatives are used by buying 
organizations. In addition, we examine why some buyers might take two other alternative 
strategies, i.e., supplier phase-out or accepting the risk, instead of using such initiatives. 
Finally, from an empirical standpoint, the vignette-based experiment 
methodology allowed for more controlled examination of the causal relationships with a 
sample of real supply managers. While the work here investigated supply managers’ 
decision making regarding supplier sustainability risk, the developed vignettes and their 
associated manipulations and scales can be used by other researchers in a variety of 
operational contexts involving risk, dependence, or slack resources constructs. 
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7. Managerial Implications and Limitations  
This study makes additional managerial contributions for buying organizations 
dealing with supplier sustainability risk. Besides, we found that supply managers’ risk 
propensity (or their prior sustainability-related knowledge) can color their decision 
making process and make them favor collaboration-based risk mitigation (or risk 
avoidance) strategy over others regardless of the situation in hand. Hence, in supply 
chain staffing decisions, senior managers in buying organizations should consider the 
personal characteristics (e.g., risk propensity, sustainability-related training and 
knowledge) of key personnel who are in charge of buyer-supplier exchanges to ensure 
that they are aligned with their social and environmental policies. They also need to 
foster improved decision-making by supply managers via establishing sustainability-
oriented purchasing policies and procedures that facilitate the supply managers’ 
translation of the information available to them into accurate risk assessments. Further, to 
create accurate views of the situation and to steer the risk management actions in the 
desired direction, they should also (i) employ appropriate training and information 
systems to promote the supply managers’ knowledge regarding the sustainability-related 
issues, such as the salient stakeholder pressures in their external environment, and (ii) 
establish performance evaluation and reward systems that provide incentives for supply 
managers to closely interact with suppliers to have a fairly accurate perception of their 
sustainability-related intentions and behaviors. Finally, they should support their 
purchasing and supply chain management functions by providing them with adequate 
resources to deploy appropriate risk management strategy, particularly for cases which 
are perceived to be high risk. 
This paper put forth and investigated a conceptual framework that can be 
deepened and broadened in a number of ways. First, we found that the supply managers’ 
decisions were directly driven by their perceptions of the risks associated with suppliers. 
However, this perception can be biased (i.e., under-estimating or over-estimating the 
actual risk), and result in improper management of the risk or over-investments in 
unsuitable more-costly risk management strategies. Therefore, a possible future research 
topic is to investigate the approaches that buying organizations can take to improve the 
supply managers’ estimation of risk such that their perceived risk aligns better with the 
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actual risk. Second, low buyer independence was one of the major premises of this study. 
More specifically, we focused on the buyer-supplier situations where the supplier 
dependence was either low or high, given that the buyer dependence on the supplier was 
always low. To extend this model, an avenue for future research would be to investigate 
how the supply managers’ choice among the four risk management strategies would shift 
if this factor is included in the model. Third, although supply managers’ risk perception 
is considered as one of the major factors in their choice among management strategies, 
the determinants of this construct, such as supplier’s size and ownership (Klassen and 
Vereecke, 2012), the level of focal firm’s accountability for social and environmental 
issues in their supply base (Parmigiani et al., 2011), or the supply managers’ personal 
characteristics such as their risk propensity (Sitkin and Weingart, 1995) were not 
included in the model and can be explored in future studies. Fourth, this study considered 
a one-shot decision regarding one supplier. Future research may consider a step-wise 
decision making process where the information on the predictor factors are gradually 
provided to the participants or use conjoint analysis technique comparing multiple 
suppliers. Finally, the scope of inquiry in this study is limited to the supply managers in 
the United States. However, given the essential effect of organizational culture on supply 
chain management practices, including sustainable supply management decisions (Crum 
et al., 2011, Wu and Pagell, 2011), future studies are required to look beyond the North 
American context. 
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Appendix IV-A: Description of the scenarios and the manipulation of treatment factors  
Scenario 1 
Kojak Inc. is a mid-sized apparel retailer based in United States, offering stylish and affordable clothing and accessories for men and women. The Kojak 
brand is available online and in more than 400 stores across North America. With only 20% of its clothing made locally, the company has a large 
international supply base located in Asia (about 50%) and South America (about 30%). In 2013, Kojak spent about $500 million on purchasing finished goods 
from suppliers. Sales in North America have been growing slowly with modest profitability in recent years. In the past few years, a number of companies 
operating in the apparel industry have experienced negative publicity and reputational damage due to the unsafe and unhealthy work conditions at their 
suppliers’ facilities. To avoid similar problems, Kojak’s CEO has recently extended Kojak’s health and safety policy to include the suppliers’ premises.  
Currently, Kojak has no formal processes to monitor, manage, or improve health- and safety-related measures in place at its suppliers’ facilities. The CEO has 
[allocated a special annual budget of $5 million to your department for making the necessary changes to the supplier management activities vs. asked you 
to make the necessary changes to the supplier management activities within your department’s current budget limits and stated that no budget 
adjustments will be approved]. To comply with Kojak’s new policy, you plan to look into all supplier profiles from a workplace health and safety perspective 
and decide what action, if any, to take with each of them. One supplier has been brought to your attention by a junior staff person. 
B.A.P. Ltd. is located in a developing country in Southeast Asia. During the past year, this company [received one safety violation citation from the local 
government authorities vs. was targeted by a reputable international human rights activist group and highlighted on their website] because of the unsafe 
and unhealthy work conditions at their facilities. Because of their [small size (120 employees) vs. large size (1100 employees)], it [is not vs. is] likely that 
they will draw [any vs. more] attention from the activist groups, non-government organizations (NGOs), or media in the future. Approximately [90% vs. 
10%] of B.A.P. total sales are to Kojak, which accounts for nearly one tenth of Kojak’s purchased goods. 
Scenario 2 
ChocoYum Inc., headquartered in Chicago, is a mid-sized confectionery producer with over 700 employees. Established in 1995, the company now 
manufactures chocolates, snacks, and refreshment products at five plants spread across United States. These products are distributed and sold in North 
America. Palm oil is one of the major ingredients of ChocoYum chocolate products. Oil palms grow in equatorial conditions in Asia, Latin America, and 
Africa. ChocoYum’s oil suppliers are mainly based in Asia. In 2013, ChocoYum spent about $200 million for the imported palm oil. During the past few 
years, a number of companies operating in this industry have experienced negative publicity and reputational damage because one or more of their suppliers 
have sourced palm oil from regions of the world experiencing rainforest deforestation. Such deforestation has been linked to climate change and destruction of 
rainforest ecosystems. To avoid similar problems, ChocoYum’s CEO has recently extended ChocoYum’s environmental policy to include the suppliers’ 
processes and activities. 
Currently, ChocoYum has no formal processes to monitor, manage, or improve the environmental measures in place at its suppliers’ facilities. The CEO has 
[allocated a special annual budget of $2 million to your department for making the necessary changes to the supplier management activities vs. asked you 
to make the necessary changes to the supplier management activities within your department’s current budget limits and stated that no budget adjustments 
will be approved]. To comply with ChocoYum’s new policy, you plan to look into how suppliers source palm oil from an environmental sustainability 
perspective and decide what action, if any, to take with each of them. One supplier has been brought to your attention by a junior staff person. 
P.O.P. Ltd., one of the palm oil suppliers, is an Indonesian firm. Last year, this company was [found guilty and ordered to pay a fine by an Indonesian 
court vs. targeted by a reputable environmental activist group and highlighted on their website] for violating the environmental laws and clearing an area 
of protected peat forest. Because of their [small size (120 employees) vs. large size (1100 employees)], it [is not vs. is] likely that they will draw [any vs. more] 
attention from the activist groups, non-government organizations (NGOs), or media in the future. Approximately [90% vs. 10%] of P.O.P. total sales are to 
ChocoYum, which accounts for nearly one tenth of ChocoYum’s palm oil supply. 
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Appendix IV-B: Dependent variable and manipulation check scales (Scenario 1) 
Scale-Type Dependent Variables 
Given the information provided in the scenario, to what extent are you likely to take the following actions with 
regard to B.A.P. Ltd.? (1=very unlikely, 7=very likely) 
Risk Acceptance 
Q-1: Take no new actions regarding health & safety issues at their facilities. 
Risk Avoidance  
Q-2: Continue the business with them for a long time. (Dropped) 
Q-3: Look for another supplier to replace them. 
Q-4: Imply in your negotiations with them that they are in danger of losing the business unless their health and 
safety issues are properly managed. (Dropped) 
Q-5: Renew the relationship once the current contract expires. (Dropped) 
Q-6: Terminate the relationship. 
Risk Mitigation- Monitoring Based 
Q-7: Include health and safety measures such as incident/ accident rates in evaluating their performance. 
Q-8: Send out a questionnaire asking them to report on their health and safety measures such as incident/ accident 
rates or the use of overtime. 
Q-9: Regularly send your staff to perform workplace health and safety audits at their facilities. 
Q-10: Provide them with feedback about the results of audits and performance evaluations. 
Q-11: Require them an international health and safety standard certification (e.g., OHSAS 18001). 
Risk Mitigation- Collaboration Based  
Q-12: Allow an open two-way dialogue to jointly establish proper goals/targets regarding health and safety 
issues. (Dropped) 
Q-13: Work closely with them to improve their health and safety performance (e.g., joint investment). 
Q-14: Provide training/education to their personnel to improve their health and safety performance. 
Q-15: Put incentives in place to improve their health and safety performance (e.g., financial rewards). 
Q-16: Invest resources in developing their capabilities and improving their health and safety performance (e.g., 
financial aids). 
Discrete Choice Dependent Variable 
Given the information provided in the scenario, which one of the following four strategies would you choose as 
your MAJOR and ULTIMATE approach in managing your supplier, B.A.P. Ltd.? 
a) You will terminate the relationship with them and switch to another supplier. 
b) You will start collaborating with them to improve their health & safety performance, e.g. through training 
and education of their personnel, providing financial aids, etc. 
c) You will start monitoring their health & safety performance, e.g. through self-evaluations, audits, third 
party certifications, etc.  
d) You will continue working with them without taking any new actions regarding health & safety issues at 
their facilities. 
Manipulation Check Scales 
Given the information provided in the scenario, to what extent do you agree or disagree with the following 
statements? (1=strongly disagree, 7= strongly agree) 
Perceived Risk (Adapted from Wagner & Bode (2006), Ellis et al. (2010), and Tazelaar & Snijders (2013)) 
1. B.A.P.’s behavior will have negative impacts on Kojak’s reputation. 
2. The relationship with B.A.P. will be problematic for Kojak in the future. 
3. The relationship with B.A.P. is risky for Kojak. 
Supplier Dependence (Adapted from Carr et al. (2008), Bode et al. (2011), He et al. (2012)) 
1. B.A.P. cannot afford to lose Kojak’s business. 
2. The relationship with Kojak is crucial to B.A.P.’s future performance. 
3. B.A.P. is dependent on Kojak. 
Slack Resources (Adapted from Danneels (2008)) 
1. You have sufficient discretionary financial resources to implement your desired supply management strategy. 
  
   
Chapter V 
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Chapter V.  Conclusion 
This dissertation aimed to study various approaches which organizations might 
undertake to manage the environmental and social risks originating from their internal 
operations or their supply chains, including environmental management, safety 
management, supplier development, and supplier phase-out initiatives. Specifically, the 
overarching research objective was to investigate the determinants of these initiatives and 
their subsequent effects on organizations’ performance. In doing so, this dissertation 
presented three complementary essays, each one making a unique contribution to a 
deeper understanding of sustainable operations management (OM). This final chapter 
concludes the dissertation by outlining the broader contributions of the dissertation, 
describing its limitations, and discussing possibilities for future research. 
1. Key Implications 
This dissertation made four major contributions to the sustainable operations 
management literature which, when taken together, sheds some light on different ways to 
manage sustainability-related risks within organizations or across their supply chains. 
First, this dissertation took a broad approach and adapted the Kleindorfer et al.’s internal-
external perspective (2005) on sustainable operations. Specifically, it took the leap from 
investigating the intra-organizational environmental and social practices in the first essay 
to the examination of the strategies aimed at managing sustainability issues within the 
supply chain in the second and third essays. In addition, the three essays collectively 
contribute to the sustainable operations management literature by exploring it through 
two relatively new perspectives, i.e., “safety management” and “risk management”.  
Second, sustainable operations management literature has traditionally focused 
on the environmental issues and overlooked the social component of sustainability 
(Kleindorfer et al., 2005, Linton et al., 2007). Moreover, only a few recent studies have 
simultaneously looked at social, environmental, and economic aspects of sustainability 
(Thornton et al., 2013, Pagell et al., 2010, Pullman et al., 2009, Gimenez et al., 2012), 
whereas almost all other studies investigate these aspects in a standalone fashion 
(Seuring and Müller, 2008). The three essays in this dissertation, however, collectively 
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considered all three elements of sustainability, i.e., people, planet, and profit (Elkington, 
1998). For example, the first and third essays concentrated on the workplace safety as 
one of the most important social aspects of organization’s operations, which has been 
predominantly ignored in the sustainable operations management literature (Pagell et al., 
2014). Essay 1, further, empirically investigated the simultaneous effect of safety culture 
on organizations’ financial, environmental, and safety performance through the 
mediating effect of environmental and safety management practices. Similarly, the 
vignette-based experiment presented in essay 3 explored how buying organizations 
manage safety- or environmentally-related risks within their supply chains. Finally, the 
second paper conceptually theorized about the relationship between managing supplier 
sustainability risks (environmental and social risks, as a whole) and organizations’ 
financial performance.  
Third, this dissertation responded to the ever-growing need for theoretically-
grounded studies to describe, explain, and predict operations and supply chain 
phenomena (Ketchen and Hult, 2007b, Sarkis et al., 2011). For example, the first essay 
built on the organizational support theory (Eisenberger et al., 1997) to explain how the 
organization’s safety culture and the management commitment in improving workplace 
safety would motivate the employees to help their organization enhance its financial 
performance and effectively adopt environmental practices and improve its 
environmental performance. In the same vein, the second and third essays drew on the 
resource dependence (Pfeffer and Salancik, 2003) and the agency/management control 
(Eisenhardt, 1989, Ouchi, 1979) theories and identified two major factors as the 
determinants of different approaches toward managing supplier sustainability risks: level 
of perceived risk and the buyer-supplier dependence structure. Accordingly, 
collaboration-based sustainable supplier development (SSD) was suggested to be used in 
interdependent buyer-supplier relationships and high-risk buyer dominant situations. 
Monitoring-based SSD, however, was hypothesized to be employed to mitigate low 
levels of risk in buyer dominant situations. In addition, it was proposed that the intended 
strategy in high-risk independent buyer-supplier relationships would be to phase-out the 
supplier. Finally, organizations were suggested to accept the risk and take no actions in 
low-risk independent situations as well as in relationships with dominant suppliers. 
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Finally, top management intentions can be quite different from the decisions 
made by the operational managers when it comes to being more sustainable (Wheeler et 
al., 2002). Therefore, it is imperative to understand the sustainability-related strategies, 
initiatives, and decisions carried out at the operational level (Pagell and Gobeli, 2009). 
This dissertation addressed this issue in three different ways: (i) the first essay examined 
individual plants, and not companies, as the unit of analysis to be closer to day-to-day 
decisions at the operational level, (ii) the scope of the second essay was limited to the 
operational-level, and not corporate-level, strategies for managing the supplier 
sustainability risks such as monitoring-based or collaboration-based sustainable supplier 
development (SSD) initiatives, and (iii) the third essay targeted actual supply managers, 
and not top management, as the sample population assuming that they are the major 
decision makers in the supply chain context.  
2. Limitations and Future Research 
The contributions made in this dissertation must be viewed in light of the 
limitations associated with the three essays. First and foremost, the scope of all three 
studies was limited to strategies and initiatives carried out at the operational level and not 
the corporate level. For example, the risk management strategies in essays 2 and 3 are 
limited to the operations strategy level and do not transcend to the corporate-level 
strategies toward reputational risk or brand management. For instance, some buying 
organizations have recently employed “stakeholder bridging” strategy to deal with 
supplier sustainability risks: they have begun to actively approach and cooperate with 
critical NGO’s and other salient stakeholders to reduce their pressure and enhance the 
legitimacy of their own sustainability-related initiatives (Foerstl et al., 2010, Matos and 
Hall, 2007). However, the scope of this dissertation does not cover such corporate-level 
strategies. 
Three major limitations of this dissertation arise predominantly from the 
employed methodologies and the nature of the data in both empirical studies (i.e., essays 
1 and 3). First, the data was collected from a limited range of industries in North America 
with moderate levels of safety and environmental risks in the first essay and high levels 
of supplier sustainability risks in the third essay. Therefore, the findings may not be 
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generalizable to organizations operating in other counties or other industries. Given the 
essential effect of industry and culture on operations and supply chain management 
practices (Wu and Pagell, 2011, Bates et al., 1995, Bortolotti et al., 2015, Baird et al., 
2012), future studies are required to look beyond the context of these two studies. 
Second, the collected data was from a cross-sectional snapshot; therefore, in the 
first essay, it was not possible to test and account for the lags between the development 
of the safety culture and the existence of practices and performance changes; similarly, 
the third essay investigated a one-shot decision regarding one supplier. To address this 
limitation in essay 1, a set of longitudinal studies can be conducted to measure the extent 
of safety-oriented culture and the implementation level of safety and environmental 
practices and their impact on organizational performance across a three to five year 
period, examining the relationships and their development through time. As for essay 3, 
future research may consider a step-wise decision making process where the information 
on the predictor factors are gradually provided to the participants or use conjoint analysis 
technique comparing multiple suppliers. 
Third, both empirical studies used a single methodology (survey or experiment) 
and data source for empirical investigation. Specifically, the first essay relied on single-
respondent perceptual data which could create grounds for bias. This shortcoming was 
partially addressed by validating the survey data on environmental performance with 
NPRI objective measure to show that there was no major bias in the single respondent 
self-reported data in this study (it was the only plant-level secondary data available). 
Changing the unit of analysis to the firm level, future studies can collect secondary panel 
data for companies whose performance information are available on databases such as 
Compustat and Environmental, Social and Governance factors (ESG) and triangulate it 
with a primary survey data collected from the same companies. 
In addition, essay 2 put forth a conceptual framework that was only partially 
validated by the empirical data in essay 3. Specifically, essay 3 neither examined the 
effect of buyer dependence on the risk management strategies nor did it investigate the 
strategy-outcome relationships (i.e., the effect of risk management strategies on 
reputation and financial performance). An avenue for future research would be to design 
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and develop empirical studies to examine these missing elements.  
From a conceptual standpoint, this dissertation provides several trajectories for 
future research. In essay 1, a positive relationship between safety culture and 
environmental practices was established. It was argued that this relationship was because 
the employees were motivated by the positive safety culture and changed their behaviors 
to contribute to organizations’ plans and objectives, including green programmes. 
However, such mediating effects were not empirically examined. Hence, an interesting 
stream of future research could supplement this study by concentrating on the underlying 
mechanisms between organizations’ safety and environmental endeavors. Similarly, in 
essays 2 and 3, supply managers’ risk perception was considered as one of the major 
factors in their choice among management strategies. However, the determinants of this 
construct, such as suppliers’ size and ownership (Klassen and Vereecke, 2012), the level 
of focal firm’s accountability for social and environmental issues in their supply base 
(Parmigiani et al., 2011), or the supply managers’ personal characteristics, such as their 
risk propensity (Sitkin and Weingart, 1995), were not included in the model and can be 
explored in future studies. 
Finally, a very interesting stream for future scholarly attempts stems from 
bringing the two research streams of this dissertation together. Specifically, exploring the 
connections between the internal sustainability-related approaches of a buying 
organization and its external sustainability-related management strategies toward the 
suppliers would be a worthy pursuit. 
As a final remark, it is noteworthy to mention that the sustainability discussions 
are based on the basic assumption that a true sustainable organization can continue to do 
business forever by performing well not only on the traditional short-term measures of 
profit and loss, but also on the broader triple-bottom-line concept, including the long-
term ecological and social outcomes. Indeed, such an organization does not exist today 
(Pagell and Gobeli, 2009). However, to be more sustainable than the competitors and 
remain in business longer than them, an organization should avoid a pure profit-
maximization approach. Instead, it is best to take a non-trade-off perspective and try to 
balance and align its non-economic sustainability objectives with its financial goals. By 
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doing so, the sustainability issues are integrated into all aspects of organization’s 
business processes, driving its growth and financial gains. 
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Appendix A. Letter of Information and Questionnaire (Essay 3) 
Sustainability Challenges across Supply Chains 
Dear Madam/Sir,  
You are invited to participate in a research project by a team of Operations Management researchers at 
Ivey Business School, Western University. This study addresses the sustainability issues within the supply 
chains, from a risk management perspective. If you are a panel member of Qualtrics who is currently 
working in the United States as a purchasing/supply manager (or director) for a medium or large size 
company in the manufacturing or retail trade industries, you are qualified to participate.   
The purpose of this letter is to provide the information required for you to make an informed decision 
regarding participation in this research. Through the collection of perspectives from informed respondents, 
this study aims to explore how the organizations (specifically, focal firms within supply chains) can 
strategically manage the reputational risks associated with the sustainability-related malpractices at their 
suppliers’ facilities. The online survey will ask you to read two scenarios and then, describe your possible 
actions in those circumstances by answering a set of questions. There is no time limit for completing the 
survey, although the estimated time for its completion is about 25 minutes. Your participation will be 
compensated in accordance with your agreement with Qualtrics.   
There are no known or anticipated risks or discomforts from participating in this study. Your identity will 
remain anonymous and will not be provided to the researchers along with your responses. Any information 
that could identify you will be removed from your questionnaire, and you will not be asked to include your 
name or other identifying information on your survey. Participation in this study is voluntary. You may 
refuse to participate or withdraw from the study at any time. The collected information will remain strictly 
confidential and will be used only to advance knowledge and for the dissemination of the overall results at 
academic or professional forums. In accordance with the American Psychological Association guidelines, 
the data will be kept on file for five years and then destroyed.    
Please note that completion of the online survey is indication of your consent to participate in this research 
study. Should you have any questions or concerns regarding this study, please contact the researchers, 
Stephan Vachon or Sara Hajmohammad. If you have any questions about the conduct of this study or your 
rights as a research participant, you may contact the Office of Research Ethics at Western University.   
Thank you for completing the survey. Your participation in this research project is greatly appreciated!    
Sincerely,  
Stephan Vachon and Sara Hajmohammad 
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Q1.1 In what state do you currently reside? 
 I do not reside in the United States 
 ____________________ 
Q1.2 In which industry are you currently employed? 
 Manufacturing (NAICS 31-33) 
 Retail Trade- Electronics and Appliance (NAICS 443) 
 Retail Trade- Food and Beverage (NAICS 445) 
 Retail Trade- Health and Personal Care (NAICS 446) 
 Retail Trade- Clothing and Clothing Accessories (NAICS 448) 
 Retail Trade- Sporting Goods, Hobby, Book and Music (NAICS 451) 
 Other (7) ____________________ 
Q1.3 Approximately, how many employees work for your company? 
 < 100 
 100 - 1,000 
 1,001 - 5,000 
 5,001 - 10,000 
 10,001 and more 
Q1.4 Do you consider yourself to be part of purchasing/supply chain team in your organization? 
 Yes 
 No 
Q1.5 Are you knowledgeable about purchasing/supply chain issues within your organization? 
 Yes  
 No 
Q1.6 Please rate your level of agreement with the following statements. 
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A significant percentage of my time & effort is devoted to 
negotiating prices with suppliers. 
              
A significant percentage of my time & effort is devoted to 
handling delivery of raw material and/or supplied items. 
              
A significant percentage of my time & effort is devoted to 
taking care of supplier problems. 
              
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Scenario 1      
Rather than focusing on your current employer, please imagine yourself in the position of Director of 
Procurement and Supply Chain Management at Kojak Inc., described below.     
Kojak Inc. is a mid-sized apparel retailer based in the United States, offering stylish and affordable clothing 
and accessories for men and women. The Kojak brand is available online and in more than 400 stores 
across North America. With only 20% of its clothing made locally, the company has a large international 
supply base located in Asia (about 50%) and South America (about 30%). In 2013, Kojak spent about $500 
million on purchasing finished goods from suppliers. Sales in North America have been growing slowly 
with modest profitability in recent years.       
In the past few years, a number of companies operating in the apparel industry have experienced negative 
publicity and reputational damage due to the unsafe and unhealthy work conditions at their suppliers’ 
facilities. To avoid similar problems, Kojak’s CEO has recently extended Kojak’s health and safety policy 
to include the suppliers’ premises.      
Currently, Kojak has no formal processes to monitor, manage, or improve health- and safety-related 
measures in place at its suppliers’ facilities. The CEO has allocated a special annual budget of $5 million to 
your department for making the necessary changes to the supplier management activities.      
To comply with Kojak’s new policy, you plan to look into all supplier profiles from a workplace health and 
safety perspective and decide what action, if any, to take with each of them. One supplier has been brought 
to your attention by a junior staff person.      
B.A.P. Ltd. is located in a developing country in Southeast Asia. During the past five years, this 
company has been targeted by a reputable international human rights activist group and 
highlighted on their website because of the unsafe and unhealthy work conditions at their 
facilities. Because of their large size (1100 employees), it is very likely that they will draw more 
attention from the activist groups, non-government organizations (NGOs), or media in the future. 
Approximately 90% of B.A.P. total sales are to Kojak, which accounts for nearly 5% of Kojak’s 
purchased goods.      
Before answering the questions, please consider how you might react in your position of Director of 
Procurement and Supply Management at Kojak Inc. 
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Q2.1 Given the information provided in the scenario, to what extent are you likely to take the following 
actions with regard to B.A.P. Ltd.? 
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) 
Take no new actions regarding health & safety issues at 
their facilities. 
              
Continue the business with them for a long time.               
Look for another supplier to replace them.               
Renew the relationship once the current contract expires.               
Terminate the relationship.                
Include health & safety measures such as incident/accident 
rates in evaluating their performance.  
              
Send out a questionnaire asking them to report on their 
health & safety measures such as incident/accident rates or 
the use of overtime. 
              
Regularly send your staff to perform workplace health & 
safety audits at their facilities. 
              
Provide them with feedback about the results of audits and 
performance evaluations.  
              
Require them an international health & safety standard 
certification (e.g., OHSAS 18001).  
              
Work closely with them to improve their health & safety 
performance (e.g., joint investment).  
              
Provide training/education to their personnel to improve 
their health & safety performance. 
              
Put incentives in place to improve their health & safety 
performance (e.g., financial rewards).  
              
Invest resources in developing their capabilities and 
improving their health & safety performance (e.g., financial 
aids) 
              
Q2.2 Given the information provided in the scenario, which one of the following four strategies would you 
choose as your MAJOR and ULTIMATE approach in managing your supplier, B.A.P. Ltd.? 
 You will terminate the relationship with them and switch to another supplier.  
 You will start collaborating with them to improve their health & safety performance, e.g. 
through training and education of their personnel, providing financial aids, etc.  
 You will start monitoring their health & safety performance, e.g. through self-evaluations, 
audits, third party certifications, etc.  
 You will continue working with them without taking any new actions regarding health & safety 
issues at their facilities.  
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Q2.3 Given the information provided in the scenario, to what extent do you agree or disagree with the 
following statements? 
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B.A.P.’s behavior will have negative impacts on Kojak’s 
reputation. 
              
The relationship with B.A.P. will be problematic for Kojak 
in the future. 
              
The relationship with B.A.P. is risky for Kojak.               
B.A.P. cannot afford to lose Kojak’s business.               
The relationship with Kojak is crucial to B.A.P.’s future 
performance. 
              
B.A.P. is dependent on Kojak.               
You have sufficient discretionary financial resources to 
implement your desired supply management strategy. 
              
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Scenario 2     
As before, rather than focusing on your current employer, please imagine that you are the Director of 
Procurement and Supply Chain Management at another firm, ChocoYum Inc., described below.      
ChocoYum Inc., headquartered in Chicago, is a mid-sized confectionery producer with over 700 
employees. Established in 1995, the company now manufactures chocolates, snacks, and refreshment 
products at five plants spread across United States. These products are distributed and sold in North 
America. Palm oil is one of the major ingredients of ChocoYum chocolate products. Oil palms grow in 
equatorial conditions in Asia, Latin America, and Africa. ChocoYum’s oil suppliers are mainly based in 
Asia. In 2013, ChocoYum spent about $200 million for the imported palm oil.      
During the past few years, a number of companies operating in this industry have experienced negative 
publicity and reputational damage because one or more of their suppliers have sourced palm oil from 
regions of the world experiencing rain-forest deforestation. Such deforestation has been linked to climate 
change and destruction of rain-forest ecosystems. To avoid similar problems, ChocoYum’s CEO has 
recently extended ChocoYum’s environmental policy to include the suppliers’ processes and activities.      
Currently, ChocoYum has no formal processes to monitor, manage, or improve the environmental 
measures in place at its suppliers’ facilities. The CEO has asked you to make the necessary changes to the 
supplier management activities within your department’s current budget limits and stated that no budget 
adjustments will be approved.       
To comply with ChocoYum’s new policy, you plan to look into how suppliers source palm oil from an 
environmental sustainability perspective and decide what action, if any, to take with each of them. One 
supplier has been brought to your attention by a junior staff person.      
P.O.P. Ltd., one of the palm oil suppliers, is an Indonesian firm. Last year, this company was 
found guilty and ordered to pay a fine by an Indonesian court for violating the environmental laws 
and clearing an area of protected peat forest. Because of their small size (120 employees), it is 
not likely that they will draw any attention from the activist groups, non-government 
organizations (NGOs), or media in the future. Approximately 10% of P.O.P. total sales are to 
ChocoYum, which accounts for nearly 5% of ChocoYum’s palm oil supply.    
Before answering the questions, please consider how you might react in your position of Director of 
Procurement and Supply Management at ChocoYum Inc.   
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Q3.1 Given the information provided in the scenario, to what extent are you likely to take the following 
actions with regard to P.O.P. Ltd.?  
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Take no new actions regarding environmental issues at their 
facilities. 
              
Continue the business with them for a long time.               
Look for another supplier to replace them.               
Renew the relationship once the current contract expires.               
Terminate the relationship.               
Include environmental measures in evaluating their 
performance. 
              
Send out a questionnaire asking them to report on the 
environmental aspects of their operations such as sources of 
their palm oil. 
              
Regularly send your staff to perform environmental audits 
at their facilities.  
              
Provide them with feedback about the results of audits and 
performance evaluations.  
              
Require them an international environmental standard 
certification (e.g., ISO 14001).  
              
Work closely with them to improve their environmental 
performance (e.g., joint investment).  
              
Provide them with training / education to improve their 
environmental performance.  
              
Put incentives in place to improve their environmental 
performance (e.g., financial rewards).  
              
Invest resources in developing their capabilities and 
improving their environmental performance (e.g., financial 
aids)  
              
Q3.2 Given the information provided in the scenario, which one of the following four strategies would you 
choose as your MAJOR and ULTIMATE approach in managing your supplier, P.O.P. Ltd.? 
 You will terminate the relationship with them and switch to another supplier.  
 You will start collaborating with them to improve their environmental performance, e.g. through 
providing training and education, financial aids, etc. 
 You will start monitoring their environmental performance, e.g. through self-evaluations, audits, 
third party certifications, etc. 
 You will continue working with them without taking any new actions regarding environmental 
issues at their facilities. 
A P P E N D I C E S  P a g e  |  1 5 4  
 
  
Q3.3 Given the information provided in the scenario, to what extent do you agree or disagree with the 
following statements? 
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P.O.P.’s behavior will have negative impacts on 
ChocoYum’s reputation. 
              
The relationship with P.O.P. will be problematic for 
ChocoYum in the future. 
              
The relationship with P.O.P. is risky for ChocoYum.               
P.O.P. cannot afford to lose ChocoYum’s business.               
The relationship with ChocoYum is crucial to P.O.P.’s 
future performance. 
              
P.O.P. is dependent on ChocoYum.                
You have sufficient discretionary financial resources to 
implement your desired supply management strategy. 
              
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Demographic Questions 
Please answer the following questions as they describe you:  
Q4.1 Your gender: 
 Male  
 Female 
Q4.2 Your age: 
 21 - 30  
 31 - 40  
 41 - 50 
 51 - 60 
 61 and over 
Q4.3 Your highest level of education completed: 
 High School 
 College 
 Undergraduate Degree 
 Master Degree 
 Doctoral Degree 
Q4.4 Your work experience (total years): 
 0 - 5 
 6 - 10 
 11 - 15 
 16 - 20 
 21 - 25 
 26 or more 
Q4.5 Your current position (Job title): 
 Manager- Purchasing/Supply Chain/Procurement 
 Director- Purchasing/Supply Chain/Procurement 
 VP- Purchasing/Supply Chain/Procurement 
 Other ____________________ 
Q4.6 Your work experience in purchasing (years): 
 0 - 5  
 6 - 10 
 11 - 15 
 16 - 20  
 21 – 25 
 26 or more  
Q4.7 Do you have any purchasing professional certification such as CPM, APP, or SCMP? 
 Yes  
 No  
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Q4.8 On a scale of 1 to 7, how do you evaluate your knowledge on the following issues? 
 
N
o
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A
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(1
) 
 
(2
) 
(3
) 
(4
) 
(5
) 
(6
) 
W
el
l-
V
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d
  
(7
) 
 
Environmental Management               
Safety Management                
Corporate Social Responsibility                
Waste Management                
Product Life Cycle Assessment               
Q4.9 Assume that in the context of your responsibilities within your current organization, you face a 
decision that may affect your organization&#39;s reputation. Given this circumstance, please rate your 
level of agreement with the following statements. 
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(7
) 
I choose more risky alternatives based on the assessment of 
others on whom I must rely. 
              
I choose more risky alternatives which rely upon complex 
technical analyses. 
              
I choose more risky alternatives which can have a major 
impact on the strategic direction of my organization. 
              
I initiate a strategic action which has the potential to 
backfire.  
              
I support a decision when I am aware that relevant analyses 
were done while missing several pieces of information.  
              
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